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Tax	Treaty	Abuse	and	the	Principal	Purpose	Test	
Part	II	
David	G.	Duff*	
Abstract	The	 Multilateral	 Convention	 to	 Implement	 Tax	 Treaty	 Measures	 to	 Prevent	 Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	or	Multilateral	 Instrument	 (MLI)	has	been	described	as	“an	historical	turning	point	in	the	area	of	international	taxation”	which	introduces	a	third	 layer	 of	 tax	 rules	 for	 the	 taxation	of	 cross-border	 transactions	 in	 addition	 to	domestic	 tax	 law	and	bilateral	 tax	 treaties.	Of	 the	many	provisions	of	 the	MLI,	 the	most	 important	 are	 the	 preamble	 text	 in	 Article	 6(1)	 and	 the	 so-called	 principal	purpose	 test	 (PPT)	 in	 Article	 7(1),	 both	 of	 which	 have	 been	 adopted	 by	 all	signatories	to	the	MLI	in	order	to	satisfy	the	OECD’s	minimum	standard	on	tax	treaty	abuse	 under	 BEPS	 Action	 6.	 This	 two-part	 article	 considers	 the	 structure	 and	potential	application	of	 the	PPT	 in	 the	context	of	pre-BEPS	responses	 to	perceived	tax	 treaty	 abuses,	 the	OECD’s	work	 on	BEPS	Action	6,	 and	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	MLI	including	the	preamble	text	in	Article	6(1).	The	first	part,	in	the	previous	issue	of	the	Journal,	reviewed	pre-BEPS	responses	to	perceived	tax	treaty	abuses,	providing	necessary	background	and	context	for	understanding	BEPS	Action	6,	the	MLI	and	the	PPT.	The	second	part,	 in	 this	 issue	of	 the	 Journal,	examines	the	PPT	 in	 light	of	 this	background	 and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 BEPS	 Action	 6	 and	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	MLI,	considering	 its	 relationship	 to	other	anti-avoidance	doctrines,	principles	and	rules,	the	various	elements	 that	comprise	 its	basic	structure,	 the	kinds	of	 transactions	or	arrangements	 to	 which	 it	 may	 be	 expected	 to	 apply,	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 its	application.	
Introduction	The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article	 examined	 pre-BEPS	 responses	 to	 perceived	 tax	treaty	abuses,	reviewing	domestic	and	treaty-based	responses	to	tax	treaty	shopping	
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and	other	perceived	treaty	abuses	in	order	to	provide	background	for	understanding	BEPS	 Action	 6,	 MLI	 provisions	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 tax	 treaty	 abuses,	 and	 the	principal	purpose	test	(PPT)	in	particular.1	The	second	part	of	this	article	examines	the	PPT	 in	 light	of	 this	background	and	 in	 the	 context	of	BEPS	Action	6	and	other	provisions	of	the	MLI,	considering	its	relationship	to	other	anti-avoidance	doctrines,	principles	and	rules,	the	various	elements	that	comprise	its	basic	structure,	the	kinds	of	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 to	 which	 it	 may	 be	 expected	 to	 apply,	 and	 the	consequences	of	its	application.	
Part	II.	BEPS	Action	6,	the	MLI	and	the	Principal	Purpose	Test		 As	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article	 explained,	 the	 OECD	 and	 its	 member	 states	relied	on	various	approaches	to	discourage	tax	treaty	shopping	and	other	perceived	tax	 treaty	 abuses	 prior	 to	 BEPS	 Action	 6	 and	 the	 MLI,	 including	 domestic	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 and	 statutory	 general	 anti-avoidance	 rules,	 the	 concept	 of	 an	implicit	 anti-abuse	 principle,	 the	 beneficial	 ownership	 requirement,	 and	 specific	anti-avoidance	 rules	 in	 domestic	 law	 and	 tax	 treaties.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 these	approaches	 have	 been	 inconsistently	 adopted	 and	 applied.	 As	 well,	 the	 2014	revisions	 to	 the	 OECD	 Commentaries	 confirm	 that	 the	 beneficial	 owner	 concept	should	 be	 narrowly	 interpreted	 and	 does	 not	 address	 all	 forms	 of	 tax	 treaty	shopping.2	
																																																								1	David	G.	Duff,	“Tax	Treaty	Shopping	and	the	Principal	Purpose	Test	–	Part	1”	(2018),	66:3	Can.	Tax	J.	1-57.		2	Paragraph	12.6	of	the	commentary	on	article	10	of	the	OECD	model	convention;	paragraph	10.4	of	the	commentary	on	article	11	of	the	OECD	model	convention;	and	paragraph	4.5	of	the	commentary	on	article	12	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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	 For	these	reasons,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	the	OECD’s	Action	Plan	on	Base	 Erosion	 and	 Profit	 Shifting	 identified	 treaty	 abuse	 as	 “one	 of	 the	 most	important	 sources	 of	 BEPS	 concerns”	 and	 that	 BEPS	 Action	 6	 was	 specifically	mandated	to	“develop	model	treaty	provisions	and	recommendations	regarding	the	design	of	domestic	rules	to	prevent	the	granting	of	treaty	benefits	 in	inappropriate	circumstances”	 and	 to	 “clarify	 that	 tax	 treaties	 are	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 used	 to	generate	 double	 non-taxation.”3	Before	 examining	 the	 PPT	 in	 detail,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	review	the	main	recommendations	of	BEPS	Action	6	and	the	incorporation	of	these	recommendations	into	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	and	provisions	of	the	MLI.	
A.		 BEPS	Action	6	and	the	MLI		 Although	 the	 Final	 Report	 of	 BEPS	 Action	 6	 devotes	 some	 attention	 to	domestic	 anti-abuse	 rules	 and	 their	 relationship	 with	 tax	 treaties,4	most	 of	 the	Report	addresses	treaty	provisions	to	prevent	tax	treaty	shopping	and	other	treaty	abuses,5	and	 revisions	 to	 the	 title	 and	 preamble	 of	 tax	 treaties	 to	 clarify	 that	 tax	treaties	are	not	intended	to	be	used	to	generate	double	non-taxation.6	Incorporated	into	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	 convention	 and	 various	 provisions	 of	 the	 MLI,	 these	provisions	and	revisions	are	intended	to	both	strengthen	treaty-based	responses	to	
																																																								3	Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development,	Action	 Plan	 on	Base	 Erosion	 and	Profit	
Shifting,	 (Paris:	 OECD,	 2013)	 at	 18	 and	 19	 (https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf).	 BEPS	Action	6	was	also	mandated	 to	 “identify	 tax	policy	considerations	 that,	 in	general,	 countries	 should	consider	before	deciding	to	enter	into	a	tax	treaty	with	another	country.”		4	OECD,	 Preventing	 the	 Granting	 of	 Treaty	 Benefits	 in	 Inappropriate	 Circumstances,	 BEPS	 Action	 6:	2015	Final	Report,	(Paris:	OECD,	2015)	[hereafter	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6]	at	paras.	53-67,		(www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm).	5	Ibid.	paras.17-52.	6	Ibid.	paras.	68-74.	
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perceived	tax	treaty	abuses	and	to	promote	increased	consistency	in	these	responses	through	minimum	standards	which	signatories	to	the	MLI	must	adopt.	
1.	 Tax	Treaty	Shopping	Beginning	 with	 tax	 treaty	 shopping,	 the	 Final	 Report	 of	 BEPS	 Action	 6	recommends	a	“three-pronged	approach”	comprising	the	following	elements:	
• a	“clear	statement”	in	tax	treaties	that	“the	Contracting	States,	when	entering	into	a	treaty,	wish	to	prevent	tax	avoidance	and,	in	particular,	intend	to	avoid	creating	opportunities	for	treaty	shopping”;	
• inclusion	 in	 the	OECD	model	 convention	 of	 a	 specific	 limitation-on-benefits	(LOB)	provision	based	on	the	LOB	provisions	in	tax	treaties	with	the	United	States;	and	
• inclusion	in	the	OECD	Model	of	“a	more	general	anti-abuse	rule	based	on	the	principal	purposes	of	transactions	or	arrangements”.7	The	 first	 of	 these	 “prongs”	 underlies	 revisions	 to	 both	 the	 title	 and	 the	preamble	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	Unlike	the	title	of	the	1963	and	1977	OECD	model	conventions,	which	referred	only	to	a	convention	“for	the	avoidance	of	double	taxation	with	respect	to	taxes	on	income	and	on	capital”,	the	title	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	refers	to	a	convention	“for	the	elimination	of	double	taxation	with	respect	 to	 taxes	 on	 income	 and	 on	 capital	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 tax	 evasion	 and	avoidance.”	As	well,	unlike	many	tax	treaties	which	refer	only	to	a	desire	to	conclude	a	 convention	 “for	 the	 avoidance	 of	 double	 taxation	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 fiscal	
																																																								7	Ibid.	para.	19.	
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evasion	with	respect	 to	 taxes	on	 income	and	on	capital,”	 the	preamble	to	 the	2017	OECD	model	conventions	states	that	the	contracting	states:	Desir[e]	 …	 to	 further	 develop	 their	 economic	 relationship	 and	 to	 enhance	 their	 co-operation	in	tax	matters,	[and]		Intend	…	to	conclude	a	Convention	for	the	elimination	of	double	taxation	with	respect	to	taxes	on	income	and	on	capital	without	creating	opportunities	for	non-taxation	or	reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 evasion	 or	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	arrangements	aimed	at	obtaining	reliefs	provided	in	this	Convention	for	the	indirect	benefit	of	residents	of	third	states).		 According	 to	 the	 Final	 Report	 of	 BEPS	Action	 6,	 these	 revisions	 build	 upon	earlier	 statements	 in	 the	 1977	 and	 2003	 commentaries	 to	 the	 OECD	 model	convention,8	“provide	 the	clarification	 required	by	Action	6,”9	and	 “will	be	 relevant	to	 the	 interpretation	and	application	of	provisions”	of	 tax	 treaties	 that	 include	 this	language.10		According	to	the	commentary	on	these	revisions:	The	 changes	made	 expressly	 recognise	 that	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 Convention	 are	 not	limited	 to	 the	 elimination	 of	 double	 taxation	 and	 that	 the	 Contracting	 States	 do	 not	intend	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Convention	 to	 create	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	reduced	taxation	through	tax	evasion	and	avoidance.	Given	the	particular	base	erosion	and	 profit	 shifting	 concerns	 arising	 from	 treaty-shopping	 arrangements,	 it	was	 also	decided	to	refer	explicitly	to	such	arrangements	as	one	example	of	tax	avoidance	that	should	not	result	from	tax	treaties,	it	being	understood	that	this	was	only	one	example	of	tax	avoidance	that	the	Contracting	States	intend	to	prevent.11			 The	 second	 element	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 “three-pronged	 approach”	 to	 tax-treaty	shopping	is	reflected	in	the	framework	for	detailed	LOB	provisions	in	articles	29(1)-																																																								8	Ibid.	paras.	70-71.	According	to	paragraph	7	of	the	1977	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	tax	treaties	“should	not	…	help	tax	avoidance	or	evasion.”	According	to	paragraph	7	of	the	2003	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	 it	 is	“a	purpose	of	tax	conventions	to	prevent	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 evasion.”	 As	 explained	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article,	 although	 it	 is	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 tax	 treaties	 are	 not	 intended	 to	 facilitate	 tax	 avoidance,	 it	 is	 less	 clear	whether	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 prevent	 tax	 avoidance,	 though	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 provisions	 for	 the	exchange	of	information	and	assistance	in	the	collection	of	taxes	help	to	prevent	tax	avoidance	as	well	as	 tax	 evasion.	 Although	 the	 amended	 title	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention	 declares	 that	 the	convention	 is	 “for	 the”	 prevention	 of	 tax	 evasion	 and	 tax	 avoidance	 as	 well	 as	 the	 elimination	 of	double	taxation,	the	amended	preamble	language	refers	to	an	intention	to	eliminate	double	taxation	“without	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	 reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 evasion	 or	avoidance”.	9	Ibid.	para.	72.	10	Ibid.	para.	73.	11	Paragraph	16.1	of	the	commentary	on	the	introduction	to	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	
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(7)	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	Similar	in	structure	to	the	LOB	provisions	in	the	2016	U.S.	model	convention,12	these	provisions	 limit	otherwise	available	 treaty	benefits	 to	 qualified	 persons,13	“headquarters”	 companies,14	income	 that	 emanates	from	 or	 is	 incidental	 to	 the	 active	 conduct	 of	 a	 trade	 or	 business	 carried	 on	 by	 a	resident	 of	 a	 contracting	 state	 who	 is	 not	 a	 qualified	 person,15	income	 paid	 to	 an	entity	that	is	not	a	qualified	person	if	a	stipulated	percentage	of	the	entity	is	owned	directly	or	indirectly	by	equivalent	beneficiaries,16	and	treaty	benefits	granted	by	the	competent	authority	of	the	source	state.17	Like	the	LOB	provisions	in	the	U.S.	model	convention,	 these	 provisions	 are	 designed	 to	 limit	 treaty	 benefits	 to	 residents	 of	contracting	 states	 with	 substantive	 economic	 connections	 to	 that	 state	 and	circumstances	where	entitlement	to	treaty	benefits	does	not	result	from	abusive	tax	treaty	 shopping.18	As	a	 result,	 as	 the	Final	Report	of	BEPS	Action	6	explains,	 these	specific	anti-avoidance	rules	target	“treaty	shopping	situations	that	can	be	identified	on	the	basis	of	criteria	based	on	the	legal	nature,	ownership	in,	and	general	activities	of,	certain	entities.”19	While	 the	 “objective	 criteria”	 of	 these	 LOB	 provisions	 provide	 “more	certainty”	 than	 a	 general	 anti-abuse	 provision	 like	 the	 PPT,	 the	 Report	 continues,	they	 do	 not	 address	 “other	 forms	 of	 treaty	 abuses”	 nor	 all	 forms	 of	 tax-treaty	
																																																								12	United	States,	Department	of	the	Treasury,	United	States	Model	Income	Tax	Convention	,	February	17,	 2016	 (www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf).	For	a	brief	summary	of	these	provisions,	see	the	first	part	of	this	article.	13	Articles	29(1)	and	(2)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	14	Article	29(5)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	15	Article	29(3)	of	the	OECD	model	convention	16	Article	29(4)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	17	Article	29(6)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	18	See	the	discussion	of	these	provisions	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	19	OECD,	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4	at	para.	20.	
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shopping	such	as	conduit	arrangements	“through	which	a	resident	of	a	Contracting	State	that	would	otherwise	qualify	for	treaty	benefits	is	used	as	an	intermediary	by	persons	 who	 are	 not	 entitled	 to	 these	 benefits.”20	For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 third	“prong”	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 recommended	 approach	 to	 tax	 treaty	 shopping	 includes	 a	more	 general	 anti-abuse	 provision	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 PPT	 that	 “incorporates	 the	principles”	contained	in	the	commentary	to	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	according	to	which:	…	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 tax	 treaty	 should	 not	 be	 available	 where	 one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes	of	arrangements	or	transactions	is	to	secure	a	benefit	under	a	tax	treaty	and	obtaining	 that	 benefit	 in	 these	 circumstances	 would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 object	 and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	tax	treaty.21		This	 general	 anti-abuse	 provision	 is	 contained	 in	 article	 29(9)	 of	 the	 2017	 OECD	model	convention.		 Although	 recommending	 this	 “three-pronged	 approach”	 to	 tax	 treaty	shopping,	 the	 Final	 Report	 of	 BEPS	Action	 6	 acknowledges	 that	 states	might	 have	legitimate	 reasons	 to	 depart	 from	 this	 combined	 approach	 –	 for	 example,	 where	domestic	 anti-abuse	 rules	 or	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 make	 a	 general	 anti-abuse	rule	 unnecessary,	 or	 administrative	 capabilities	make	 it	 difficult	 to	 apply	 detailed	LOB	 provisions. 22 	For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 Report	 accepts	 “a	 certain	 degree	 of	flexibility”	 in	 the	 approaches	 that	 different	 states	 may	 adopt,	 provided	 that	 they	
																																																								20	Ibid.	21	Ibid.	at	para.	19,	referring	to	the	“guiding	principle”	in	paragraph	9.5	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	 the	 2003	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	model	 convention.	 This	 “guiding	 principle”	 now	 appears	 in	paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	22	Ibid.	paras.	6	and	21.	
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“effectively	 address	 …	 treaty	 abuses	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 this	 report.”23	In	 the	 end,	therefore,	the	Report	concludes:	At	 a	 minimum,	 countries	 should	 agree	 to	 include	 in	 their	 tax	 treaties	 an	 express	statement	 that	 their	 common	 intention	 is	 to	 eliminate	 double	 taxation	 without	creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	 reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 evasion	 or	avoidance,	 including	 through	 treaty	 shopping	arrangements	…	 [and]	 implement	 that	common	intention	through	either	the	combined	approach		…,	,	the	inclusion	of	the	PPT	rule,	or	the	inclusion	of	the	LOB	rule	supplemented	by	a	mechanism	(such	as	a	treaty	rule	 that	 might	 take	 the	 form	 of	 a	 PPT	 rule	 restricted	 to	 conduit	 arrangements	 or	domestic	 anti-abuse	 rules	 or	 judicial	 doctrines	 that	 would	 achieve	 a	 similar	 result)	that	would	deal	with	conduit	arrangements	not	already	dealt	with	in	tax	treaties.24		The	 various	 elements	 of	 the	 combined	 approach	 as	 well	 as	 these	 “minimum	standards”	on	treaty	abuse	are	reflected	in	provisions	of	the	MLI.		 The	MLI	itself	is	a	product	of	BEPS	Action	15,	which	was	mandated	to	devise	a	legal	 instrument	 to	 modify	 existing	 bilateral	 tax	 treaties	 “in	 order	 to	 swiftly	implement	the	tax	treaty	measures	developed	in	the	course	of	the	OECD-G20	BEPS	Project.”25	Consistent	with	the	recommended	approach	to	tax	treaty	shopping	in	the	Final	Report	in	BEPS	Action	6,	the	MLI	includes	preamble	language	corresponding	to	the	 amended	 preamble	 text	 of	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	 convention,26 	simplified	limitation-on-benefits	 (SLOB)	 provisions	 similar	 to	 articles	 29(1)-(7)	 of	 the	 2017	OECD	model	convention,27	and	a	general	anti-abuse	provision	like	the	PPT	in	article	29(9)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.28	Consistent	with	the	“minimum	standards”	in	this	Report,	signatories	to	the	MLI	are	required	to	adopt	the	amended	preamble	text																																																									23	Ibid.	paras.	6	and	22.	24	Ibid.	para.	22.	25	OECD,	Developing	a	Multilateral	Instrument	to	Modify	Bilateral	Tax	Treaties,	BEPS	Action	15:	2015	Final	 Report,	 (Paris:	 OECD,	 2015)	 at	 11,	 available	 at	 http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-a-multilateral-instrument-to-modify-bilateral-tax-treaties-9789264219250-en.htm.			26	Articles	6(1)	and	(3)	of	the	MLI.	The	MLI	does	not	include	a	provision	that	would	modify	the	title	of	CTAs	to	correspond	to	the	amended	title	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	27	Articles	 7(8)-(13)	 of	 the	 MLI.	 Unlike	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 however,	 the	 SLOB	 does	 not	include	a	provision	extending	treaty	benefits	to	headquarters	companies.	28	Article	7(1)	of	the	MLI.	
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expressing	 an	 intention	 “to	 eliminate	 double	 taxation	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 taxes	covered	 by	 this	 agreement	 without	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 evasion	 or	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	 arrangements	 aimed	 at	 obtaining	 reliefs	 provided	 in	 this	 Convention	 for	the	indirect	benefit	of	residents	of	third	jurisdictions)”	where	such	language	does	not	already	 exist	 in	 a	 CTA.29	They	 are	 also	 required	 to	 implement	 this	 intention	 by	adopting	the	PPT	alone	where	a	CTA	does	not	already	contain	a	similar	general	anti-abuse	 provision,30	by	 adopting	 the	 PPT	 and	 the	 SLOB,	31	or	 by	 indicating	 that	 they	intend	 to	 adopt	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 detailed	 LOB	 provision	 and	 either	 rules	 to	address	conduit	financing	structures	or	a	PPT.32																																																									29	See	article	6(2)	of	the	MLI,	providing	that	the	preamble	text	 in	article	6(1)	“shall	be	included	in	a	Covered	 Tax	 Agreement	 in	 place	 of	 or	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 preamble	 language	 of	 a	 Covered	 Tax	Agreement	 referring	 to	 an	 intent	 to	 eliminate	 double	 taxation,	 whether	 or	 not	 that	 language	 also	refers	to	the	intent	not	to	create	opportunities	for	non-taxation	or	reduced	taxation,”	and	article	6(4)	of	the	MLI	which	allows	parties	to	the	MLI	to	reserve	the	right	 for	article	6(1)	not	to	apply	to	CTAs	“that	 already	 contain	 preamble	 language	 describing	 the	 intent	 of	 the	 Contracting	 Jurisdictions	 to	eliminate	 double	 taxation	 without	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	 reduced	 taxation,	whether	 that	 language	 is	 limited	 to	 cases	 of	 tax	 evasion	 or	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	 arrangements	 aimed	 at	 obtaining	 reliefs	 provided	 in	 the	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement	 for	 the	indirect	benefit	of	residents	of	third	jurisdictions)	or	applies	more	broadly.”	In	contrast,	article	6(3)	provides	parties	to	the	MLI	the	right	to	choose	to	include	preamble	text	expressing	the	desire	of	the	contracting	 jurisdictions	 “to	 further	 develop	 their	 economic	 relationship	 and	 to	 enhance	 their	 co-operation	in	tax	matters.”	30	See	article	7(15)(b)	of	the	MLI,	which	permits	signatories	to	reserve	the	right	for	article	7(1)	not	to	apply	to	CTAs	that	“already	contain	provisions	that	deny	all	of	the	benefits	that	would	otherwise	be	provided	 under	 the	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement	 where	 the	 principal	 purpose	 or	 one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes	 of	 any	 arrangement	 or	 transaction,	 or	 of	 any	 person	 concerned	with	 an	 arrangement	 or	transaction,	was	to	obtain	those	benefits.”	31	See	article	7(6)	of	the	MLI,	which	allows	parties	to	the	MLI	to	choose	to	apply	the	SLOB.	Although	this	provision	states	that	the	SLOB	will	apply	to	a	CTA	only	where	all	parties	to	the	CTA	have	chosen	to	 apply	 the	 provisions,	 article	 7(7)(a)	 provides	 that	 the	 SLOB	 may	 apply	 asymmetrically	 where	contracting	 jurisdictions	 that	 do	 not	 choose	 to	 apply	 these	 provisions	 agree	 to	 such	 application	 by	contracting	 jurisdictions	 that	 choose	 to	 apply	 the	 SLOB.	Where	 parties	 choose	 to	 apply	 the	 SLOB,	article	7(14)	provides	that	it	“shall	apply	in	place	of	or	in	the	absence	of”	provisions	of	a	CTA	that	limit	treaty	benefits	“only	to	a	resident	that	qualifies	for	such	benefits	by	meeting	one	or	more	categorical	tests.”	According	 to	article	7(15)(c),	however,	parties	which	choose	 to	apply	 the	SLOB	may	 reserve	the	 right	 for	 the	 provisions	 not	 to	 apply	 to	 CTAs	 that	 already	 contain	 provisions	 limiting	 treaty	benefits	only	to	residents	that	qualify	by	meeting	one	or	more	categorical	tests.	32	See	article	7(15)(a)	of	the	MLI,	which	permits	parties	to	the	MLI	to	reserve	the	right	for	article	7(1)	not	to	apply	to	its	CTAs	“on	the	basis	that	it	intends	to	adopt	a	combination	of	a	detailed	limitation	on	
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Of	eighty-four	jurisdictions	that	had	signed	the	MLI	as	of	18	September	2018,	all	 adopted	 the	preamble	 text	 in	 article	 6(1)	 and	 the	PPT	 in	 article	 7(1),	 fifty-four	(not	 including	 Canada)	 adopted	 the	 additional	 preamble	 text	 in	 article	 6(3),	 and	thirteen	 have	 chosen	 to	 apply	 the	 SLOB	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 PPT.	33	Although	 no	signatory	reserved	the	right	for	the	PPT	not	to	apply	on	the	basis	that	it	 intends	to	adopt	 detailed	 LOB	 provisions	 and	 either	 rules	 to	 address	 conduit	 financing	structures	 or	 a	 PPT	 through	 bilateral	 negotiations,	 eight	 jurisdictions	 including	Canada	 have	 stated	 that	 they	 accept	 the	 PPT	 alone	 “as	 an	 interim	 measure”	 but	“intend	…	where	possible	to	adopt	a	limitation	on	benefits	provision,	 in	addition	to	or	in	replacement	of	[the	PPT],	through	bilateral	negotiations.”34	
2.	 Other	Treaty	Abuses		 In	 addition	 to	 its	 recommendations	 and	minimum	standards	 to	 address	 tax	treaty	shopping,	 the	Final	Report	of	BEPS	Action	6	also	contains	recommendations	and	proposed	treaty	provisions	to	address	other	situations	where	persons	enter	into	transactions	or	arrangements	to	satisfy	conditions	of	particular	treaty	provisions	“in	circumstances	 where	 it	 would	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 grant	 the	 relevant	 treaty	
																																																																																																																																																																						benefits	provision	and	either	rules	to	address	conduit	financing	structures	or	a	principal	purpose	test,	thereby	 meeting	 the	 minimum	 standard	 for	 preventing	 treaty	 abuse	 under	 the	 OECD/G20	 BEPS	package.”	In	this	case,	the	provision	continues,	“the	Contracting	Jurisdictions	shall	endeavour	to	reach	a	mutually	satisfactory	solution	which	meets	the	minimum	standard.”	See	also	article	7(17)(a),	which	permits	 a	 party	 to	 the	 MLI	 to	 declare	 that	 it	 accepts	 the	 PPT	 alone	 “as	 an	 interim	 measure”	 but	“intends	where	possible	to	adopt	a	limitation	on	benefits	provision,	in	addition	to	or	in	replacement	of	[the	PPT],	through	bilateral	negotiations.”	33	Figures	compiled	by	the	author	from	positions	of	signatories	available	at	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	“Signatories	and	Parties	to	the	Multilateral	Convention	To	Implement	Tax	Treaty	Measures	 to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	 Shifting:	 Status	 as	of	18	September	2018”	(http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf).	34	Ibid.	
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benefits.”35	Although	 observing	 that	 the	 PPT	 “will	 be	 useful	 in	 addressing	 such	situations,”36	the	Report	 rightly	 notes	 that	 that	 “targeted	 specific	 treaty	 anti-abuse	rules	 generally	 provide	 greater	 certainty	 for	 both	 taxpayers	 and	 tax	administrations.”37	For	this	reason,	 it	provides	“examples	of	situations	with	respect	to	which	specific	 treaty	anti-abuse	rules	may	be	helpful	and	proposals	 for	changes	intended	to	address	some	of	these	situations.”38		 In	order	to	prevent	tax-motivated	transactions	or	arrangements	 intended	to	obtain	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends	paid	to	a	parent	company,	for	example,	the	Report	proposes	that	the	reduced	rate	should	be	available	only	where	the	minimum	 ownership	 threshold	 is	 satisfied	 “throughout	 a	 365	 day	 period	 that	includes	the	day	of	the	payment	of	the	dividend.39	Incorporated	into	article	10(2)(a)	of	 the	 2017	OECD	model	 convention,	 this	minimum	 shareholding	 period	 provides	greater	certainty	than	the	application	of	limited	purpose	tests	in	many	tax	treaties	or	the	application	of	a	general	anti-abuse	principle.40	In	order	to	prevent	tax-motivated	transactions	 or	 arrangements	 intended	 to	 avoid	 a	 substituted	 property	 rule	 for	capital	 gains	 by	 diluting	 the	 proportion	 of	 an	 entity’s	 value	 attributable	 to	immovable	property	in	a	state,	the	Report	also	proposes	that	the	value	threshold	for																																																									35	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4,	para.	27.	36	Ibid.	37	Ibid.	 As	 a	 result,	 according	 to	 paragraph	 62	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	convention,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 PPT	 “does	 not	 mean	 that	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 the	 inclusion,	 in	 tax	conventions,	 of	 specific	 provisions	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 particular	 forms	 of	 tax	 avoidance.”	 On	 the	contrary,	it	explains:	”Where	specific	avoidance	techniques	have	been	identified	or	where	the	use	of	such	techniques	is	especially	problematic,	it	will	often	be	useful	to	add	to	the	Convention	provisions	that	focus	directly	on	the	relevant	avoidance	strategy.”	38	Ibid.	39	Ibid.	 at	 para.	 36.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 computing	 this	 period,	 the	 proposed	 provision	 explicitly	excludes	“changes	of	ownership	that	would	result	directly	from	a	corporate	reorganization,	such	as	a	merger	or	divisive	reorganization,	of	the	company	that	holds	the	shares	or	that	pays	the	dividend.”	40	See	the	discussion	of	pre-BEPS	approaches	to	these	transactions	or	arrangements	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.		
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the	 substituted	 property	 rule	 should	 apply	 “at	 any	 time	 during	 the	 365	 days	preceding	the	alienation”	of	the	shares	or	comparable	interests	subject	to	the	rule.41	As	with	 the	minimum	 shareholding	 period	 for	 dividends,	 the	 time	 period	 for	 this	value	threshold	was	added	to	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.42		 In	addition	to	these	specific	treaty	anti-abuse	rules,	the	Final	Report	of	BEPS	Action	6	also	discusses	anti-abuse	provisions	to	prevent	the	tax-motivated	splitting-up	 of	 contracts	 to	 avoid	 permanent	 establishment	 status	 for	 a	 building	 site	 or	construction	or	installation	project	that	lasts	more	than	twelve	months,43	“hiring-out	of	 labour”	 arrangements	 designed	 to	 convert	 employment	 income	 that	 would	otherwise	be	subject	to	tax	in	which	the	employment	is	exercised	into	employment	income	 that	 is	 exempt	 from	 source	 state	 taxation,44	and	 transactions	 designed	 to	convert	dividends	into	capital	gains.45	It	also	proposes	an	alternative	tie-breaker	rule	for	dual-resident	entities	 that	replaces	 the	place	of	effective	management	 test	with	competent	 authority	 determination,46	and	 a	 specific	 anti-abuse	 provision	 for	 low-taxed	 income	 attributable	 to	 a	 permanent	 establishment	 in	 a	 third	 state	 that	 is	exempt	 from	 tax	 in	 the	 residence	 state.47	article	 4(3)	 of	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	convention	replaces	the	place	of	effective	management	test	for	dual-resident	entities	with	competent	authority	determination,	and	article	29(8)	adds	the	anti-abuse	rule	for	low-taxed	income	attributable	to	a	permanent	establishment	in	a	third	state.	
																																																								41	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4,	paras.	43-44.	42	Article	13(4)	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	43	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4,	para.	29.	44	Ibid.	para.	31.	45	Ibid.	para.	32.	46	Ibid.	paras	45-48.	47	Ibid.	paras	49-52.	
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	 As	 with	 the	 BEPS	 proposals	 on	 measures	 to	 prevent	 tax	 treaty	 shopping,	provisions	 to	 prevent	 other	 treaty	 abuses	 were	 also	 included	 in	 the	 MLI,	 which	contains	 anti-avoidance	 rules	 for	 dividends	 and	 capital	 gains	 in	 articles	 8(1)	 and	9(1),	 an	 anti-avoidance	 rule	 for	 low-taxed	 income	 attributable	 to	 a	 permanent	establishments	 in	 third	 jurisdictions	 in	 article	 10(1),	 an	 anti-avoidance	 rule	 for	splitting-up	 of	 contracts	 in	 article	 14(1),	 and	 the	 alternative	 tie-breaker	 rule	 for	dual-resident	 entities	 in	 article	 4(1).	Unlike	 the	proposals	 on	measures	 to	prevent	tax	 treaty	 shopping,	 however,	 none	 of	 these	 provisions	 constitute	 minimum	standards	that	signatories	to	the	MLI	must	adopt,	and	none	will	modify	a	CTA	unless	all	 parties	 to	 the	 CTA	 choose	 to	 apply	 the	 provision	 and	 notify	 the	 OECD	 to	 this	effect.48	Of	the	eighty-four	jurisdictions	that	had	signed	the	MLI	as	of	18	September	2018,	 thirty-seven	opted	 to	 apply	 the	 rule	 for	dividends	 in	article	8(1),	 forty-eight	opted	to	apply	the	rule	for	capital	gains	in	article	9(1),	twenty-three	opted	to	apply	the	rule	for	low-taxed	permanent	establishments	in	article	10(1),	twenty-eight	opted	to	apply	the	rule	for	splitting-up	of	contracts	in	article	14(1),	and	twenty-nine	opted	to	 apply	 the	 alternative	 tie-breaker	 rule	 for	 dual-resident	 entities	 in	 article	 4(1).49	Although	Canada	did	not	choose	to	apply	any	of	these	provisions	when	it	signed	the	MLI	 on	 7	 June	 2017,50	it	 has	 subsequently	 indicated	 that	 it	 will	 adopt	 the	 anti-
																																																								48	See	Articles	8(4),	9(8),	10(6),	14(4)	and	4(4)	of	the	MLI.	49	Figures	 compiled	by	 the	 author	 from	positions	of	 signatories	 available	 at	OECD,	 “Signatories	 and	Parties	 to	 the	Multilateral	Convention	To	 Implement	Tax	Treaty	Measures	 to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting:	Status	as	of	18	September	2018”	supra	note	33.	50	Department	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 Trade	 and	 Development,	 “Status	 of	 List	 of	 Reservations	 and	Notifications	at	the	Time	of	Signature”	30	May	2017	(www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-canada.pdf).	
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avoidance	 rules	 for	 dividends	 and	 capital	 gains	 in	 articles	 8(1)	 and	 9(1)	 and	 the	alternative	tie-breaker	rule	for	dual-resident	entities	in	article	4(1).51	
B.	 The	Principal	Purpose	Test		 Of	the	many	provisions	of	the	MLI,	the	most	important	are	the	preamble	text	in	article	6(1)	and	the	PPT	in	article	7(1),	which	have	been	adopted	by	all	signatories	to	 the	 Convention	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 the	minimum	 standard	 on	 treaty	 abuse.	While	the	preamble	text	states	that	the	CTA	is	intended	to	eliminate	double	taxation	“without	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	 reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	evasion	 or	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	 arrangements	 aimed	 at	obtaining	reliefs	provided	 in	 this	agreement	 for	 the	 indirect	benefit	of	 residents	of	third	jurisdictions),”52	the	PPT	reads	as	follows:	Notwithstanding	 any	 provisions	 of	 a	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement,	 a	 benefit	 under	 the	Covered	 Tax	 Agreement	 shall	 not	 be	 granted	 in	 respect	 of	 an	 item	 of	 income	 or	capital	 if	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 conclude,	 having	 regard	 to	 all	 relevant	 facts	 and	circumstances,	 that	 obtaining	 the	 benefit	was	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 of	 any	arrangement	or	transaction	that	resulted	directly	or	indirectly	in	that	benefit,	unless	it	 is	 established	 that	 granting	 that	 benefit	 in	 those	 circumstances	 would	 be	 in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	Covered	Tax	Agreement.53			 Based	 on	 a	 “guiding	 principle”	 in	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	 model	convention,54 	and	 similar	 in	 structure	 to	 Canada’s	 general	 anti-avoidance	 rule	
																																																								51	Department	 of	 Finance	 Canada,	 “Backgrounder:	 The	 Next	 Step	 in	 the	 Fight	 Against	 Aggressive	International	 Tax	 Avoidance”	 21	 June	 2018	 (https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2018/05/backgrounder-the-next-step-in-the-fight-against-aggressive-international-tax-avoidance.html).	52	Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 MLI.	 This	 language	 also	 appears	 in	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	convention.	53	Article	 7(1)	 of	 the	 MLI.	 This	 provision	 also	 appears	 as	 article	 29(9)	 of	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	convention.	54	See	Paragraph	169	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	referring	to	the	“guiding	principle”	in	para.	61	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention,	according	to	which	“the	benefits	of	 a	 double	 taxation	 convention	 should	 not	 be	 available	 where	 a	 main	 purpose	 for	 entering	 into	certain	transactions	or	arrangements	was	to	secure	a	more	favourable	tax	position	and	obtaining	that	
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(GAAR),55	this	 provision	 introduces	 a	 general	 anti-avoidance	 or	 anti-abuse	 rule	 to	CTAs.	According	to	the	commentary	on	the	2017	OECD	model	convention,	the	PPT	is	intended	to	“allow	States	to	address	cases	of	improper	use	of	the	Convention	even	if	their	domestic	law	does	not	allow	then	to	do	so”	and	to	“confirm”	the	application	of	a	general	anti-abuse	principle	“for	States	whose	domestic	 law	already	allows	them	to	 address	 such	 cases.”56	The	 remainder	 of	 this	 article	 examines	 this	 provision	 in	detail,	considering	its	relationship	to	other	anti-avoidance	doctrines,	principles	and	rules,	 and	 the	 various	 elements	 that	 comprise	 its	 basic	 structure,	 in	 order	 to	determine	the	kinds	of	transactions	or	arrangements	to	which	it	may	be	expected	to	apply	and	the	consequences	of	its	application.	
1.	 Relationship	to	Other	Anti-Avoidance	Doctrines,	Principles	and	Rules			 Beginning	with	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 PPT	 and	 other	 anti-avoidance	doctrine,	principles	and	rules,	three	questions	may	be	posed.	First,	how	does	the	PPT	interact	with	domestic	anti-avoidance	doctrines	and	statutory	anti-avoidance	rules?	Second,	does	the	PPT	displace	implicit	general	anti-abuse	principles	like	the	“guiding	principle”	in	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention?	And	third,	how	should	the	PPT	relate	to	specific	treaty	anti-abuse	rules	that	are	included	(or	not	included)	in	a	CTA?	The	following	sections	address	each	of	these	questions.																																																																																																																																																																							more	favourable	treatment	in	the	circumstances	would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions.”	55	Income	Tax	Act,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	I-1,	s.	245	(as	amended)	[hereafter	ITA].	Like	the	PPT,	this	provision	applies	 to	deny	a	 tax	benefit	where	 three	requirements	are	satisfied:	 (1)	a	 transaction	 (or	series	of	transactions	of	which	 the	 transaction	 is	 a	part)	would	otherwise	 result	directly	or	 indirect	 in	 a	 tax	benefit;	(2)	the	transaction	may	not	reasonably	be	considered	to	have	been	undertaken	or	arranged	primarily	 for	bona	fide	purposes	other	 than	 to	obtain	 the	 tax	benefit;	 and	 (3)	 it	may	 reasonably	be	considered	that	the	transaction	would	otherwise	result	in	a	misuse	of	provisions	of	the	ITA	or	other	relevant	enactments	or	an	abuse	having	regard	to	those	provisions	read	as	a	whole.	56	Paragraph	169	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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(1)	 Relationship	 to	Domestic	Anti-Avoidance	Doctrines	and	Statutory	Anti-
Avoidance	Rules		 Since	domestic	law	generally	determines	the	characterization	of	transactions	or	arrangements	to	which	tax	treaties	apply,	it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	PPT	 will	 not	 displace	 domestic	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 and	 statutory	 anti-avoidance	rules	that	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	that	might	otherwise	be	subject	to	the	PPT.	Where	tax-motivated	emigration	is	subject	to	a	domestic	exit	tax,	for	 example,	 reliance	 on	 the	 PPT	 is	 likely	 unnecessary.	 Similarly,	 where	 tax	avoidance	 transactions	or	 arrangements	 are	 re-characterized	under	domestic	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 or	 statutory	 general	 anti-avoidance	 rules,	 the	 PPT	 is	presumably	redundant.	For	these	reasons,	the	commentary	on	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	 affirms	 the	 “important	 role”	 of	 domestic	 anti-abuse	 rules	 and	 judicial	doctrines	 in	 “preventing	 treaty	 benefits	 from	 being	 granted	 in	 inappropriate	circumstances”	irrespective	of	the	PPT.57		 To	 the	 extent	 that	 treaty	 provisions	 prevail	 over	 conflicting	 provisions	 of	domestic	law,	however,	it	may	be	argued	that	domestic	anti-avoidance	doctrines	and	statutory	anti-	avoidance	rules	are	inapplicable	if	they	result	in	taxation	that	is	not	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	a	tax	treaty.58	Although	the	commentary	explains	that	these	conflicts	will	be	avoided	in	many	cases59	–	for	example,	where	the	treaty	specifically	allows	the	application	of	specific	domestic	anti-abuse	rules,60	where	the	
																																																								57	Paragraph	67	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	58	Paragraph	70	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	59	Paragraph	71	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	60	Paragraph	72	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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treaty	 specifically	 depends	 on	 the	 application	 of	 domestic	 law,61	or	 where	 the	application	of	 a	 treaty	provision	 is	denied	under	 judicial	doctrines	or	principles	of	treaty	 interpretation62	–	 it	also	suggests	that	the	PPT	could	apply	to	deny	a	benefit	under	 a	 treaty	 provision	 that	 would	 otherwise	 prevail	 over	 a	 domestic	 anti-avoidance	rule.63	It	also	concludes	that	general	statutory	anti-avoidance	rules	do	not	conflict	with	 tax	 treaties	 to	 the	extent	 that	 they	conform	to	 the	 “guiding	principle”	and	 the	PPT,	 since	 “the	relevant	domestic	general	anti-abuse	rule	will	apply	 in	 the	same	circumstances	in	which	the	benefits	of	the	Convention	would	be	denied”	under	the	“guiding	principle”	or	the	PPT.64		For	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 PPT	 does	 not	 preclude	 reliance	 on	domestic	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 and	 statutory	 anti-avoidance	 rules, 65 	which	should	presumably	be	applied	prior	to	the	PPT	since	these	doctrines	and	provisions	generally	determine	the	characterization	of	 transactions	or	arrangements	 to	which	tax	treaties	apply.	Nor	does	the	application	of	a	domestic	anti-avoidance	doctrine	or	provision	 preclude	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 where	 the	 anti-avoidance	 doctrine	 or	provision	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 treaty	 provision	 that	 would	 otherwise	 prevail	 over	 the	domestic	 doctrine	 or	 provision.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 follows	 that	 transactions	 or																																																									61	Paragraph	73	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	referring	for	example,	to	 the	 determination	 of	 a	 person’s	 residence,	 the	 determination	 of	 immovable	 property,	 and	 the	determination	of	when	income	from	corporate	rights	may	be	treated	as	a	dividend.	62	Paragraph	75	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	providing	an	example	of	 a	 transaction	 characterized	 as	 a	 sham	 under	 domestic	 law.	 See	 also	 paragraph	 78	 of	 the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	referring	to	judicial	anti-avoidance	doctrines	“such	as	substance	over	 form,	economic	substance,	sham,	business	purpose,	step-transaction,	abuse	of	law	and	fraus	legis.”	63	Paragraph	 74	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 1	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 providing	 as	 an	example	a	domestic	anti-avoidance	rule	taxing	capital	gains	of	former	residents	that	might	otherwise	be	subject	to	the	treaty	exemption	in	article	13(5)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	64	Paragraph	72	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	65	See,	e.g.,	Luc	De	Broe	and	Joris	Luts,	“BEPS	Action	6;	Tax	Treaty	Abuse”	(2015),	43:2	Intertax	135	at	139.	
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arrangements	 may	 be	 assessed	 under	 domestic	 anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 and	statutory	anti-avoidance	rules	as	well	as	the	PPT.	
(2)	 Relationship	to	Implicit	Anti-Abuse	Principle	According	 to	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	OECD	model	 convention,	 the	 “guiding	principle”	that	a	benefit	under	a	tax	treaty	should	not	be	available	where	“one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	arrangements	or	 transactions	 is	 to	secure	a	more	 favourable	tax	position”	and	“obtaining	that	more	favourable	treatment	in	these	circumstances	would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions”	of	the	treaty,		“applies	independently	from	the	provisions	of	[the	PPT],	which	merely	confirm	it.”66	On	this	basis,	it	follows	that	the	concept	of	an	implicit	anti-abuse	principle	reflected	in	the	“guiding	principle”	is	not	displaced	by	the	PPT,	but	may	operate	alongside	as	an	independent	approach	to	address	tax	treaty	shopping	and	other	treaty	abuses.	Notwithstanding	this	statement,	however,	a	strong	argument	can	be	made	as	a	matter	 of	 treaty	 interpretation	 that	 an	 explicit	 anti-abuse	provision	 like	 the	PPT	should	 prevail	 over	 an	 implicit	 anti-abuse	 principle	 like	 the	 “guiding	 principle”.67	Indeed,	 subsequent	 statements	 in	 the	 commentary	 suggest	 that	 the	 “guiding	principle”	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 PPT,	 which	 “applies	independently”	 of	 the	 PPT	 only	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 tax	 treaties	 that	 do	 not	include	a	PPT.68	For	this	reason,	as	Danon	concludes,	the	“status	and	function	of	the	
																																																								66	Paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	67	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	140-141.	68	See,	 e.g.,	 paragraphs	 74	 and	 77	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 1	 of	 the	 OECD	model	 convention,	arguing	 that	 domestic	 anti-abuse	 rules	 generally	 do	 not	 conflict	 with	 tax	 treaties	 since	 benefits	otherwise	available	under	a	treaty	may	be	denied	under	the	PPT,	“or,	in	the	case	of	a	treaty	that	does	not	include	that	paragraph“	under	the	“guiding	principle”	[emphasis	added].	
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guiding	principle	will	obviously	be	less	important”	following	the	introduction	of	the	PPT	into	the	text	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	and	the	MLI.69	
(3)	 Relationship	to	Specific	Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	More	challenging,	and	 likely	more	 important,	 than	 the	relationship	between	the	PPT	and	domestic	anti-avoidance	doctrines	and	statutory	anti-avoidance	rules	or	the	 relationship	 between	 the	 PPT	 and	 the	 “guiding	 principle”	 is	 the	 relationship	between	 the	PPT	and	specific	 treaty	anti-abuse	 rules	 that	may	be	 included	 (or	not	included)	in	a	CTA.	As	the	parenthetical	words	in	the	previous	sentence	suggest,	this	issue	involves	two	separate	inquiries,	concerning	the	relationship	between	the	PPT	and	 specific	 treaty	 anti-abuse	 rules	 that	 are	 included	 in	 a	 particular	 CTA,	 and	 the	relationship	between	 the	PPT	and	 specific	 treaty	anti-abuse	 rules	 contained	 in	 the	MLI	or	other	 tax	conventions,	 including	model	 tax	conventions,	but	not	adopted	 in	that	CTA.	
(a)	 Relationship	to	Specific	Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	in	a	CTA	Where	 a	 CTA	 includes	 a	 specific	 anti-abuse	 rule	 or	 SAAR,	 the	 relationship	between	the	PPT	and	this	rule	can	become	an	issue	in	two	kinds	of	cases:	where	the	SAAR	applies	to	a	particular	transaction	or	arrangement,	or	where	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	not	subject	to	a	SAAR	because	it	satisfies	the	formal	requirements	of	the	rule.		In	the	first	case,	where	the	SAAR	applies	to	a	transaction	or	arrangement,	the	interpretive	 principle	 that	 a	 specific	 provision	 prevails	 over	 a	 more	 general																																																									69	Robert	J.	Danon,	“Treaty	Abuse	in	the	Post-BEPS	World:	Analysis	of	the	Policy	Shift	and	Impact	of	the	Principal	Purpose	Test	for	MNE	Groups”	(January	2018),	72	Bulletin	for	International	Taxation	31	at	38.	
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provision	 (lex	specialis	derogat	legi	generali)	 suggests	 that	 the	PPT	should	have	no	application.	 In	 the	domestic	context,	 for	example,	courts	 typically	regard	GAARs	as	provisions	“of	last	resort”	that	apply	only	to	deny	tax	benefits	that	are	not	otherwise	denied	under	anti-avoidance	doctrines	or	specific	anti-avoidance	rules,70	concluding	on	this	basis	that	a	GAAR	cannot	be	applied	to	impose	additional	tax	consequences	beyond	 those	 resulting	 from	a	 specific	 anti-avoidance	 rule.71	For	 this	 reason,	 some	commentators	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 PPT	 should	 generally	 not	 apply	 to	 abusive	transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 “could	 be	 tackled”	 under	 both	 the	 PPT	 and	 a	treaty-based	SAAR.72		Since	 the	 PPT	 explicitly	 applies	 “[n]otwithstanding	 any	 provisions	 of	 a	Covered	 Tax	 Agreement,”	 however,	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 words	 of	 this	 provision	override	 the	 lex	 specialis	 principle	 that	 would	 otherwise	 apply.73	As	 a	 result,	 the	proper	 interpretive	 question	 is	 not	 simply	 whether	 a	 treaty-based	 SAAR	 prevails	over	 the	PPT,	 but	whether	 a	 transaction	or	 arrangement	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 SAAR	may	still	result	in	a	“benefit	under	a	CTA”	to	which	the	PPT	could	apply.	Indeed,	the	commentary	 to	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	 convention	 supports	 this	 interpretation,	stating	that	a	benefit	that	is	denied	under	an	LOB	provision	or	a	SAAR	for	low-taxed	permanent	 establishments	 in	 third	 jurisdictions	 “is	 not	 a	 ‘benefit	 under	 the	Convention’	that	[the	PPT]	would	also	deny.”74	If	application	of	a	SAAR	were	to	result	
																																																								70	Canada	Trustco	Mortgage	Co.	v	Canada,	2005	SCC	56,	[2005]	2	SCR	601,	[2005]	5	C.T.C.	215,	2005	D.T.C.	5523,	at	para.	21	[hereafter	Canada	Trustco].	71	XCo	Investments	Ltd.	v.	Canada,	[2006]	1	C.T.C.	2220,	2005	D.T.C.	1731	(T.C.C.),	aff’d	[2007]	2	C.T.C.	243,	2007	D.T.C.	5146	(F.C.A.),	at	para.	40,	stating	that	the	GAAR	cannot	be	used	to	“top	up”	a	remedy	under	a	specific	anti-avoidance	rule.	72	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	52.	73	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	146.	74	Paragraph	171	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
	 21	
in	a	treaty	benefit,	however,	judicial	decisions	in	context	of	domestic	GAARs	suggest	that	 a	 general	 anti-abuse	 rule	 could	 be	 applied	 to	 deny	 this	 benefit	 if	 it	 would	contradict	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	SAAR.75		In	practice,	however,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	case	in	which	a	SAAR	could	be	used	to	produce	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.	In	 the	 second	 case,	where	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 a	treaty-based	SAAR	because	it	satisfies	the	formal	requirements	of	the	rule,	different	considerations	apply.	Although	the	lex	specialis	principle	might	suggest	that	the	PPT	should	not	apply	in	this	circumstance,	this	conclusion	depends	on	whether	the	SAAR		fully	 addresses	 the	 particular	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 at	 issue.76	For	 example,	since	the	beneficial	owner	requirement	addresses	only	“some	forms	of	tax	avoidance	(i.e.	 those	 involving	 the	 interposition	 of	 a	 recipient	who	 is	 obliged	 to	 pass	 on	 the	dividend	to	someone	else),”	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	is	clear	that	 the	 PPT	 can	 apply	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 even	 if	 they	 satisfy	 this	requirement.77		Likewise,	since	LOB	provisions	do	not	address	all	forms	of	tax	treaty	shopping,	it	is	clear	that	the	PPT	can	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	such	as	conduit	financing	arrangements	that	satisfy	one	or	more	LOB	provisions.78	
																																																								75	See,	e.g.,	Lipson	v.	Canada,	[2009]	1	C.T.C.	314,	2009	D.T.C.	5015	(S.C.C.)	[hereafter	Lipson]	at	para.	42,	in	which	a	majority	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	applied	the	GAAR	to	a	series	of	transactions	that	were	subject	 to	a	specific	attribution	rule	on	 the	basis	 that	 “a	specific	anti-avoidance	rule”	had	been	“used	to	facilitate	abusive	tax	avoidance.”	76	See,	 e.g.,	 Danon,	 supra	 note	 69	 at	 53,	 arguing	 that	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 in	 this	 circumstance	depends	on	whether	the	specific	anti-abuse	rule	“covers	the	factual	situation	at	issue.”	77	Paragraph	12.5	of	the	commentary	on	article	10	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	stating	that	the	fact	that	 the	 recipient	of	 a	dividend	 is	 its	beneficial	 owner	 “does	not	mean	…	 that	 the	 limitation	of	 tax”	under	 article	 10(2)	 “must	 automatically	 be	 granted”	 and	 that	 the	 PPT	 and	 general	 anti-abuse	principles	“will	apply	 to	prevent	abuses,	 including	treaty-shopping	situations	where	the	recipient	 is	the	beneficial	owner	of	the	dividends.”	Virtually	identical	language	appears	in	paragraph	10.3	of	the	commentary	on	article	11	and	paragraph	4.4	of	the	commentary	on	article	12.	78	This	is	clear	from	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4	at	para.	19,	recommending	both	a	specific	anti-abuse	rule	based	on	LOB	provisions	and	a	PPT	“to	address	other	forms	of	treaty	abuse,	including	 treaty	shopping	situations	 that	would	not	be	covered	by	 the	LOB	rule”	 [emphasis	added].	
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For	 the	 same	 reason,	 the	 PPT	 could	 also	 apply	 to	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 that	 satisfy	 the	 formal	 requirements	 of	 other	 treaty	 provisions	 or	circumvent	the	application	of	other	SAARs.	Although	these	provisions	often	include	quantitative	 limitations	 that	 arguably	 create	 safe	 harbours	 for	 transactions	 or	arrangements	that	either	satisfy	or	avoid	these	limitations,79	any	conclusion	that	the	
lex	 specialibus	 principle	 excludes	 the	 PPT	 in	 these	 circumstances	 also	 depends	 on	whether	 these	 provisions	 fully	 address	 the	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 at	 issue.	Where	a	treaty	provision	that	reduces	the	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends	paid	to	a	 parent	 company	 with	 a	 minimum	 shareholding	 does	 not	 include	 a	 minimum	withholding	 period,	 for	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 the	 lex	 specialibus	 principle	prevents	 the	 PPT	 from	 applying	 to	 a	 transaction	 in	 which	 a	 company	 with	 a	shareholding	 less	 than	 the	minimum	 increases	 its	 shareholding	 shortly	 before	 the	payment	 of	 a	 dividend	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 reduced	 withholding	 tax	 rate.80	Likewise,	 where	 a	 substituted	 property	 rule	 for	 capital	 gains	 on	 the	 alienation	 of	shares	 or	 comparable	 interests	 deriving	 their	 value	 principally	 from	 immovable	property	does	not	include	a	time	period	preceding	the	alienation	during	which	this	value	 threshold	may	apply,	 it	 is	arguable	 that	 the	 lex	specialibus	principle	does	not																																																																																																																																																																							See	also	paragraph	172	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	stating	that	“the	 fact	 that	 a	 person	 is	 entitled	 to	 benefits”	 under	 a	 specific	 LOB	 provision	 “does	 not	mean	 that	these	 benefits	 cannot	 be	 denied”	 under	 the	 PPT,	 and	 the	 example	 in	 paragraph	 173	 of	 the	commentary	 of	 a	 publicly-traded	 bank	 that	 enters	 into	 conduit	 financing	 arrangement,	 which	 the	commentary	 concludes	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 PPT	 even	 though	 it	 would	 be	 entitled	 to	 benefits	under	a	LOB	provision	as	a	“qualified	person”.	79	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	53,	arguing	that	“it	would	be	unacceptable	to	first	include	a	SAAR	in	 a	 tax	 treaty	 that	 specifically	 circumscribes	 the	 taxpayer	 behaviour	 which	 the	 treaty	 partners	consider	 abusive	on	 the	basis	 of	 objectively	 verifiable	 (often	quantitative,	 safe	harbor)	parameters,	only	to	subsequently	apply	the	PPT	rule	to	extend	the	legal	consequences	provided	therein	to	other	situations	beyond	the	scope	of	that	SAAR.”	80	Before	 2017,	 paragraph	 17	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 10	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention	characterized	this	kind	of	transaction	as	an	“abuse”	of	the	provision	to	which	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	“should	not	be	available”.		
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prevent	the	PPT	from	applying	to	a	transaction	carried	out	shortly	before	alienation	of	 shares	 or	 other	 interests	 that	 dilutes	 the	 proportion	 of	 an	 entity’s	 value	attributable	to	immovable	property	in	order	to	circumvent	the	rule.	Moreover,	 since	 the	 text	 of	 the	 PPT	 explicitly	 states	 that	 it	 applies	“[n]otwithstanding	 any	 provisions	 of	 a	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement,”	 it	 appears	 as	thought	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes	 of	 which	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA	 even	 if	 the	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 satisfies	 or	 circumvents	 the	 formal	 requirements	 of	 other	 treaty	provisions	including	SAARs.	In	this	circumstance,	however,	the	relevant	interpretive	question	 is	 not	whether	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 results	 in	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	CTA	 (since	 this	will	 be	 the	 case	where	 the	 transaction	or	 arrangement	 satisfies	 or	circumvents	the	formal	requirements	of	the	relevant	treaty	provisions),	but	whether	granting	the	benefit	in	this	circumstance	contradicts	the	object	and	purpose	of	these	provisions.81	While	 the	 satisfaction	 or	 avoidance	 of	 a	 quantitative	 limitation	 in	 a	specific	 treaty	 provision	 creates	 a	 strong	 presumption	 that	 granting	 the	 resulting	benefit	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions,82	this	determination	is	ultimately	a	matter	of	interpretation	having	regard	to	the	relevant	provisions	 as	 well	 as	 extrinsic	 materials	 such	 as	 explanatory	 memoranda	 and	commentaries	that	may	shed	light	on	the	intentions	of	the	contracting	jurisdictions.	Since	 a	 key	 objective	 of	 specific	 treaty	 anti-abuse	 rules	 is	 “to	 provide	 greater																																																									81	This	aspect	of	the	PPT	is	examined	in	further	detail	below	at	infra	notes	198-273	and	accompanying	text.	82	See,	 e.g.,	Michael	 Lang,	 “BEPS	 Action	 6:	 Introducing	 an	 Antiabuse	 Rule	 in	 Tax	 Treaties”	 (19	May	2014)	Tax	Notes	 International	655	 at	 658,	 observing	 that	 “it	 is	 hard	 to	 understand	why	 [the	 PPT]	should	in	some	cases	reduce	the	percentage”	threshold	of	a	substituted	property	rule	that	applies	to	shares	or	comparable	interests	the	value	of	which	is	principally	attributable	to	immovable	property	in	a	state	“to	50	percent	or	less.”	
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certainty	 for	 both	 taxpayers	 and	 tax	 administrations,” 83 	however,	 it	 seems	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 benefits	 resulting	 from	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	that	comply	with	quantitative	limitations	in	these	provisions	are	generally	consistent	with	their	object	and	purpose.	
(b)	 Relevance	of	Specific	Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	not	Included	in	a	CTA	Where	a	particular	CTA	is	not	modified	by	a	SAAR	that	is	contained	in	the	MLI		or	 does	 not	 otherwise	 include	 a	 SAAR	 that	 is	 contained	 in	 the	MLI	 or	 another	 tax	convention,	 including	 a	 model	 tax	 convention,	 a	 different	 question	 arises	 as	 to	whether	the	PPT	can	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	that	would	otherwise	be	subject	to	this	SAAR.	Although	it	might	reasonably	be	argued	that	the	absence	of	this	rule	 in	 the	 contest	 of	 a	 particular	 CTA	 evidences	 an	 intention	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	contracting	 jurisdictions	 to	 grant	 treaty	 benefits	 resulting	 from	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 that	would	otherwise	be	 subject	 to	 the	 rule,84	it	may	also	be	argued	that	 the	 contracting	 jurisdictions	 intend	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 PPT	 to	 challenge	 these	transactions	 or	 arrangements	 without	 adopting	 the	 detailed	 limitations	 of	 the	SAAR.85	As	with	the	relationship	between	the	PPT	and	SAARs	that	either	modify	or	are	included	in	a	particular	CTA,	this	question	is	ultimately	a	matter	of	interpretation	having	 regard	 to	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 as	 well	 as	 extrinsic	 materials	 such	 as																																																									83	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6,	supra	note	4	at	para.	27.	84	For	a	useful	example,	see	Knights	of	Columbus	v.	The	Queen,	[2009]	1	C.T.C.	2163,	2008	D.T.C.	3648	(T.C.C.)	[hereafter	Knights	of	Columbus]	in	which	the	Tax	Court	of	Canada	considered	the	absence	of	a	specific	 insurance	 provision	 like	 article	 5(6)	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 model	 tax	 convention	 in	 the	Canada-U.S.	Treaty	to	be	a	relevant	consideration	in	concluding	that	the	taxpayer	had	not	carried	on	business	 in	Canada	 through	a	permanent	establishment.	See	United	Nations,	Model	Double	Taxation	
Convention	 between	Developed	 and	Developing	Countries,	 (New	 York:	 United	 Nations,	 2011),	 article	5(6)	[herein	referred	to	as	the	United	Nations	model	tax	convention]	85	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	43,	concluding	that	“[w]here	a	state	has	reserved	the	right	not	to	apply”	the	specific	anti-abuse	rules	in	articles	8(1)	and	9(1)	of	the	MLI,	“the	PPT	would	thus	apply	by	default	to	those	situations.”	
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explanatory	memoranda	and	commentaries	that	may	shed	light	on	the	intentions	of	the	contracting	jurisdictions.		 Beginning	 with	 LOB	 provisions,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 minimum	 standards	 on	treaty	abuse	may	be	satisfied	by	a	PPT	alone	or	by	a	combination	of	PPT	and	LOB	provisions,	 suggests	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 benefits	 that	might	 otherwise	 be	denied	 under	 specific	 LOB	 provisions	 that	 do	 not	 modify	 and	 are	 not	 otherwise	included	in	a	particular	CTA.86	This	conclusion	is	also	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	minimum	standards	require	signatories	to	the	MLI	to	adopt	the	amended	preamble	language	 declaring	 that	 the	 CTA	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 create	 “opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	or	reduced	taxation	through	tax	avoidance	or	evasion	…	including	through	treaty	shopping	arrangements	aimed	at	obtaining	reliefs	provided	in	this	agreement	for	the	indirect	benefit	of	residents	of	third	jurisdictions.”87	As	a	result,	although	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	does	not	specifically	address	this	issue,	the	amended	preamble	text	and	the	context	of	BEPS	Action	6	strongly	suggest	that	the	PPT	may	apply	to	tax	treaty-shopping	transactions	or	arrangements	that	would	be	subject	to	an	LOB	provision	if	it	modified	or	were	otherwise	included	in	a	CTA.		 Likewise	with	“dividend	transfer	transactions”	that	are	specifically	addressed	by	 the	 minimum	 shareholding	 period	 for	 the	 reduced	 withholding	 tax	 rate	 on	dividends	in	article	8(1)	of	the	MLI,	the	text	of	the	MLI	and	the	context	of	this	SAAR	suggest	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 would	 be	
																																																								86	As	 explained	 at	 supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 33-34,	 only	 thirteen	 signatories	 to	 the	MLI	 have	chosen	to	apply	the	SLOB	as	well	as	the	PPT,	and	only	eight	have	indicated	that	they	intend	to	adopt	LOB	provisions	in	addition	to	or	in	replacement	of	the	PPT	through	bilateral	negotiations.	As	a	result,	most	CTAs	subject	to	the	MLI	will	not	include	LOB	provisions.		87	Article	6(1)	of	the	MLI.	
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subject	 to	 this	 rule	 if	 it	modified	 or	were	 otherwise	 included	 in	 a	 particular	 CTA.	Since	 the	MLI	 provides	 that	 the	 PPT	 applies	 “in	 place	 of”	 limited	 purpose	 tests	 in	CTAs, 88 	which	 could	 be	 used	 to	 challenge	 rule-shopping	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 undertaken	 to	 obtain	 a	 reduced	 withholding	 tax	 rate	 on	 dividends	paid	by	a	subsidiary	to	a	parent	company,89	it	is	difficult	to	see	why	the	replacement	of	these	provisions	by	the	PPT	should	preclude	the	application	of	this	more	general	anti-abuse	 provision	 to	 these	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	minimum	shareholding	period	for	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends.	As	well,	since	the	pre-2017	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	characterized	dividend	transfer	transactions	as	an	“abuse”	of	article	10(2)(a)	to	which	the	reduced	withholding	 tax	 rate	 “should	 not	 be	 available”,90	and	 the	 PPT	 was	 introduced	 to	“confirm”	the	application	of	a	general	anti-abuse	principle	to	tax	treaties,91	it	would	be	 odd	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 PPT	 should	 not	 apply	 to	 these	 transactions	 or	arrangements	because	they	might	also	be	addressed	by	a	SAAR	that	does	not	apply	to	or	is	not	otherwise	included	in	a	particular	CTA.	Indeed,	although	the	commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	 convention	does	not	 explicitly	 state	 that	 the	PPT	 can	apply	 to	deny	 benefits	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 denied	 under	 article	 8(1)	 of	 the	 MLI,	 this	conclusion	is	suggested	by	an	example	that	considers	the	possible	application	of	the	PPT	 to	 a	 transaction	 that	 could	 be	 subject	 to	 this	 specific	 anti-abuse	 rule.92	As	 a	
																																																								88	Article	7(2)	of	the	MLI.	89	See	the	discussion	of	“Other	Treaty	Abuses”	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	90	Paragraph	17	of	the	commentary	on	article	10	of	the	2003	OECD	model	convention.	91	Paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	and	paragraph	169	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	92		Example	E	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	which	is	discussed	at	infra,	text	accompanying	notes	262-265.	See	also	paragraph	16	of	the	commentary	on	article	10	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	which	notes	the	addition	of	a	minimum	shareholding	period	
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result,	although	at	least	one	commentator	has	argued	that	the	PPT	should	not	apply	to	deny	a	treaty	benefit	resulting	from	a	dividend	transfer	transaction	if	the	dividend	article	does	not	include	a	minimum	shareholding	period,93	it	seems	more	reasonable	to	 conclude	 that	 the	PPT	 could	 apply	 in	 this	 circumstance,	 absent	 some	 indication	that	 the	 contracting	 jurisdictions	 intended	 that	 the	 PPT	 should	 not	 apply	 in	 such	circumstances	to	CTAs	without	a	minimum	shareholding	period.		 	A	 similar	 argument	 supports	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	contract-splitting	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 permanent	establishment	status	for	a	building	site	or	construction	or	installation	project	lasting	more	than	twelve	months,	even	if	the	CTA	does	is	not	modified	by	or	not	otherwise	include	 a	 SAAR	 like	 article	 14(1)	 of	 the	 MLI	 that	 aggregates	 the	 time	 periods	 of	separate	 contracts	 involving	 connected	 activities	 carried	 on	 by	 closely	 related	enterprises.94	These	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	were	 considered	 abusive	 in	 the	pre-2017	commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	convention,95	and	are	also	addressed	 in	the	 2017	 commentary,	 which	 suggests	 that	 “these	 abuses	 could	 …	 be	 addressed”	through	the	PPT.96	As	a	result,	as	one	commentator	observes,	 “having	reserved	not	
																																																																																																																																																																						to	article	10(2)(a)	of	 the	OECD	model	convention,	but	concludes	that	 the	PPT	could	apply	 to	“other	abusive	arrangements	aimed	at	obtaining	the	benefits”	of	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	under	this	provision.	93	Reinout	Kok,	“The	principal	purpose	test	in	tax	treaties	under	BEPS	6”	(2016),	44:5	Intertax	406	at	411.	94	See	 the	 discussion	 of	 this	 provision	 at	 supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 43	 and	 48-49	 under	 the	heading	“Other	Treaty	Abuses”.	95	Paragraph	18	of	the	commentary	on	article	5	of	the	2003	OECD	model	convention.	96	Paragraph	52	of	the	commentary	on	article	5	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	See	also	example	J	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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to	apply	this	specific	SAAR	to	their	CTAs,	countries	may	…	tackle	this	fact	pattern	on	the	basis	of	the	PPT	rule.”97		 Indeed,	 since	 the	 commentary	 on	 abusive	 contract-splitting	 also	 states	 that	“[s]ome	 States	 may	 nevertheless	 wish	 to	 deal	 expressly	 with	 such	 abuses”98	it	appears	as	though	specific	anti-abuse	rules	in	the	MLI	could,	like	LOB	provisions,	be	regarded	as	complements	to	the	PPT,	which	do	not	preclude	application	of	the	PPT	to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 would	 be	 addressed	 by	 these	 specific	 anti-abuse	rules	if	they	were	included	in	a	CTA.	On	this	basis,	the	PPT	could	also	apply	to	transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 dilute	 the	 proportion	 of	 an	 entity’s	 value	attributable	to	immovable	property	in	order	to	avoid	a	substituted	property	rule	or	“hiring-out	of	labour”	arrangements	in	order	to	avoid	source	taxation	of	employment	income,	even	if	the	CTA	does	not	include	a	specific	anti-abuse	provision	that	would	otherwise	address	these	transactions	or	arrangements.	Although	the	commentary	is	silent	 on	 the	 possible	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	avoid	a	substituted	property	rule	that	does	not	include	a	time	period	test	like	the	one	in	article	9(1)	of	the	MLI,99	it	explicitly	affirms	the	application	of	the	PPT	to	hiring-out	 of	 labour	 arrangements	 even	 if	 a	 treaty	 does	 not	 include	 a	 specific	 anti-abuse	rule	to	address	these	arrangements.100	
	 	
																																																								97	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	44.	98	Paragraph	52	of	the	commentary	on	article	5	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	99	See	the	discussion	of	 this	provision	at	supra	 text	accompanying	notes	41-42	and	48-49	under	the	heading	“Other	Treaty	Abuses”.	100	Paragraph	8.8	of	the	commentary	on	article	15	of	the	OECD	model	Convention,	stating	that	a	state	“may	deny	the	application	of	the	exception”	in	article	15(2)	of	the	OECD	model	convention	“in	abusive	cases”	–	“as	recognized	by”	the	PPT.			
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2.	 Basic	Structure	of	the	PPT		 Like	the	guiding	principle	and	the	Canadian	GAAR,	the	application	of	the	PPT	turns	 on	 three	 tests.	According	 to	 the	 first	 of	 these	 tests,	which	may	be	 called	 the	“result	test”,	a	transaction	or	arrangement	must	have	“resulted	directly	or	indirectly”	in	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.	According	to	the	second	test,	which	is	a	“purpose	test”,	 it	must	 be	 “reasonable	 to	 conclude,	 having	 regard	 to	 all	 relevant	 facts	 and	circumstances,	 that	obtaining	the	benefit	was	one	of	 the	principal	purposes”	of	 the	transaction	 or	 arrangement.	 Finally,	 the	 third	 test	 is	 an	 “object	 and	 purpose	 test”	which	 provides	 that	 the	 PPT	 does	 not	 apply	 if	 it	 is	 established	 that	 granting	 the	benefit	in	the	circumstances	would	be	“in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions”	of	 the	CTA.	Where	 the	 first	 two	 tests	are	satisfied	and	 the	third	 is	 not,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 PPT	 is	 to	 deny	 the	 benefit	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	granted	 in	 respect	 of	 an	 item	 of	 income	 or	 capital	 under	 the	 CTA.	 The	 following	sections	consider	each	of	these	tests,	as	well	as	the	consequences	of	its	application,	considering	 similarities	 to	 and	 differences	 from	 the	 guiding	 principle	 and	 the	Canadian	GAAR.	
(1)	 Result	Test	Although	 the	 PPT	 is	 based	 on	 the	 guiding	 principle,	 which	 refers	 to	 “the	benefits	of	a	double	tax	convention”,	the	language	and	structure	of	the	result	test	in	the	PPT	is	actually	much	closer	to	the	Canadian	GAAR,	which	denies	a	“tax	benefit”	that	would	otherwise	“result,	directly	or	indirectly”	from	an	avoidance	transaction	or	a	 series	 of	 transactions	 that	 includes	 an	 avoidance	 transaction.	 In	 order	 to	 fully	understand	this	test,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	each	of	its	elements:	(1)	the	meaning	
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of	a	“benefit	under	a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”,	(2)	the	meaning	of	an	“arrangement	or	 transaction”,	 and	 (3)	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 has	“resulted	directly	or	indirectly”	in	the	benefit.	
(a)	 Benefit	under	a	CTA		 It	is	curious	that	neither	the	MLI	nor	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	define	the	term	“benefit	under	a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”.	In	contrast,	the	concept	of	a	“tax	benefit”	for	the	purposes	of	the	Canadian	GAAR	is	explicitly	defined	as:	a	reduction,	avoidance	or	deferral	of	tax	or	other	amount	payable	under	this	Act	or	an	 increase	 in	 a	 refund	 of	 tax	 or	 other	 amount	 under	 this	 Act,	 and	 includes	 a	reduction,	avoidance	or	deferral	of	tax	or	other	amount	that	would	be	payable	under	this	Act	but	for	a	tax	treaty	or	an	increase	in	a	refund	of	tax	or	other	amount	under	this	Act	as	a	result	of	a	tax	treaty.101		 Since	 article	1(2)	of	 the	MLI	 states	 that	 an	undefined	 term	 shall,	 unless	 the	context	 otherwise	 requires,	 have	 the	 meaning	 that	 it	 has	 at	 that	 time	 under	 the	relevant	CTA,	and	 tax	 treaties	generally	provide	 that	 terms	 that	are	not	defined	 in	the	 treaty	shall,	unless	 the	context	otherwise	requires,	have	 the	meaning	 that	 they	have	under	domestic	 law	at	 the	time,	 it	might	be	argued	that	a	domestic	definition	such	as	this	one	should	apply	for	the	purposes	of	the	PPT.	Because	the	PPT	refers	to	a	benefit	“under	a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”,	however,	it	seems	clear	that	the	concept	has	an	autonomous	international	fiscal	meaning	and	should	not	be	defined	according	to	the	meaning	of	a	tax	benefit	for	the	purposes	of	domestic	law.	This	interpretation	also	 supports	 one	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 PPT,	 to	 foster	 greater	 uniformity	 among	contracting	jurisdictions	in	their	responses	to	tax	treaty	abuse.	Consistent	with	this	interpretation,	the	commentary	to	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	 states	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 “benefit	 under	 a	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement”																																																									101	ITA,	s.	245(1).	
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contemplates	treaty	limitations	on	source	taxation	under	the	distributive	rules	of	a	CTA,	 as	 well	 as	 treaty	 benefits	 attributable	 to	 an	 elimination	 of	 double	 taxation	article,	including	benefits	from	a	tax	sparing	provision.102	It	also	states	that	a	benefit	under	 a	 CTA	 could	 also	 include	 protection	 against	 non-discrimination	 under	provisions	 comparable	 to	 article	 24	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 though	 it	 is	difficult	to	imagine	how	this	benefit	could	be	obtained	abusively.103	In	contrast,	the	commentary	does	not	identify	other	benefits	under	a	CTA,	such	as	the	availability	of	dispute	 resolution	 mechanisms	 under	 the	 mutual	 agreement	 procedure	 or	arbitration,	though	at	least	one	commentator	has	suggested	that	these	mechanisms	are	 not	 themselves	 “benefits”	 but	 processes	 through	 which	 benefits	 may	 be	obtained.104	Nor	 does	 the	 commentary	 address	 unilateral	 benefits	 under	 domestic	law	 such	 as	 foreign	 tax	 credits	 or	 participation	 exemptions,	 though	 it	 seems	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 these	 benefits	 are	 not	 benefits	 “under	 a	 Covered	 Tax	Agreement”	to	which	the	PPT	could	apply,	even	if	these	benefits	are	contemplated	by	an	elimination	of	double	taxation	article	in	a	CTA.105	Although	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention	 provides	 useful	guidance	on	the	general	concept	of	a	“benefit	under	a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”,	the	characterization	of	a	benefit	in	the	context	of	a	specific	transaction	or	arrangement	necessarily	 depends	 on	 a	 standard	or	 benchmark	 against	which	 the	 existence	 of	 a	“benefit”	 is	 measured.	 Since	 the	 PPT	 refers	 to	 a	 benefit	 “under	 a	 Covered	 Tax	Agreement”,	 an	 obvious	 interpretation	 of	 this	 benchmark	 would	 be	 the	 tax																																																									102	Paragraph	175	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	103	See,	e.g.,	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	657;	and	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	144.	104	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	657.	105	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	144;	and	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	43.	
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consequences	 that	 would	 have	 resulted	 under	 the	 domestic	 law	 of	 a	 contracting	jurisdiction	 absent	 the	 CTA.106	Alternatively,	 as	 with	 the	 characterization	 of	 a	 tax	benefit	for	the	purposes	of	the	Canadian	GAAR,	the	existence	of	a	“benefit”	under	a	CTA	 could	 be	 determined	 by	 comparing	 the	 tax	 consequences	 resulting	 from	 the	specific	 transaction	or	arrangement	at	 issue	with	 the	 tax	consequences	 that	would	have	 resulted	 from	 an	 alternative	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 that	 that	 “might	reasonably	have	been	carried	out	but	for	the	existence	of	the	…	benefit.”107	Because	 the	 PPT	 stipulates	 that	 “a	 benefit	 under	 a	 Covered	 Tax	 Agreement	shall	not	be	granted”	whenever	the	provision	applies,	 the	 first	 interpretation	could	have	punitive	consequences,	since	the	PPT	would	deny	the	treaty	benefit	that	would	otherwise	 result	 from	 the	 specific	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 at	 issue	 without	recognizing	benefits	 that	would	have	 resulted	under	 the	 same	CTA	or	 another	 tax	treaty	 from	 an	 alternative	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 that	would	 otherwise	 have	been	carried	out.108	For	this	reason,	absent	any	indication	that	the	PPT	is	intended	to	have	this	punitive	effect,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	second	interpretation	should	be	preferred.	Textually,	 however,	 the	 meaning	 of	 “a	 benefit	 under	 a	 Covered	 Tax	Agreement”	 seems	more	 compatible	with	 the	 first	 interpretation	 than	 the	 second,	which	instead	contemplates	an	overall	benefit	“from”	the	CTA,	not	a	specific	benefit																																																									106	See,	e.g.,	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	657,	stating	that:	“Obviously,	what	is	meant	is	that	the	tax	situation	would	 have	 to	 improve	 for	 the	 taxpayer	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 application	 of	 one	 or	 several	 treaty	provisions	as	compared	with	the	domestic	legislation	….”	[emphasis	added]	107	Copthorne	Holdings	v.	Canada,	2011	SCC	63,	[2011]	3	SCR	721,	[2012]	2	C.T.C.	29,	2012	D.T.C.	5007	[Copthorne	Holdings]	at	para.	35,	citing	D.G.	Duff,	et.	al,	Canadian	Income	Tax	Law,	3d	ed.	(Markham:	LexisNexis,	2009)	at	187.	108	See	the	discussion	at	infra	text	accompanying	notes	274-286	under	the	heading	“Consequences	of	Application”.	As	noted	below,	these	punitive	consequences	may	be	relieved	under	a	remedial	benefits	provision	in	article	7(4)	of	the	MLI.	
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“under”	 the	 CTA.	 More	 significantly,	 perhaps,	 the	 MLI	 also	 contains	 a	 remedial	benefits	rule	authorizing	the	competent	authority	of	the	contracting	jurisdiction	that	would	otherwise	have	granted	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	to:		…	 nevertheless	 treat	 that	 person	 as	 being	 entitled	 to	 this	 benefit,	 or	 to	 different	benefits	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 specific	 item	 of	 income	 or	 capital,	 if	 such	 competent	authority,	 upon	 request	 from	 that	 person	 and	 after	 consideration	 of	 the	 relevant	facts	and	circumstances,	determines	that	such	benefits	would	have	been	granted	to	that	person	in	the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement.109		Taking	this	provision	into	account,	therefore,	it	seems	more	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	existence	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	should	be	determined	by	reference	to	the	tax	consequences	that	would	have	resulted	under	the	domestic	law	of	a	contracting	jurisdiction	absent	the	CTA,	not	the	tax	consequence	that	would	have	resulted	from	an	alternative	 transaction	or	arrangement	 that	would	otherwise	have	been	carried	out.110		 On	this	basis,	it	also	follows	that	the	characterization	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	should	 be	 made	 without	 regard	 to	 tax	 consequences	 in	 the	 other	 contracting	jurisdiction,	such	as	higher	taxes	in	a	residence	state	on	account	of	reduced	foreign	tax	credits	to	offset	lower	taxes	in	a	source	state,	even	if	these	tax	consequences	are	governed	 by	 the	 CTA	 rather	 than	 domestic	 law.	 While	 these	 offsetting	 tax	consequences	 may	 affect	 a	 taxpayer’s	 overall	 tax	 burden	 in	 both	 contracting	
																																																								109	Article	 7(4)	 of	 the	 MLI.	 This	 provision	 is	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 article	 under	 the	 heading	“Consequences	of	Application”.	Although	this	remedial	benefits	rule	was	not	added	to	the	2017	OECD	model	convention,	it	appears	in	paragraph	184	of	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	as	an	optional	provision	that	“States	are	free	to	include	…	in	their	bilateral	treaties”.	110	For	 a	 similar	 conclusion	 addressing	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 PPT’s	 application	 rather	 than	 the	concept	of	 a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	 see	André	Báez	Moreno,	 “GAARS	and	Treaties:	From	 the	Guiding	Principle	 to	 the	 Principal	 Purpose	 Test:	 What	 Have	 We	 Gained	 from	 BEPS	 Action	 6?”	 (2017),	 45	
Intertax	432	at	442.	
	 34	
jurisdictions,111	they	 do	 not	 affect	 the	 character	 of	 “a”	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA,	which	exists	 whenever	 the	 CTA	 reduces	 the	 domestic	 tax	 of	 a	 contracting	 jurisdiction	regardless	of	 the	 impact	 that	 this	 tax	 reduction	may	have	on	 taxation	 in	 the	other	contracting	 jurisdiction.112	Although	 this	 means	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 even	 if	reduced	taxes	in	one	contracting	jurisdiction	were	fully	offset	by	increased	taxes	in	the	 other	 contracting	 jurisdiction,113	this	 result	 is	 presumably	 consistent	 with	 the	object	and	purpose	of	the	PPT,	which	is	not	only	to	prevent	non-taxation	or	reduced	taxation	from	the	abuse	of	tax	treaties,	but	also	to	ensure	that	tax	treaties	apply	“in	accordance	 with	 the	 purpose	 for	 which	 they	 were	 entered	 into”114	–	 namely,	 to	allocate	 taxing	 rights	 among	 contracting	 states	 in	 a	 fair	 and	 reasonable	manner	 in	order	 to	 encourage	 cross-border	 economic	 activity	 by	 reducing	 or	 eliminating	economic	double	 taxation.115	Where	 the	denial	of	 a	 treaty	benefit	 in	 a	 source	 state	increases	the	tax	that	is	paid	to	that	state,	the	other	state	will	generally	be	obliged	to	eliminate	double	taxation	by	crediting	this	increased	tax.116		
(b)	 Transaction	or	Arrangement	Like	the	concept	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	the	concepts	of	a	“transaction”	or	an	“arrangement”	are	also	not	defined	in	the	MLI	or	the	OECD	model	convention.	In																																																									111	See	 e.g.,	 Lang,	 supra	 note	 82	 at	 657,	 observing	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 identify	 a	 “benefit”	where	 a	lower	withholding	tax	burden	in	a	source	state	is	fully	offset	by	higher	taxation	in	the	residence	state	on	account	of	a	lower	foreign	tax	credit.	112	For	a	similar	conclusion,	see	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	43,	concluding	that	the	concept	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	“exclusively	covers	the	reduction	of	the	domestic	taxation	that	the	state	applying	the	tax	treaty	must	accept”.	113	In	this	circumstance,	on	the	other	hand,	it	might	be	difficult	to	conclude	that	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	the	CTA.		114	Paragraph	174	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.		115	See,	e.g.,	Luc	De	Broe,	 International	Tax	Planning	and	the	Prevention	of	Abuse,	 (Amsterdam:	 IBFD,	2008)	at	344.	See	the	discussion	of	the	object	and	purpose	of	tax	treaties	at	infra,	text	accompanying	notes	220-225.	116	This	 and	 other	 consequences	 of	 the	 PPT’s	 application	 are	 examined	 at	 infra,	 text	 accompanying	notes	274-286	under	the	heading	“Consequences	of	Application”.	
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contrast,	 the	Canadian	GAAR	defines	a	“transaction”	to	 include	“an	arrangement	or	event”,	 and	 distinguishes	 a	 transaction	 from	 a	 “series	 of	 transactions”	 which	 is	defined	to	include	“related	transactions	completed	in	contemplation	of	the	series.”117	In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 definition,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 has	 held	 that	 an	ordinary	series	of	transactions	contemplates	“a	number	of	transactions	that	are	‘pre-ordained	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 a	 given	 result’	with	 ‘no	 practical	 likelihood	 that	 the	pre-planned	 events	 would	 not	 take	 place	 in	 the	 order	 ordained’’,118	and	 that	 the	statutory	 definition	 of	 the	 term	 extends	 this	 ordinary	 meaning	 to	 also	 include	transactions	that	are	completed	before	or	after	an	ordinary	series	“because	of”	or	“in	relation	to”	the	ordinary	series	and	with	knowledge	of	the	ordinary	series.119		 As	with	the	concept	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	since	the	MLI	does	not	define	the	meaning	of	a	transaction	or	an	arrangement,	it	is	arguable	that	article	1(2)	of	the	MLI	requires	these	terms	to	be	given	the	meanings	that	they	have	under	the	relevant	CTA,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	which	 these	 terms	 should	 be	 given	 the	meanings	 that	 they	have	under	domestic	law.	Since	the	Canadian	GAAR	defines	a	“transaction”	to	include	an	 “arrangement”	and	distinguishes	a	 “transaction”	 from	a	 “series	of	 transactions”,	this	interpretation	means	that	the	PPT	would,	in	the	Canadian	context,	apply	only	to	benefits	that	result	from	a	single	transaction	and	not	from	a	series	of	transactions.		 While	 the	 resolution	of	 this	 interpretive	 issue	 is	not	 as	 clear	 as	 it	 is	 for	 the	concept	of	a	 “benefit	under	a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”,	 the	 text	and	context	of	 the																																																									117	ITA,	s.	248(10).	118	Canada	Trustco,	supra	note	70	at	para.	25,	citing	Craven	v.	White,	[1989]	A.C.	398	(H.L.)	at	514,	per	Lord	Oliver.	119	Ibid.	at	para.	26.	Although	the	conclusion	that	the	extended	meaning	of	a	series	of	transactions	can	include	a	subsequent	related	transaction	has	been	criticized	as	a	strained	interpretation	of	the	words	“in	 contemplation	 of”,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 reaffirmed	 this	 interpretation	 in	 Copthorne	
Holdings,	supra	note	107	at	paras.	50-58.	
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PPT	suggest	that	the	terms	“transaction”	or	“arrangement”	should	also	be	given	an	autonomous	international	fiscal	meaning	independent	of	domestic	law.	Although	the	Canadian	 GAAR	 defines	 a	 “transaction”	 to	 include	 an	 “arrangement”,	 the	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 an	 “arrangement”	 is	 broad	 enough	 to	 contemplate	 a	 series	 of	transactions.	 More	 importantly,	 while	 the	 official	 French	 version	 of	 the	 ITA	translates	“transaction”	as	“opération”	which	is	defined	to	include	“une	convention,	un	méchanism	 ou	 un	 événement”,	 the	 official	 French	 version	 of	 the	MLI	 refers	 to	“une	 transaction”	and	 “un	montage”	–	 the	 latter	of	which	 is	 also	broad	and	clearly	contemplates	 a	 series	 of	 transactions.	 As	 well,	 since	 contracting	 jurisdictions	presumably	 intended	 the	 PPT	 to	 have	 a	 common	 meaning	 in	 all	 CTAs,	 it	 seems	reasonable	 that	 the	 words	 “transaction”	 or	 “arrangement”	 should	 be	 given	 a	meaning	independent	of	domestic	law.120		 Not	surprisingly,	this	interpretation	is	consistent	with	the	commentary	on	the	2017	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 which	 states	 that	 the	 terms	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 “should	 be	 interpreted	 broadly	 and	 include	 any	 agreement,	understanding,	scheme,	transaction	or	series	of	transactions,	whether	or	not	legally	enforceable.” 121 	More	 specifically,	 the	 commentary	 continues,	 the	 words	“transaction”	 or	 “arrangement”	 include	 “the	 creation,	 assignment,	 acquisition	 or	transfer	 of	 the	 income	 itself,	 or	 of	 the	 property	 or	 right	 in	 respect	 of	 which	 the	income	 accrues”	 and	 “encompass	 arrangements	 concerning	 the	 establishment,	
																																																								120 	For	 a	 similar	 argument	 that	 undefined	 words	 in	 the	 PPT	 should	 have	 an	 autonomous	interpretation,	see	Blażej	Kużniacki,	“The	Principal	Purpose	Test	(PPT)	in	BEPS	Action	6	and	the	MLI:	Exploring	the	Challenges	arising	from	Its	Legal	Implementation	and	Practical	Application”	(2018),	10	
World	Tax	J.	1	at	6-7.	121	Paragraph	177	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	Model	Convention.	
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acquisition	 or	 maintenance	 of	 a	 person	 who	 derives	 the	 income,	 including	 the	qualification	of	that	person	as	a	resident	of	one	of	the	Contracting	States,	and	include	steps	 that	 persons	 may	 take	 themselves	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 residence.”122	As	 a	result,	 as	 one	 commentator	 observes,	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 abusive	 conduit	arrangements	 as	 well	 as	 abusive	 restructurings. 123 	Indeed,	 examples	 in	 the	commentary	 on	 the	 2017	 OECD	 model	 convention	 suggest	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 –	where	other	requirements	of	the	PPT	are	satisfied	–	apply	to	conduit	arrangements	such	as	those	in	Prévost	Car	Inc.	v.	The	Queen124	and	Velcro	Canada	Inc.	v.	Canada,125	dividend	transfer	transactions	like	those	in	the	Royal	Dutch	Oil	Company	case126	and	the	 Bank	 of	 Scotland	 case,127	as	 well	 as	 steps	 that	 are	 taken	 in	 order	 to	 change	 a	corporation’s	residence	for	tax	purposes	as	occurred	in	MIL	Investments	(SA)	v.	The	
Queen128	and	Yanko-Weiss	Holdings	(1996)	Ltd.	v.	Holon	Assessing	Office.129	
	 	
																																																								122	Ibid.	123		Danon,	supra	note	69	at	43.	124	[2008]	5	C.T.C.	2306,	2008	D.T.C.	3080	(T.C.C.),	aff’d	[2009]	3	C.T.C.	160,	2009	D.T.C.	5053	(F.C.A.)	[hereafter	Prévost	Car].	This	case	is	summarized	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	125	[2012]	4	C.T.C.	2029,	2012	D.T.C.	1100	(T.C.C.)	[hereafter	Velcro].	This	case	is	summarized	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	126	BNB	1994/217[herein	referred	to	as	the	Royal	Dutch	Oil	Company	case].	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	 first	part	of	 this	article,	and	 is	 the	basis	 for	example	A	 in	paragraph	182	of	 the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	127	Conseil	d’Etat,	Case	283314	(29	December	2006)	[herein	referred	to	as	the	Bank	of	Scotland	case].	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article,	and	is	the	basis	for	example	B	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	128	[2006]	5	C.T.C.	2552,	2006	D.T.C.	3301	(T.C.C.),	aff’d	[2007]	4	C.T.C.	235,	2007	D.T.C.	5437	(F.C.A.)	[hereafter	MIL	Investments].	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	See	paragraph	180	of	the	 commentary	 on	 article	 29	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 referring	 to	 a	 change	 of	 residence	shortly	before	the	sale	of	property.	129	(2007)	10	ITLR	254	[hereafter		[hereafter	Yanko-Weiss	Holdings].	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	 of	 this	 article.	 See	 paragraph	 177	 of	 the	 Commentary	 on	 article	 29	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	convention,	 referring	 specifically	 to	 “steps	 [that]	 are	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	meetings	 of	 the	board	of	directors	of	a	company	are	held	in	a	different	country	in	order	to	claim	that	the	company	has	changed	its	residence.”	
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(c)	 Benefit	 Results	 Directly	 or	 Indirectly	 from	 the	 Transaction	 or	
Arrangement		 In	order	for	a	transaction	or	arrangement	to	“result”	in	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	there	must	be	a	 connection	or	nexus	between	 the	 transaction	or	arrangement	and	the	benefit	under	the	CTA,	such	that	the	benefit	may	reasonably	be	considered	to	be	attributable	 to	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement.	 Although	 this	 nexus	may	 be	 easily	established	where	 a	 single	 transaction	 results	 directly	 in	 a	 benefit,	 it	 can	 be	more	difficult	to	identify	where	the	benefit	results	indirectly	from	another	transaction	or	arrangement,	or	where	the	benefit	results	from	several	transactions	that	may	or	may	not	comprise	an	arrangement	or	series	of	transactions.		 Beginning	with	indirect	benefits,	the	use	of	the	words	“directly	or	indirectly”	in	 the	PPT	are	 intended	 to	expand	 the	nexus	requirement,	making	 it	 clear	 that	 the	provision	 applies	 not	 only	 to	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA	 that	 results	 directly	 from	transactions	or	arrangements	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	which	is	to	obtain	the	benefit,	but	also	to	benefits	that	result	from	other	transactions	or	arrangements	that	do	 not	 themselves	 result	 in	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA.130	As	 a	 result,	 the	 commentary	explains,	where	a	company	that	has	loaned	funds	to	a	taxpayer	in	a	state	with	which	the	company’s	state	of	 residence	does	not	have	a	 tax	 treaty	 transfers	 the	 loan	 to	a	subsidiary	that	is	resident	in	a	state	with	which	the	borrower’s	state	of	residence	has	entered	into	a	tax	treaty	in	order	to	obtain	benefits	under	this	treaty,	the	PPT	could	apply	to	deny	the	benefit	of	a	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	on	interest	payments	on																																																									130	See	paragraph	176	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	stating	that	the	phrase	 “that	 resulted	directly	 or	 indirectly	 in	 that	 benefit”	 is	 “deliberately	 broad”	 and	 “intended	 to	include	situations	where	the	person	who	claims	the	application	of	benefits	under	a	tax	treaty	may	do	so	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 transaction	 that	 is	 not	 the	 one	 that	 was	 undertaken	 for	 one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes	of	obtaining	that	treaty	benefit.”	
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the	grounds	that	this	benefit	has	resulted	indirectly	from	a	tax-motivated	transfer	of	the	loan,	notwithstanding	that	the	interest	payment	is	not	itself	tax-motivated.131		 It	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 determine	 when	 a	 number	 of	 transactions	 may	 be	regarded	as	a	series	of	 transactions	or	 “arrangement”	 for	 the	purposes	of	 the	PPT.	Although	a	narrow	interpretation	of	a	“series	of	transactions”	might	suggest	that	an	“arrangement”	 comprises	 only	 transactions	 that	 are	 “pre-ordained	 in	 order	 to	produce	 a	 given	 result”	 with	 “no	 practical	 likelihood	 that	 the	 pre-planned	 events	would	 not	 take	 place	 in	 the	 order	 ordained,’’132	a	 broader	 interpretation	 could	encompass	all	mutually	interdependent	transactions	the	legal	effect	of	which	would	be	meaningless	without	the	series,	or	all	transactions	which	are	undertaken	in	order	to	obtain	the	particular	benefit.133	Since	the	PPT	uses	the	word	“arrangement”	rather	than	 the	 term	 “series	 of	 transactions”	 and	 domestic	 law	 in	 Canada	 deliberately	extends	 the	 narrow	 meaning	 of	 a	 series	 of	 transactions	 to	 include	 related	transactions	completed	in	contemplation	of	a	series,	it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	meaning	of	an	“arrangement”	in	the	PPT	should	be	interpreted	more	broadly	than	 the	narrow	meaning	 of	 an	 ordinary	 series	 of	 transactions	 adopted	 in	English	and	Canadian	law.		 Even	if	the	concept	of	an	“arrangement”	is	broadly	defined,	however,	there	is	a	 limit	 to	 the	 transactions	 and	 events	 that	 may	 reasonably	 be	 included	 in	 this	concept.	While	it	may	be	relatively	easy	to	conclude	that	an	acquisition	of	shares	by	a	
																																																								131	Paragraph	176	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	132	Canada	Trustco,	supra	note	70	at	para.	25,	citing	Craven	v.	White,	supra	note	118.	133	For	a	useful	discussion	of	 these	alternative	 interpretations	of	a	 “series	of	 transactions”,	 see	 John	Tiley,	 “Series	 of	 Transactions”	 in	 1988	Conference	Report:	 Report	 of	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Fortieth	Tax	
Conference,	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1988)	8:1	at	8.3-8.4.	
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company	shortly	before	the	payment	of	a	dividend	by	another	company	is	part	of	an	arrangement	the	result	of	which	is	to	obtain	the	benefit	of	a	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	 on	 the	 dividend	 payment,	 this	 conclusion	 is	 difficult	 to	 sustain	 where	 the	acquisition	 occurs	 long	 before	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 dividend	 –	 particularly	 if	 the	acquisition	 is	 motivated	 by	 a	 non-tax	 purpose.	 Likewise,	 where	 assets	 are	contributed	 to	 a	 company	 shortly	 before	 a	 sale	 of	 its	 shares	 in	 order	 to	 dilute	 the	proportion	 of	 the	 company’s	 assets	 attributable	 to	 immovable	 property,	 it	 is	relatively	easy	to	conclude	that	this	transaction	is	part	of	an	arrangement	the	result	of	 which	 is	 to	 obtain	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 treaty	 exemption	 on	 capital	 gains	 from	 the	alienation	of	the	shares.	Where	the	assets	are	contributed	long	before	the	share	sale,	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	difficult	to	regard	this	transaction	as	part	of	an	arrangement	the	result	of	which	is	obtain	a	treaty	benefit	–	especially	if	the	assets	are	contributed	to	the	company	for	a	non-tax	purpose.		 In	the	absence	of	specific	rules	like	the	time	period	tests	in	articles	8(1)	and	9(1)	of	the	MLI,134	determining	whether	a	transaction	is	part	of	an	arrangement	that	results	 in	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA	 is	 ultimately	 a	 matter	 of	 interpretation,	 having	regard	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 specific	 transaction	 and	 other	 transactions	and	the	purposes	for	which	the	transaction	is	undertaken.	In	this	respect,	therefore,	as	with	the	characterization	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	the	determination	of	whether	a	transaction	is	part	of	an	arrangement	that	results	directly	or	 indirectly	 in	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	necessarily	depends	on	the	purposes	of	the	transaction.	
																																																								134	See	the	earlier	discussion	of	these	provisions	at	supra	 text	accompanying	notes	39-42	and	48-49	under	the	heading	“Other	Treaty	Abuses”.	
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(2)	 Purpose	Test		 Like	the	guiding	principle,	which	refers	to	“a	main	purpose”	for	entering	into	a	transaction	or	arrangement,135	and	limited	purpose	tests	in	tax	treaties	which	refer	to	“the	main	purpose	or	one	of	the	main	purposes”	of	any	person	concerned	with	the	creation	or	assignment	of	property	in	respect	of	which	an	amount	is	paid,136	the	PPT	applies	where	 it	 is	 “reasonable	 to	conclude,	having	 regard	 to	all	 relevant	 facts	and	circumstances,“	that	obtaining	a	treaty	benefit	was	“one	of	the	principal	purposes”	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	that	resulted	in	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.		As	a	result,	the	purpose	test	in	the	PPT	adopts	a	lower	threshold	than	most	domestic	GAARs	which	generally	 apply	 only	 where	 the	 sole	 or	 dominant	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 is	 to	obtain	a	 tax	benefit,137	and	a	 lower	 threshold	 than	 the	Canadian	GAAR	which	 applies	where	 a	 transaction	 is	 undertaken	or	 arranged	 “primarily”	 to	obtain	a	tax	benefit.138		 Like	the	Canadian	GAAR	and	unlike	the	guiding	principle	and	limited	purpose	tests,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 PPT	 refers	 to	 the	 purposes	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 itself,	 rather	 than	 the	 purpose	 “for	 entering	 into”	 the	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 or	 the	 purpose	 “of	 persons	 concerned”	 with	 a	 transaction	 or	arrangement,	suggesting	a	more	objective	analysis	of	 the	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement,	beyond	the	subjective	intentions	of	the	parties	to	these	transactions																																																									135	Paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	136	See,	e.g.,	articles	10(7),	11(9)	and	12(8)	of	the	Canada-UK	tax	treaty.	Convention	Between	Canada	and	the	Government	of	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	for	the	Avoidance	of	Double	Taxation	and	the	Prevention	of	Fiscal	Evasion	with	respect	to	Taxes	on	Income	and	Capital	Gains,	signed	in	London	on	September	8,	1978,	and	amended	by	Protocols	signed	on	April	15,	1980,	October	16,	1985,	May	7,	2003,	and	July	21,	2014	(herein	referred	to	as	“the	Canada-UK	tax	treaty”).		137	Paulo	 Rosenblatt	 and	Manuel	 Tron,	 “General	 Report”	 2018	 IFA	 Congress,	 Cahiers	 de	 droit	 fiscal	
international,	vol.	103	(Rotterdam:	International	Fiscal	Association,	2018)	17	at	29-30.	138	ITA,	s.	245(3).	
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or	 arrangements.	 This	 objective	 analysis	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 use	 of	 the	 words	“reasonable	to	conclude”	in	the	PPT,	which	do	not	appear	in	the	guiding	principle	or	limited	purpose	tests	in	tax	treaties,	but	are	similar	to	the	words	“may	reasonably	be	considered”	which	appear	in	the	Canadian	GAAR.		 Unlike	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 however,	 which	 does	 not	 apply	 where	 a	transaction	 “may	 reasonably	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 undertaken	 or	 arranged	primarily	for	bona	fide	purposes	other	than	to	obtain	the	tax	benefit,”	the	PPT	applies	where	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 of	 an	arrangement	or	transaction	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.	As	a	result,	while	the	Canadian	GAAR	imposes	an	initial	burden	on	taxpayers	to	provide	a	reasonable	explanation	as	to	why	the	primary	purpose	of	a	transaction	was	not	to	obtain	a	tax	benefit	which	the	revenue	department	must	then	refute,	the	PPT	imposes	an	initial	burden	on	the	revenue	authority	to	provide	a	reasonable	explanation	as	to	why	one	of	 the	principal	purposes	of	an	arrangement	or	 transaction	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	which	the	taxpayer	must	refute.		 This	 section	 examines	 each	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT,	considering:	 (1)	 the	 concept	of	 a	purpose	of	 a	 transaction	or	 arrangement,	 (2)	 the	meaning	of	“one	of	the	principal	purposes”	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement,	and	(3)	the	effect	of	 the	words	 “reasonable	 to	 conclude”	on	 the	application	of	 the	purpose	test.	
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(a)	 Purpose	of	a	Transaction	or	Arrangement	Unlike	 anti-avoidance	 provisions	 in	 early	 tax	 treaties	which	 referred	 to	 the	intention	 of	 a	 taxpayer,139 	limited	 principal	 purposes	 tests	 which	 refer	 to	 the	purpose	of	persons	concerned	with	the	creation	or	assignment	of	rights,140	and	the	“guiding	principle”	which	refers	to	a	purpose	“for	entering	into	certain	transactions	or	arrangements”,141	the	PPT	does	not	refer	to	the	subjective	intentions	or	purposes	of	 parties	 to	 a	 transaction	or	 arrangement	but	 to	 the	purposes	of	 a	 transaction	or	arrangement	 itself.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 is	 similar	 to	 the	purpose	 test	 in	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction,	rather	than	the	purpose	of	the	parties	to	a	transaction.		 Although	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 reference	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	suggests	a	purely	objective	test	irrespective	of	the	subjective	purposes	of	parties	to	a	transaction,142	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	that	a	transaction	or	arrangement	could	have	transcendent	purposes	independent	of	the	purposes	of	the	parties	to	the	transaction	or	arrangement.143	On	this	basis,	it	follows	that	a	purpose	test	based	on	the	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	not	entirely	objective,	but	may	take	into	account																																																									139	See.	e.g.,	article	XI(2)	of	the	1942	Canada-US	tax	treaty,	which	denied	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	for	dividends	paid	by	a	subsidiary	to	a	parent	company	if	“the	competent	authority”	of	the	source	state	was	“satisfied	that	the	corporate	relationship	between	the	two	corporations	has	been	arranged	or	 is	 maintained	 primarily	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 taking	 advantage	 of	 this	 paragraph.”	 Convention	Between	 Canada	 and	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 for	 the	 Avoidance	 of	 Double	 Taxation	 and	 the	Establishment	of	Rules	of	Reciprocal	Administrative	Assistance	in	the	Case	of	Income	Taxes,	signed	at	Washington,	DC	on	March	4,	1942	(herein	referred	to	as	“the	1942	Canada-US	tax	treaty”).			140	See,	e.g.,	articles	10(7),	11(9)	and	12(8)	of	the	Canada-UK	tax	treaty,	supra	note	136.	141	Paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	142	Brian	J.	Arnold	and	James	R.	Wilson,	“The	General	Anti-Avoidance	Rule	-	Part	2”	(1988),	34:5	Can.	
Tax	J.	1123	at	1157.	See	also	Carlos	Palao	Taboada,	“OECD	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	Action	6:	The	General	Anti-Abuse	Rule”	 (2015),	 10	Bulletin	for	International	Taxation	 602	at	605,	 concluding	that	the	purpose	of	a	transaction	“is	not	a	quality	pertaining	to	the	will	of	a	party	to	the	transaction,	but	rather	a	legal	attribute	of	the	transaction	itself.”	143	See	David	G.	Duff,	et.	al.	Canadian	Income	Tax	Law,	6th	ed.	(Markham,	LexisNexis,	2018)	at	184,	n.	64.	
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the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 the	 persons	 who	 are	 parties	 to	 the	 transaction	 or	arrangement.144	The	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	is	consistent	with	this	conclusion,	observing	that	 is	 important	to	consider	“the	aims	and	objects	of	all	
persons	 involved	 in	 putting	 [an]	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 into	 place	 or	 being	 a	party	to	it.”145	In	assessing	the	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement,	on	the	other	hand,	courts	consistently	emphasize	that	they	should	not	“be	guided	only	by	a	taxpayer’s	statements,	 ex	 post	 facto	 or	 otherwise”	 but	 should	 instead	 look	 for	 “objective	manifestations	of	purpose.”146	In	 this	 respect,	 as	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Canada	has	stated,	“purpose	is	ultimately	a	question	of	fact,	to	be	decided	with	due	regard	for	all	of	 the	circumstances.”147	The	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	adopts	a	similar	 approach,	 stating	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 an	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 is	 “a	question	 of	 fact,	 which	 can	 only	 be	 answered	 by	 considering	 all	 circumstances	surrounding	the	arrangement	or	event	on	a	case	by	case	basis,”148	and	that	a	person	cannot	 avoid	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 “by	merely	 asserting	 that	 the	 arrangement	 or	transaction	was	not	undertaken	or	arranged	to	obtain	the	benefits”	of	a	tax	treaty.149	Where	a	transaction	results	in	a	tax	benefit,	moreover,	at	least	one	Canadian	tax	case	has	held	that	the	revenue	authority	may	reasonably	infer	that	a	purpose	of	the	 transaction	 was	 to	 obtain	 this	 tax	 benefit,	 so	 that	 the	 taxpayer	must	 offer	 an																																																									144	Ibid.	145	Paragraph	178	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	[emphasis	added].	146	Symes	v.	Canada,	[1994]	1	C.T.C.	40,	94	D.T.C.	6001	(S.C.C.),	at	para.	74.	See	also	Groupe	Honco	Inc.	
v.	Canada,	2012	TCC	305	at	para.	16	[hereafter	Group	Honco	Inc.].	147	Symes,	supra	note	146	at	para	74.	For	this	reason,	it	is	mistaken	to	conclude	that	the	purpose	test	in	the	PPT	requires	an	assessment	of	“motives”	which	are	“impossible	to	prove.”	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	658.	148	Paragraph	178	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	149	Paragraph	179	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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explanation	that	is	“neither	improbable	nor	unreasonable”	to	rebut	this	inference.150	Since	 a	 purpose	 test	 clearly	 differs	 from	 a	 result	 test,	 however,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	transaction	results	 in	a	 tax	benefit	 is	generally	not	 itself	sufficient	 to	conclude	that	one	 of	 its	 purposes	 was	 to	 obtain	 this	 benefit.151	The	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	model	convention	arrives	at	the	same	conclusion,	emphasizing	that:		It	 should	not	be	 lightly	assumed	…	 that	obtaining	a	benefit	under	a	 tax	 treaty	was	one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 of	 an	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 and	 merely	reviewing	 the	effects	of	 an	arrangement	will	not	usually	enable	a	 conclusion	 to	be	drawn	about	its	purposes.152	
	
(b)	 One	of	the	Principal	Purposes	of	a	Transaction	or	Arrangement	Like	 limited	 purpose	 tests	 in	 tax	 treaties	 which	 apply	 where	 “the	 main	purpose	or	one	of	the	main	purposes”	of	any	person	concerned	with	the	creation	or	assignment	of	property	 in	 respect	of	which	an	amount	 is	paid	 is	 to	obtain	a	 treaty	benefit,153	the	 PPT	 applies	 where	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 concluded	 that	 “one	 of	 the	principal	purposes”	of	 a	 transaction	or	 arrangement	 is	 to	obtain	 a	benefit	 under	 a	CTA.	 Similar	 language	 appears	 in	 the	 general	 anti-abuse	 rule	 of	 the	 EU	 Anti-Tax	Avoidance	Directive	(ATAD),154	and	identical	words	appear	in	the	anti-abuse	rule	in	
																																																								150	Placer	Dome	Inc.	v.	Canada,	[1977]	1	C.T.C.	72,	96	D.T.C.	6562	(F.C.A.)	at	para	21	[hereafter	Placer	
Dome].	 See	 also	Groupe	Honco	 Inc.,	 supra	note	 146	 at	 para.	 18,	 concluding	 that	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	consider	“the	inherent	likelihood	or	probability	of	an	event	occurring”	in	assessing	where	one	of	the	main	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	series	of	transactions	was	to	obtain	a	dividend.	151	Placer	 Dome,	 supra	 note	 150	 at	 para.	23,	 observing	 that	 “the	 term	 ‘result’	 invites	 an	 objective	appreciation	of	the	factual	circumstances”	and	concluding	that	the	use	of	the	word	“purpose”	in	one	context	and	“result”	in	another	“requires	that	a	different	meaning	be	attributed	to	each.”	152	Paragraph	178	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	153	See,	e.g.,	articles	10(7),	11(9)	and	12(8)	of	the	Canada-UK	tax	treaty,	supra	note	136.	154	Article	6(1)	of	EU	Council	Directive	2016/1164	(12	July	2016),	providing	that,	for	the	purpose	of	calculating	 corporate	 tax	 liability,	 member	 states	 “shall	 ignore	 an	 arrangement	 or	 a	 series	 of	arrangements	which,	having	been	put	into	place	for	the	main	purpose	or	one	of	the	main	purposes	of	obtaining	a	tax	advantage	that	defeats	the	object	or	purpose	of	the	applicable	tax	law,	are	not	genuine	having	regard	to	all	relevant	facts	and	circumstances.”		
	 46	
the	EU	Union	Parent-Subsidiary	Directive155	and	 the	discretionary	relief	provisions	of	the	LOB	rules	in	the	MLI	and	the	US	model	tax	convention.156	In	contrast	to	these	provisions,	 domestic	 GAARs	 generally	 apply	 only	 where	 the	 sole	 or	 dominant	purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 tax	 benefit,157	and	 the	Canadian	GAAR	applies	where	a	transaction	is	undertaken	or	arranged	“primarily”	to	obtain	a	tax	benefit.158	For	 this	 reason,	 the	 PPT	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 considerable	 criticism,159	including	 the	objection	 that	 the	provision	 violates	principles	of	 legal	 certainty	 and	proportionality	 under	 European	 law. 160 	Although	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 PPT	contradicts	 EU	 law	 seems	 overblown	 given	 similar	 language	 in	 the	 ATAD	 and	identical	 language	 in	 the	 Parent-Subsidiary	Directive,161	there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	
																																																								155 	EU	 Council	 Directive	 2015/121	 (27	 January	 2015),	 amending	 the	 EU	 Council	 Directive	2011/96/EU	(30	November	2011),	stipulating	that	member	states	“shall	not	grant	the	benefit	of	this	Directive	 to	 an	 arrangement	 or	 a	 series	 of	 arrangements	which,	 having	been	put	 into	place	 for	 the	main	 purpose	 or	 one	 of	 the	main	 purposes	 of	 obtaining	 a	 tax	 advantage	 that	 defeats	 the	 object	 or	purpose	of	this	Directive,	are	not	genuine	having	regard	to	all	the	facts	or	circumstances.”	156	See	article	7(12)	of	the	MLI	and	article	22(6)	of	the	US	model	tax	convention,	which	authorize	the	competent	authority	of	state	to	grant	treaty	benefits	to	a	resident	of	the	other	state	either	generally	or	with	 respect	 to	 a	 specific	 item	 of	 income	 where,	 among	 other	 requirements,	 the	 resident	demonstrates	 to	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 the	 competent	 authority	 that	 “neither	 its	 establishment,	acquisition	or	maintenance,	nor	the	conduct	of	its	operations	had	as	one	of	its	principal	purposes	the	obtaining	of	benefits”	under	the	relevant	tax	treaty.	United	States,	Department	of	the	Treasury,	Unites	States	 Model	 Income	 Tax	 Convention,	 February	 17,	 2017	 [herein	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 US	 model	 tax	convention].	157	Rosenblatt	and	Tron,	supra	note	137	at	29-30	158	ITA,	s.	245(3).	159	See,	e.g.,	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	659-60;	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	145;	Kużniacki,	supra	note	120	at	13-14;	and	Kok,	supra	note	93	at	408.		160	See,	e.g.,	E.C.C.M.	Kemmeren,	“Where	 is	EU	Law	in	the	OECD	BEPS	Discussion?”	(2014),	23(4)	EC	
Tax	Review	190;	and	Luc	De	Broe,	“Tax	Treaty	and	EU	Aspects	of	the	LOB	and	PPT	provision	proposed	by	 BEPS	 Action	 6,”	 in	 Robert	 Danon,	 ed.,	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	 Shifting:	 Impact	 for	European	and	
International	Tax	Policy,	(Geneva/Zurich:	Shulthess,	2016)	197.	161	See,	e.g.,	Philip	Baker,	“The	BEPS	Action	Plan	in	light	of	EU	Law:	Treaty	Abuse”	[2015]	Brit.	Tax	Rev.	408,	referring	to	the	language	of	the	Parent-Subsidiary	Directive;	and	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	45-48,	referring	to	the	ATAD	and	arguing	that	the	PPT	implicitly	incorporates	a	“genuine	economic	activity”	element	that	corresponds	to	EU	law.	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	which	concludes	that	the	PPT	does	not	 contradict	 EU	 law,	 see	 Dennis	Weber,	 “The	 Reasonableness	 Test	 of	 the	 Principal	 Purpose	 Test	
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PPT	adopts	a	lower	purpose	threshold	than	most	domestic	GAARs	and	will	therefore	be	easier	for	revenue	authorities	to	apply	than	these	anti-abuse	provisions	–	a	result	which	is	presumably	intended	by	contracting	jurisdictions	to	the	MLI	given	extensive	criticism	 directed	 at	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 PPT	 in	 comments	 on	 the	 BEPS	 Action	 6	discussion	draft.162		 While	 the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 is	 based	 on	 limited	 purpose	 tests	 in	 tax	treaties,	these	limited	purpose	tests	are	themselves	derived	from	domestic	tax	law	in	the	United	Kingdom,	where	several	specific	anti-avoidance	rules	apply	where	“one	of	the	main	objects”	or	“one	of	the	main	purposes”	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	tax	advantage.163	Not	surprisingly,	given	the	influence	of	U.K.	income	tax	law	 on	 Canadian	 income	 tax	 law,164	similar	 purpose	 tests	 also	 appear	 in	 several	specific	anti-avoidance	rules	in	Canada.165	Addressing	this	language	in	the	context	of	a	specific	anti-avoidance	rule,	one	UK	case	concluded	that	the	concept	of	a	main	object	or	purpose	“envisages	…	a	range	
																																																																																																																																																																						Rule	in	OECD	BEPS	Action	6	(Tax	Treaty	Abuse)	versus	the	EU	Principle	of	Legal	Certainty	and	the	EU	Abuse	of	Law	Case	Law,”	(2017)	10	Erasmus	Law	Rev.	48.	162 	Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development,	 “Comments	 Received	 on	 Public	Discussion	 Draft	 ‘BEPS	 Action	 6:	 Preventing	 the	 Granting	 of	 Treaty	 Benefits	 in	 Inappropriate	Circumstances”	(2014).	163	Jonathan	Schwarz,	Schwarz	on	Tax	Treaties,	3d	ed.,	(London:	CCH,	2013)	at	421.		164	Benjamin	Alarie	and	David	G.	Duff,	“The	Legacy	of	UK	Tax	Concepts	in	Canadian	Income	Tax	Law”	Influence	of	U.K.	Tax	Law	on	Canadian	Tax	Law,”	[2008]	British	Tax	Rev.	228.	165	See,	e.g.,	ITA,	s.	83(2.1)	which	deems	a	dividend	to	be	a	taxable	dividend	and	not	a	capital	dividend	where	the	dividend	is	paid	on	a	share	that	was	acquired	by	its	holder	in	a	transaction	or	as	part	of	a	series	 of	 transactions	 “one	 of	 the	main	 purposes”	 of	which	was	 to	 receive	 the	 dividend:	 s.	 94.1(1)	which	 includes	 an	 amount	 in	 respect	 of	 offshore	 investment	 fund	 property,	 among	 other	circumstances,	 where	 “one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons”	 for	 the	 taxpayer	 acquiring,	 holding	 or	 having	 an	interest	in	this	property	was	to	derive	a	benefit	from	portfolio	investments	in	such	a	manner	that	the	taxes	 on	 income,	 profits	 against	 gains	 from	 such	 assets	 are	 significantly	 less	 than	 they	would	have	been	if	the	income,	profits	or	gains	had	been	earned	directly	by	the	taxpayer;	and	s.	256.1(6)	which	deems	 the	 attribute	 trading	 restrictions	 to	 apply	 as	 if	 control	 of	 one	 or	 more	 corporations	 were	acquired	where	control	of	a	particular	corporation	is	acquired	by	a	person	or	group	of	persons	and	it	can	reasonably	be	concluded	that	“one	of	the	main	reasons”	for	the	acquisition	of	control	is	so	that	a	specified	provision	does	not	apply	to	one	or	more	corporations.	
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of	objectives”	which	“must	be	assessed	in	some	sort	of	priority	or	hierarchy”	in	order	to	determine	“which	are	of	sufficient	significance	to	count	as	‘main’	from	those	which	are	not.”166	Another	case	states	that	a	main	purpose	is	always	“more	than	trivial”	and	“has	 a	 connotation	 of	 importance.”167	Other	 UK	 decisions	 have	 held	 that	 a	 tax	advantage	may	be	a	main	object	or	purpose	of	a	transaction	“even	if	the	transaction	…	had	a	commercial	objective	at	least	as	important”	as	the	tax	advantage,168	and	will	necessarily	 be	 a	 main	 object	 or	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	 if	 the	 transaction	 is	 “so	influenced	by	[its]	tax	effect”	that	is	it	“reasonable	to	assume	that	the	tax	effect	must	have	 been	 one	 of	 the	 main	 purposes”	 of	 the	 transaction169	–	 for	 example	 if	 the	transaction	 as	 structured	 would	 not	 have	 been	 undertaken	 but	 for	 the	 tax	advantage. 170Where	 transactions	 are	 entered	 into	 for	 a	 “genuine	 commercial	purpose,”	on	the	other	hand,	and	are	not	deliberately	structured	in	way	to	obtain	a	tax	advantage,	the	tax	advantage	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	main	object	or	purpose	of	the	transaction.171	The	 commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	 convention	 is	broadly	 consistent	with	these	 judicial	 decisions,	 stating	 that	 the	PPT	may	 apply	where	 “at	 least	 one	of	 the	principal	purposes”	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	tax	treaty,	notwithstanding	that	there	may	also	be	other	principal	purposes	for	the																																																									166	Lloyds	TSB	Equipment	Leasing	(No.	1)	Ltd.	v.	Commissioners	for	Her	Majesty’s	Revenue	and	Customs,	[2012]	 UKFTT	 47	 (TC)	 at	 para.	 388.	 This	 statement	 was	 affirmed	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	
Commissioners	 for	Her	Majesty’s	 Revenue	 and	 Customs	 v.	 Lloyds	 TSB	Equipment	 Leasing	 (No.	 1)	 Ltd.,	[2014]	EWCA	Civ	1062	at	para.	52	[hereafter	Lloyd’s	TSB	Equipment	Leasing	(CA)].	167 	Travel	 Document	 Service	 &	 Ladbroke	 Group	 International	 v.	 Commissioners	 for	 Her	 Majesty’s	
Revenue	&	Customs,	[2018]	EWCA	Civ	549	at	para.	48	48	[hereafter	Travel	Document	Service].	168	See,	 e.g.,	 Commissioners	 for	 Her	Majesty’s	 Revenue	 and	 Customs	 v.	 Lloyds	 TSB	 Equipment	 Leasing	
(No.	1)	Ltd.,	[2013]	UKUT	0368	(TCC)	at	para.	82	[hereafter	Lloyds	TSB	Equipment	Leasing	(TCC)].	169	AH	Field	(Holdings)	Ltd.	v.	Revenue	and	Customs,	[2012]	TC	01800	at	para.	126.	170	Ibid.	at	para.	176.	171	Lloyd’s	TSB	Equipment	Leasing	(CA),	supra	note	166	at	para.	65.	
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transaction	or	arrangement.172	As	a	result,	it	explains,	where	a	person	sells	property	after	 changing	 residence	 and	 “one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes”	 of	 this	 change	 “is	 to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	tax	convention,”	the	PPT	could	apply	“notwithstanding	the	fact	that	there	may	also	be	other	principal	purposes	for	changing	residence,	such	as	facilitating	 the	 sale	 of	 the	 property	 or	 the	 re-investment	 of	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	alienation.”173 	In	 addition,	 it	 emphasizes,	 where	 an	 arrangement	 “can	 only	 be	reasonably	explained	by	a	benefit	 that	arises	under	a	 treaty,”	 it	necessarily	 follows	that	“one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	that	arrangement	was	to	obtain	the	benefit.”174	In	 contrast,	 the	 commentary	 continues,	 a	 purpose	 will	 not	 be	 a	 principal	purpose	if:	…	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 conclude,	 having	 regard	 to	 all	 the	 relevant	 facts	 and	circumstances,	that	obtaining	the	benefit	was	not	a	principal	consideration	and	would	not	 have	 justified	 entering	 into	 any	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 that	 has,	 alone	 or	together	with	other	transactions,	resulted	in	the	benefit.175		As	a	result,	it	maintains,	where	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	“inextricably	linked	to	a	core	commercial	activity,	and	its	form	has	not	been	driven	by	considerations	of	obtaining	a	benefit,	it	is	unlikely	that	its	principal	purpose	will	be	considered	to	be	to	obtain	 that	benefit.”176	For	 example,	where	 a	 company	 resident	 in	one	 state	 (RCO)	establishes	a	manufacturing	plant	in	a	developing	country	“in	order	to	benefit	from	
																																																								172	Paragraph	180	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	173	Ibid.	 This	 example	 corresponds	 to	 the	 facts	 in	MIL	 Investments,	 supra	 note	 128,	where	 the	 trial	judge	 accepted	 the	 taxpayer’s	 testimony	 that	 it	 continued	 into	 Luxembourg	 primarily	 for	 business	reasons,	 notwithstanding	 a	 substantial	 tax	 benefit.	 As	 explained	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article,	 the	taxpayer	conceded	that	the	continuation	into	Luxembourg	was	primarily	tax-motivated	on	appeal,	but	the	 Federal	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 upheld	 the	 decision	 in	 any	 event	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 revenue	authority	failed	to	establish	that	the	transactions	were	abusive.	174	Paragraph	178	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	175	Paragraph	181	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	176	Ibid.	 Since	 the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 refers	 not	 to	 “the	 principal	 purpose”	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	arrangement	but	to	“one	of	the	principal	purposes”	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement,	the	words	“its	principal	purpose”	in	this	sentence	should	read	“one	of	its	principal	purposes”.	
	 50	
lower	manufacturing	costs”,	the	commentary	concludes	that	“the	principal	purposes	for	making	 that	 investment	 and	 building	 the	 plant	 are	 related	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	RCO’s	business	and	the	lower	manufacturing	costs	of	that	country”	–	despite	the	fact	that	the	decision	to	invest	in	the	developing	country	was	“taken	in	light	of”	the	fact	that	 the	developing	country	was	 “the	only	one”	of	 three	countries	considered	with	which	the	state	in	which	RCO	is	resident	has	a	tax	treaty.177		To	 some	 commentators,	 this	 example	 and	 specific	 statements	 in	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	suggest	that	the	PPT	should	be	applied	only	where	the	primary	purpose	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	to	obtain	a	treaty	benefit,	 not	where	one	of	 its	 principal	 purposes	 is	 to	 obtain	 the	benefit.178	Indeed,	since	 the	 example	 indicates	 that	 investment	 was	made	 in	 “the	 only	 one”	 of	 three	countries	with	which	the	state	in	which	RCO	is	resident	has	a	tax	treaty,	it	is	not	clear	why	obtaining	treaty	benefits	was	not	“a	principal	purpose”	of	the	investment,	even	though	 it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	 it	was	not	the	primary	purpose	of	 the	investment.179	The	 commentary	 is	 also	 poorly	 drafted	 in	 two	 paragraphs	where	 it	appears	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 PPT	 can	 apply	 only	where	 the	 principal	 purpose	 of	 a	transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 treaty	 benefit,	 not	 where	 one	 of	 the	principal	purposes	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	is	to	obtain	a	treaty	benefit.180	
																																																								177	Example	C	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	178	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe	and	Luts,	supra	note	65	at	145;	and	Vikram	Chand,	“The	Principal	Purpose	Test	in	the	Multilateral	Convention:	An	In-Depth	Analysis”	(2018),	46	Intertax	18	at	23.	179	As	a	result,	the	better	reason	why	the	PPT	should	not	apply	to	this	example	is,	as	also	stated	in	the	commentary,	that	obtaining	treaty	benefits	in	this	case	would	be	“in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	 of	 the	 provisions”	 of	 the	 tax	 treaty,	 which	 are	 “to	 encourage	 cross-border	 investment.”	Example	C	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.		180	See	 paragraph	 174	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 29	 of	 the	OECD	model	 convention,	 stating	 the	purpose	of	the	PPT	is	“to	ensure	that	tax	conventions	apply	in	accordance	with	the	purpose	for	which	they	 were	 entered	 into,	 i.e.	 to	 provide	 benefits	 in	 respect	 of	 bona	 fide	 exchanges	 of	 goods	 and	
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Nonetheless,	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 PPT	 should	 apply	 only	 where	 the	primary	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 treaty	 benefit	 is	clearly	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 text	 of	 the	 PPT	 and	 with	 an	 explicit	 statement	 in	 the	Commentary	that	the	phrase	“one	of	the	principal	purposes”	means	that	“obtaining	the	benefit	under	a	 tax	 convention	need	not	be	 the	 sole	or	dominant	purpose	of	 a	particular	 arrangement	 or	 transaction.”181	As	 a	 result,	 despite	 the	 example	 and	poorly	drafted	statements	 in	 the	commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	 convention,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 is	 satisfied	 when	 “one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes”	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	to	obtain	a	treaty	benefit.	More	 plausibly,	 however,	 the	 statement	 in	 the	 commentary	 that	 “it	 is	unlikely”	 that	 a	 principal	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	benefit	 where	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 “inextricably	 linked	 to	 a	 core	commercial	 activity”	 suggests	 that	 the	 PPT	 may	 incorporate	 an	 implicit	 “genuine	economic	activity”	exception	that	generally	precludes	its	application	to	transactions	or	 arrangements	 with	 real	 economic	 substance.182	Indeed,	 this	 interpretation	 is	supported	by	several	examples	in	the	commentary,	including	the	earlier	example	of	the	manufacturing	plant	established	in	a	developing	country,183	which	conclude	that	transactions	or	arrangements	with	real	economic	substance	would	not	be	subject	to	
																																																																																																																																																																						services,	 and	 movements	 of	 capital	 and	 persons	 as	 opposed	 to	 arrangements	 whose	 principal	
objective	 is	to	secure	a	more	favourable	tax	treatment”	[emphasis	added];	and	paragraph	181	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	 the	OECD	model	convention,	concluding	that	where	an	arrangement	 is	inextricably	 linked	 to	 a	 core	 commercial	 activity,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 “its	 principal	 purpose”	 will	 be	considered	to	be	to	obtain	a	treaty	benefit	181	Paragraph	180	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	182	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	47;l	and	Chand,	supra	note	178	at	23.	183	Example	 C	 in	 paragraph	 182	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 29	 of	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	summarized	at	supra	text	accompanying	note	177.		
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the	PPT.184	Although	it	may	often	be	concluded	in	these	circumstances	that	obtaining	a	treaty	benefit	was	not	a	principal	purpose	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement,185	the	most	persuasive	reason	for	concluding	that	the	PPT	should	not	apply	in	these	cases	is	 (as	 explained	 below)	 that	 providing	 treaty	 benefits	 for	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 with	 real	 economic	 substance	 is	 generally	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	object	and	purpose	of	tax	treaties.186	
(c)	 Reasonableness	of	Conclusion	Although	judicial	decisions	suggest	that	any	purpose	test	must	be	assessed	in	light	of	objective	manifestations	of	purpose,187	the	words	“reasonable	to	conclude”	in	the	PPT	make	this	objective	assessment	explicit,	confirming	that	the	purpose	test	in	the	PPT,	like	the	purpose	test	in	the	Canadian	GAAR,	considers	“not	what	was	in	the	particular	 taxpayer’s	mind	but	what	a	 reasonable	 taxpayer	would	have	considered	the	 purpose	 of	 the	 transaction.”188	Interpreting	 similar	 language	 in	 the	 Canadian	GAAR,	 the	Federal	Court	of	Appeal	has	held	 that	 “the	 focus	will	be	on	 the	relevant	facts	and	circumstances	and	not	on	statements	of	intention.”189	
																																																								184	In	addition	to	example	C,	see	also	examples	G	and	K	of	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	 of	 the	OECD	model	 convention,	 and	 examples	B	 and	 F	 of	 paragraph	187	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	commentary.	These	examples	are	discussed	at	infra,	text	accompanying	notes	228-232.	185	See,	 e.g.,	 Danon,	 supra	 note	 69	 at	 48,	 concluding	 that	 “substance	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 elements	allowing	 the	 taxpayer	 to	demonstrate	 that	…	obtaining	 the	 relevant	 treaty	benefit	 is	not	one	of	 the	principal	 purposes	 of	 the	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 that	 resulted	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 in	 that	benefit”.	186	Infra	at	text	accompanying	notes	228-232.	187	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	146-149.	188	Arnold	and	Wilson,	supra	note	142	at	1157.	189	OSFC	Holdings	Ltd.	v.	Canada,	[2001]	F.C.J.	No.	1381,	[2001]	4	C.T.C.	82,	2001	D.T.C.	5471	(F.C.A.)	at	para.	46	[hereafter	OSFC].	
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Similarly,	 the	OECD	Commentary	 states	 that	 “different	 interpretation	 of	 the	events	 must	 be	 objectively	 considered,” 190 	and	 the	 PPT	 itself	 states	 that	 the	reasonableness	 of	 the	 conclusion	 that	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 of	 an	arrangement	 or	 transaction	 was	 to	 obtain	 a	 treaty	 benefit	 must	 be	 determined	“having	regard	to	all	relevant	 facts	and	circumstances”.191	As	well,	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	states	that	a	person	cannot	avoid	application	of	the	PPT	“by	merely	asserting	that	the	arrangement	or	transaction	was	not	undertaken	or	arranged	 to	 obtain	 the	 benefits”	 of	 a	 tax	 treaty.192	As	 a	 result,	 the	 PPT	 clearly	requires	an	objective	assessment	of	the	purposes	of	the	parties	to	the	transaction	or	arrangement.193	Unlike	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 however,	 which	 does	 not	 apply	 where	 a	transaction	may	reasonably	be	considered	 to	be	undertaken	or	arranged	primarily	for	bona	fide	purposes	other	than	to	obtain	a	tax	benefit,	the	PPT	applies	where	it	is	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 of	 the	 transaction	 or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	benefit.	As	a	result,	while	the	GAAR	places	the	onus	on	the	 taxpayer	 to	 disprove	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 of	 fact	 on	 which	 the	assessment	is	based,	the	PPT	places	the	onus	on	the	revenue	authority	to	establish	that	 a	 principal	 purpose	 of	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	was	 to	 obtain	 a	 treaty	benefit.	
																																																								190	Paragraph	179	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	191	Article	7(1)	of	the	MLI.	192	Paragraph	179	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	193	See,	 e.g.,	 Weber,	 supra	 note	 161	 at	 49,	 observing	 that	 the	 “reasonableness	 test”	 requires	 “an	objective	analysis”	of	the	facts	and	circumstances	in	order	to	determine	the	subjective	intention	of	the	taxpayer.		
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More	 significantly,	 the	 reasonableness	 language	 in	 each	 provision	 operates	differently,	resulting	in	a	lower	a	lower	burden	for	the	revenue	authority	under	the	PPT	than	under	the	Canadian	GAAR.	Under	the	GAAR,	the	taxpayer	must	provide	a	reasonable	explanation	as	 to	why	 the	primary	purpose	of	a	 transaction	was	not	 to	obtain	 a	 tax	 benefit,	which	 the	 revenue	 authority	must	 then	 refute	 by	 clearly	 and	unambiguously	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 primary	 purpose	 of	 the	 transaction	was	 to	obtain	a	tax	benefit.	In	contrast,	the	PPT	requires	the	revenue	authority	to	provide	a	reasonable	explanation	as	to	why	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	an	arrangement	or	transaction	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	which	the	taxpayer	must	then	refute	by	clearly	and	unambiguously	demonstrating	that	none	of	the	principal	purposes	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	the	benefit.194	As	 a	 result,	 the	 PPT	 not	 only	 adopts	 a	 lower	 purpose	 threshold	 than	 the	Canadian	GAAR	and	most	domestic	GAARs,	but	effectively	requires	 the	 taxpayer	 to	argue	 that	 it	 would	 be	 unreasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 a	 principal	 purpose	 of	 a	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.195	Since	this	may	be	difficult	to	establish	in	the	context	of	cross-border	transactions	or	arrangements	for	which	 tax	 implications	 are	 typically	 taken	 into	 account,196	the	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	PPT	may	be	relatively	easy	to	satisfy,	as	a	result	of	which	application	of	the	PPT	will	
																																																								194	See,	e.g.,	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	658,	concluding	that	this	requirement	is	“not	too	demanding”	since	the	revenue	department’s	argument	need	only	be	“reasonable”	not	“compelling”.		195	See,	 e.g.,	 DeBroe	 and	 Luts,	 supra	 note	 65	 at	 145,	 concluding	 on	 this	 basis	 that	 the	 purpose	threshold	in	the	PPT	“is	set	extremely	low”.	196	See,	e.g.,	Erik	Pinetz,	“Final	Report	on	Action	6	of	the	OECD/G20	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	Initiative:	Prevention	of	Treaty	Abuse”	 (2016),	70	Bulletin	for	International	Taxation	113	at	11;	and	Ansh	Bhargava,	“The	Principal	Purpose	Test:	Functioning,	Elements	and	Legal	Relevance”	in	Daniel	W.	Blum	and	Markus	Seiler,	eds.,	Preventing	Treaty	Abuse,	(Vienna:	Linde,	2016)	311	at	318..	
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turn	 primarily	 on	 whether	 granting	 the	 benefit	 is	 in	 accordance	 the	 object	 and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	CTA.197	
(3)	 Object	and	Purpose	Test	Where	 the	 result	 test	 and	 the	purpose	 test	 are	 satisfied,	 the	PPT	 applies	 to	deny	 a	 treaty	 benefit	 “unless	 it	 is	 established	 that	 granting	 that	 benefit	 in	 these	circumstances	would	be	 in	accordance	with	 the	object	and	purpose	of	 the	relevant	provisions”	of	the	CTA.	Similarly,	the	guiding	principle	applies	only	where	obtaining	a	more	favourable	tax	position	“would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions”	of	a	tax	treaty,198	and	the	Canadian	GAAR	applies	only	if	it	may	reasonably	be	considered	that	the	transaction	results	in	a	misuse	of	provisions	of	the	ITA	or	other	relevant	enactments	or	an	abuse	having	regard	to	these	provisions	read	as	 a	 whole199	–	 which	 entails	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 these	provisions.200	In	 contrast	 to	 the	object	 and	purpose	 tests	 in	 the	 guiding	principle	 and	 the	Canadian	GAAR,	however,	which	constitute	an	additional	requirement	 that	must	be	satisfied	 if	 benefits	 that	would	 otherwise	 be	 available	 are	 to	 be	 denied,	 the	 object	and	purpose	test	in	the	PPT	operates	as	an	exception	to	the	general	anti-abuse	rule,	allowing	treaty	benefits	that	would	otherwise	be	denied	by	the	provision.	As	a	result,	while	the	object	and	purpose	tests	 in	the	guiding	principle	and	the	Canadian	GAAR																																																									197	See,	e.g.,	Lang	supra	note	82	at	658-59,	suggesting	on	this	basis	 that	 the	purpose	test	 in	 the	PPT	“runs	the	risk	of	not	gaining	any	significance	in	itself.”	198	Paragraph	61	of	the	commentary	on	article	1	of	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	199	ITA,	s.	245(4).	200	See,	e.g.,	Copthorne	Holdings,	supra	note	107	at	para.	55,	explaining	that	the	characterization	of	an	avoidance	transaction	as	abusive	 is	ultimately	a	matter	of	statutory	 interpretation,	 in	which	a	court	must	first	“determine	the	object,	spirit	or	purpose	of	the	provisions”	that	are	relied	upon	in	order	to	obtain	 the	 tax	benefit,	 and	 then	decide	whether	 the	 transaction	defeats	or	 frustrates	 this	 identified	purpose.	
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require	 the	 revenue	 authorities	 to	 establish	 that	 a	 benefit	 that	 a	 taxpayer	 would	otherwise	obtain	would	contradict	the	object	and	purpose	of	relevant	provisions,	the	PPT	requires	the	taxpayer	to	establish	that	a	benefit	that	would	otherwise	be	denied	should	 be	 allowed	 because	 it	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	relevant	provisions	of	a	CTA.		 This	section	examines	each	of	the	elements	of	the	object	and	purpose	test	in	the	 PPT,	 considering:	 (1)	 the	 identification	 of	 “relevant	 provisions”	 of	 a	 CTA,	 (2)	whether	 the	 treaty	benefit	 is	 in	accordance	with	 the	 “object	and	purpose”	of	 these	provisions,	and	(3)	the	effect	of	making	the	object	and	purpose	test	an	exception	to	the	general	anti-abuse	rule.	
(a)	 Relevant	Provisions	In	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 benefit	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 denied	under	 the	PPT	may	be	granted	under	 the	object	 and	purposes	exception,	 it	 is	 first	necessary	to	identify	the	“provisions”	of	the	CTA	that	are	“relevant”	to	this	object	and	purpose	test.	Although	the	meaning	of	a	“relevant	provision”	is	neither	defined	in	the	MLI	nor	discussed	 in	 the	OECD	Commentary,	 this	 concept	necessarily	 includes	 the	specific	provision	that	is	relied	upon	in	order	to	obtain	the	benefit	under	the	CTA	–	for	 example,	 the	 article	 of	 a	 CTA	 that	 provides	 a	 reduced	withholding	 tax	 rate	 or	exemption	 from	 source	 taxation.	 Where	 a	 company	 increases	 its	 shareholding	 in	another	company	 in	order	to	obtain	a	 lower	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends,	 for	example,	 the	 treaty	 provision	 under	which	 this	 lower	 rate	 is	 granted	 is	 obviously	
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relevant	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 test.201	Likewise,	 where	 person	 splits	 up	 a	contract	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 permanent	 establishment	 status	 for	 a	 building	 site	 or	construction	 or	 installation	 project,	 the	 treaty	 provision	 that	 excludes	 short-term	contracts	from	permanent	establishment	status	is	clearly	relevant	to	the	object	and	purpose	test.202	As	well,	where	a	person	carries	out	a	transaction	or	arrangement	in	order	to	circumvent	 the	 application	 of	 another	 treaty	 provision,	 this	 other	 provision	 is	presumably	 also	 relevant	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 test.	 For	 example,	 where	 a	person	 contributes	 assets	 to	 a	 corporation	 in	 order	 to	 circumvent	 a	 substituted	property	 rule	 like	article	13(4)	of	 the	OECD	model	 convention,	 this	provision	 is	 at	least	 as	 relevant	 to	 an	object	 and	purpose	analysis	 as	 the	 general	 treaty	provision	that	exempts	gains	 from	taxation	 in	 the	source	state	 that	 is	actually	relied	upon	 in	order	to	obtain	the	treaty	benefit.		In	 addition,	 although	 the	 PPT	 refers	 only	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	“relevant	provisions”	of	a	CTA	and	not	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	CTA	as	a	whole	or	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 CTA	 read	 as	 a	 whole,203	these	 are	 undoubtedly	 also	
																																																								201	See	example	E	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	concluding	that	an	increase	in	a	company’s	shareholding	in	order	to	obtain	a	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	 under	 article	 10(2)(a)	 of	 the	 OECD	model	 convention	was	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 object	 and	purpose	of	this	provision.	202	See	example	J	 in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	concluding	that	the	splitting-up	of	a	contract	 in	order	to	avoid	permanent	establishment	status	was	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	article	5(3)	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	203	In	 this	 respect,	 the	 PPT	 (and	 the	 guiding	 principle)	 differ	 from	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 which	contemplates	a	misuse	of	provisions	of	the	ITA	and	other	relevant	enactments	and	an	abuse	“having	regard	 to	 those	provisions,	 other	 than	 this	 section,	 read	 as	 a	whole.”	 ITA,	 s.	 245(4).	 In	OSFC,	 supra	note	189	at	para.	64,	the	Federal	Court	of	Appeal	held	that	this	language	contemplates	“an	object	and	spirit,	or	policy,	analysis	of	the	provisions	in	question	or	the	provisions	of	the	Act	read	as	a	whole”	–	with	 one	 level	 of	 analysis	 directed	 at	 the	 specific	 provisions	 at	 issue	 and	 another	 level	 of	 analysis	concerned	with	the	broader	purpose,	scheme	or	policy	of	the	ITA	as	a	whole.	In	Canada	Trustco,	supra	note	70,	however,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	rejected	this	two-level	analysis,	concluding	(at	para.	
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relevant	 to	 an	 object	 and	 purpose	 analysis,	 since	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 a	 tax	treaty	 is	 necessarily	 realized	 through	 its	 specific	 provisions	 and	 the	 object	 and	purpose	 of	 specific	 provisions	 are	 presumably	 intended	 to	 fulfill	 the	 object	 and	purpose	of	the	treaty	as	a	whole.204	Indeed,	although	it	is	arguable	that	the	preamble	of	a	CTA	is	not	technically	a	“provision”	of	a	CTA,	it	would	be	absurd	to	assume	that	the	preamble	is	not	a	“relevant	provision”	for	the	purposes	of	the	object	and	purpose	test	in	the	PPT,	particularly	since	the	amended	preamble	language	in	article	6(1)	of	the	MLI	is	clearly	intended	to	influence	the	interpretation	of	provisions	of	a	CTA,205	including	the	PPT.206	As	a	result,	although	relevance	of	the	provisions	of	a	CTA	as	a	whole	to	the	application	of	the	PPT	is	not	as	clear	as	it	might	be	if	the	PPT	specifically	referred	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 the	 CTA	 and	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																						43)	 that	 the	 GAAR	 “requires	 a	 single,	 unified	 approach	 to	 the	 …	 interpretation	 of	 the	 specific	provisions	of	the	Income	Tax	Act	that	are	relied	upon	by	the	taxpayer	in	order	to	determine	whether	there	was	 abusive	 tax	 avoidance.”	Although	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 Canada’s	 subsequent	 decision	 in	
Copthorne	Holdings,	supra	note	107,	reaffirmed	this	“unified”	approach,	it	appears	to	have	broadened	the	scope	of	the	misuse	or	abuse	analysis	to	include	not	only	“the	specific	provisions	…	relied	upon	by	the	 taxpayer”	 to	 obtain	 a	 tax	 benefit	 but	 also	 other	 provisions	 that	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	statutory	scheme.	204	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe,	 International	Tax	Planning	and	the	Prevention	of	Abuse,	supra	note	115	at	330;	Kok,	 supra	 note	 93	 at	 409,	 stating	 that	 “the	 ‘object	 and	 purpose’	 of	 a	 treaty	 provision	 has	 to	 be	interpreted	in	light	of	the	 ‘object	and	purpose’	of	the	treaty	in	general”;	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	45,	observing	that	“it	is	generally	not	obvious	to	assign	a	specific	purpose	to	treaty	provisions	such	as	the	distributive	rules	whose	general	objective	is	simply	to	allocate	taxing	rights	with	a	view	to	eliminating	double	 taxation”;	 and	 Chand,	 supra	 note	 178	 at	 26,	 concluding	 that	 “the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	‘relevant	provisions’	have	to	be	read	in	light	of	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	entire	tax	treaty.”		205	See	 paragraph	 16.2	 of	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	emphasizing	that	the	title	and	preamble	of	the	OECD	Model	Convention	“form	part	of	the	context	of	the	Convention	and	constitute	a	general	statement	of	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	Convention,”	and	should	therefore	“play	an	important	role	in	the	interpretation	of	the	provisions	of	the	Convention.”		206	See	paragraph	173	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	emphasizing	that	the	PPT	“must	be	read	in	the	context	of	[the	limitation	on	benefit	provisions	in]	paragraphs	1	to	7	and	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Convention,	 including	 the	 Preamble.”	 [emphasis	 added]	 According	 to	 the	commentary,	“[t]his	is	particularly	important	for	determining	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	Convention.”	
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provisions	of	 the	CTA	read	as	a	whole,207	it	 is	not	surprising	that	several	of	 the	tax	treaty-shopping	examples	 in	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	refer	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	tax	convention	as	a	whole	rather	than	the	object	and	purpose	of	specific	provisions	under	which	treaty	benefits	are	conferred.208	Less	clear,	though	potentially	also	relevant	to	an	object	and	purpose	analysis,	are	provisions	of	the	MLI	or	model	tax	treaties	that	are	not	included	in	the	particular	CTA	–	for	example,	the	simplified	LOB	provisions	in	articles	7(8)-(13)	of	the	MLI,	the	specific	anti-avoidance	rule	 for	dividend	transfer	 transactions	 in	article	8(1)	of	 the	MLI,	 or	 the	 anti-avoidance	 rule	 for	 capital	 gains	 from	 the	 alienation	 of	 shares	 or	comparable	 interests	 deriving	 their	 value	 principally	 from	 immovable	 property	 in	article	9(1)	of	the	MLI.	Although	it	might	be	argued	that	an	absence	of	agreement	on	the	inclusion	of	these	provisions	in	a	CTA	evidences	an	intention	on	the	part	of	the	contracting	 jurisdictions	 to	 permit	 arrangements	 or	 transactions	 that	 might	otherwise	 be	 prohibited	 by	 these	 provisions, 209 	it	 is	 also	 arguable	 that	 the	contracting	jurisdictions	intended	to	rely	on	the	more	general	language	of	the	PPT	to	challenge	 these	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 without	 adopting	 the	 detailed	
																																																								207	On	 this	 point,	 see	 Danon,	 supra	 note	 69	 at	 45,	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 “an	 inherent	 conceptual	difficulty	to	apply	the	PPT	rule	which	may	entail	uncertainties	if	the	decision	to	deny	treaty	benefits	is	simply	made	on	the	basis	of	a	general	purpose	of	the	treaty	as	modified	by	the	MLI.”	208	See,	e.g.,	examples	A,	B,	and	C	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention,	 concluding	 that	 the	 “treaty-shopping	 arrangements”	 in	 Examples	 A	 and	 B	 “would	 be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	tax	convention”	whereas	the	selection	of	a	state	in	which	to	establish	a	manufacturing	plant	“in	light	of”	a	tax	treaty	would	be	“in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	 of	 provisions	 of	 that	 convention”	 because	 “a	 general	 objective	 of	 tax	 conventions	 is	 to	encourage	cross-border	investment”.	See	also	Examples	D	and	K	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	 the	OECD	model	convention,	which	conclude	that	 the	PPT	would	not	apply	 in	 large	part	because	the	“intent	of	tax	treaties”	is	“to	provide	benefits	to	encourage	cross-border	investment”.	209	See,	e.g.,	Kok,	supra	note	93	at	411,	arguing	that	the	PPT	should	not	apply	to	deny	a	treaty	benefit	resulting	 from	 a	 dividend	 transfer	 transaction	 if	 the	 dividend	 article	 does	 not	 include	 a	minimum	shareholding	period.	For	a	judicial	example	of	this	approach,	see	Knights	of	Columbus,	supra	note	84.	
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limitations	 of	 these	 SAARs.210	Either	 way,	 as	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 addressing	 the	relationship	between	 the	PPT	and	specific	anti-avoidance	rules,211	the	absence	of	a	provision	that	might	otherwise	be	included	in	a	CTA	could	be	relevant	to	the	object	and	purpose	analysis.	
(b)	 Treaty	 Benefit	 in	 Accordance	 with	 Object	 and	 Purpose	 of	 Relevant	
Provisions	
	 Once	 the	 “relevant	 provisions”	 are	 identified,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 determine	their	objects	and	purposes	in	order	to	decide	whether	granting	a	benefit	that	might	otherwise	be	denied	under	the	PPT	is	in	accordance	with	these	object	and	purposes.	As	with	the	misuse	or	abuse	analysis	under	the	Canadian	GAAR,	this	process	can	be	divided	 into	 two	 analytical	 stages:	 first,	 identifying	 the	 objects	 and	 purposes	 or	“policy”	of	the	relevant	provisions;	second,	assessing	the	facts	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	 to	determine	whether	 granting	 a	benefit	 in	 these	 circumstances	 is	 in	accordance	with	these	objects	and	purposes.212	As	 also	with	 the	misuse	 and	 abuse	 analysis	 under	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 the	first	of	these	stages	involves	an	interpretive	exercise	that	differs	from	the	ordinary	interpretation	of	a	statute	or	a	treaty,	since	its	aim	is	not	to	determine	the	meaning	of	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 in	 light	 of	 their	 objects	 and	 purposes,	 but	 to	 determine	“the	rationale	that	underlies	the	words”	of	these	provisions,	which	“may	or	may	not	
																																																								210	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	43,	concluding	that	“[w]here	a	state	has	reserved	the	right	not	to	apply”	the	specific	anti-abuse	rules	in	articles	8(1)	and	9(1)	of	the	MLI,	“the	PPT	would	thus	apply	by	default	to	those	situations.”	211	Supra	notes	84-100	and	accompanying	text	under	the	heading	“Relevance	of	Specific	Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	not	Included	in	a	CTA”.	212	This	“two-stage	analytical	process”	was	adopted	in	OSFC,	supra	note	189	at	para.	67,	and	endorsed	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	Canada	Trustco,	supra	note	70	at	para.	44.	Chand	also	considers	this	two-stage	analysis	appropriate	for	the	object	and	purpose	test	in	the	PPT.	Chand,	supra	note	178	at	26.		
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be	 captured	by	 the	…	words”	of	 the	provisions	 themselves.213	For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	wrong	to	conclude	that	the	object	and	purpose	test	 in	the	PPT	simply	incorporates	ordinary	principles	of	treaty	interpretation,	which	must	always	consider	the	objects	and	purposes	of	treaty	provisions.214	
(i)	 Interpreting	the	Object	and	Purpose	of	a	Treaty	Provision		 In	order	to	interpret	the	object	and	purpose	of	a	treaty	provision,	it	is	always	necessary	to	consider	the	text	of	the	provision,215	construing	its	rationale	or	policy	in	the	 context	 of	 other	 treaty	 provisions	 including	 the	 preamble,	 as	well	 as	 extrinsic	materials	 such	 as	 explanatory	 memoranda	 and	 commentaries	 (provided	 that	 the	commentaries	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 any	 relevant	 reservations).216	While	 the	 text	 of	 a	treaty	provision	may	not	fully	capture	its	object	and	purpose,	it	often	provides	some	basis	on	which	its	object	and	purpose	may	reasonably	be	inferred,	particularly	when	the	provision	is	read	in	the	context	of	other	provisions.	For	example,	although	article	5(3)	of	the	OECD	model	convention	states	only	that	“[a]	building	site	or	construction	or	installation	project	constitutes	a	permanent	establishment	only	if	it	lasts	more	than	twelve	months”,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	 the	 object	 or	 purpose	 of	 this	 provision	 is	 to	 exclude	 short-term	 building	 or	construction	 or	 installation	 projects	 from	 source	 taxation	 of	 business	 profits	 that																																																									213 	Copthorne	 Holdings,	 supra	 note	 107	 at	 para.	 70,	 explaining	 that	 “traditional	 statutory	interpretation”	seeks	to	determine	the	meaning	of	a	statutory	text,	while	a	misuse	or	abuse	analysis	under	the	GAAR	seeks	“the	rationale	that	underlies	the	words	that	may	or	may	not	be	captured	by	the	bare	meaning	of	the	words.”	214	Lang,	 supra	 note	 82	 at	 661,	 referring	 to	 article	 31(1)	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	
Treaties.	Signed	at	Vienna	on	May	23,	1969,	UN	doc.	A/Conf.	39/27,	fourth	annex,	UNTS	1155/331.	215	Frank	Engelen,	Interpretation	of	Tax	Treaties	under	International	Law,	(Amsterdam:	IBFD,	2004)	at	175.	216	Kok,	 supra	note	93	at	409.	On	 the	 relevance	of	 interpretative	memoranda	and	commentaries	on	the	OECD	model	convention	to	the	interpretation	of	Canada’s	tax	treaties,	see	Crown	Forest	Industries	
Ltd.	v.	Canada,	[1995]	2	C.T.C.	64,	95	D.T.C.	5389	(S.C.C.).	
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would	otherwise	be	permitted	under	article	7(1)	of	 the	OECD	model	 convention	 if	the	project	were	characterized	as	a	permanent	establishment.	Likewise,	although	the	substituted	 property	 rule	 in	 article	 13(4)	 of	 the	OECD	model	 convention	 does	 not	explicitly	say	so,	it	is	reasonable	to	infer	from	its	text	and	its	relationship	to	articles	13(1)	and	(5)	of	the	OECD	model	convention	that	its	object	or	purpose	is	“to	prevent	the	 non-taxation	 by	 the	 source	 state	 of	 capital	 gains	 derived	 principally	 from	immovable	property	situated	in	the	source	state.”217		 In	 other	 circumstances,	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 a	 provision	 may	 be	suggested	 by	 the	 text	 and	 clarified	 by	 extrinsic	 materials.	 According	 to	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention,	 for	example,	the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends	under	article	10(2)(a)	of	the	convention	is	intended	to	impose	a	 lower	 tax	on	“dividends	paid	by	a	subsidiary	company	 to	 its	parent	company”	 in	order	 “to	 avoid	 recurrent	 taxation	 and	 facilitate	 international	 investment.”218	The	commentary	also	explains	that	the	object	and	purpose	of	article	15(2)	of	the	OECD	model	convention	is:	…	 to	 avoid	 the	 source	 taxation	 of	 short-term	 employments	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	employment	 income	 is	 not	 allowed	 as	 a	 deductible	 expense	 in	 the	 State	 of	 source	because	the	employer	is	not	taxable	in	that	State	as	it	neither	is	a	resident	nor	has	a	permanent	establishment	therein.219	In	 each	 of	 these	 cases,	 the	 commentary	 confirms	 a	 plausible	 interpretation	 that	might	reasonably	be	inferred	from	the	text	of	the	provisions	themselves.																																																									217	Alta	Energy	Luxembourg	S.A.R.L.	v.	The	Queen,	[2018]	T.C.C.	152	[hereafter	Alta	Energy]	at	para.	41,	observing	 that:	 “Absent	 this	rule,	 it	would	be	possible	…	to	conduct	a	share	sale	 instead	of	an	asset	sale	to	avoid	taxation	in	the	source	state.”	218	Paragraph	10	of	the	commentary	on	article	10	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	219	Paragraph	 6.2	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 article	 15	 of	 the	 OECD	model	 convention,	 adding	 that	 the	provision	“can	also	be	justified	by	the	fact	that	imposing	source	deduction	requirements	with	respect	to	 short-term	 employments	 in	 a	 given	 State	 may	 be	 considered	 to	 constitute	 an	 excessive	administrative	burden	where	the	employer	neither	resides	nor	has	a	permanent	establishment	in	that	State.”	
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	 Where	the	text	of	a	treaty	provision	does	not	itself	suggest	specific	rationale,	on	the	other	hand,	its	object	and	purpose	can	generally	be	construed	in	light	of	the	objects	 and	 purposes	 of	 the	 treaty	 as	 a	 whole.	 Although	 the	 specific	 object	 and	purpose	of	each	distributive	rule	in	a	tax	treaty	may	not	be	immediately	obvious,	for	example,	the	overall	object	and	purpose	of	these	provisions	is	generally	understood	to	 be	 to	 allocate	 taxing	 rights	 among	 contracting	 states	 in	 a	 fair	 and	 reasonable	manner	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 cross-border	 economic	 activity	 by	 reducing	 or	eliminating	 economic	 double	 taxation.220	As	 the	 U.S.	 Fifth	 Circuit	 court	 stated	 in	
Johansson	v.	United	States,221	the	 “primary	 objective”	 of	 tax	 treaties	 is	 to	 eliminate	“impediments	 to	 international	 commerce	 resulting	 from	 the	 double	 taxation	 of	international	 transactions”	 by	 allocating	 tax	 jurisdiction	 to	 the	 “most	 appropriate	locus	 for	 the	 taxation	 of	 any	 given	 transaction.”	 Consistent	with	 these	 objects	 and	purposes,	the	title	to	the	2017	OECD	model	convention	explicitly	states	that	one	of	its	purposes	 is	 “the	elimination	of	double	 taxation	with	respect	 to	 taxes	on	 income	and	 capital”	 and	 the	 preamble	 to	 this	 model	 states	 among	 other	 things	 that	 the	contracting	states	desire	“to	further	develop	their	economic	relationship”.222		 	In	 addition	 to	 these	 established	 objects	 and	 purposes,	 however,	 it	 is	 also	generally	 accepted	 that	 tax	 treaties	 are	 not	 intended	 to	 facilitate	 tax	 avoidance,223	
																																																								220	See,	e.g.,	De	Broe,	International	Tax	Planning	and	the	Prevention	of	Abuse,	supra	note	115	at	344.	221	336	F.2d	809	(5th	Cir.	1964)	at	813.	222	Although	the	MLI	does	not	include	a	provision	to	modify	the	title	of	CTAs,	contracting	jurisdictions	may	adopt	optional	preamble	 language	 in	article	6(3)	 expressing	a	desire	 “to	 further	develop	 their	economic	relationship”.	Of	eighty-four	signatories	to	the	MLI	as	of	18	September	2018,	fifty-five	(not	including	 Canada)	 had	 adopted	 this	 optional	 preamble	 language.	 Since	 encouraging	 economic	relationships	among	contracting	states	is	a	well-recognized	object	and	purpose	of	tax	treaties,	it	is	not	clear	that	this	preamble	language	will	have	any	impact	on	the	interpretation	of	tax	treaties	generally	or	the	PPT	in	particular.	223	See,	e.g.,De	Broe,	International	Tax	Planning	and	the	Prevention	of	Abuse,	supra	note	115	at	337.	
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and	 the	preamble	 to	 the	2017	OECD	model	 convention	and	article	6(1)	of	 the	MLI	explicitly	state	that	CTAs	are	not	intended	to	create	“opportunities	for	non-taxation	or	 reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 …	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	arrangements	aimed	at	obtaining	reliefs	provided	in	this	agreement	for	the	indirect	benefit	of	residents	of	third	jurisdictions).”	In	construing	the	objects	and	purposes	of	a	 CTA	 that	 is	 modified	 by	 this	 preamble	 language,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	consider	not	only	the	primary	aim	of	 the	CTA	to	encourage	cross-border	economic	activity	by	allocating	taxing	rights	in	a	fair	and	reasonable	manner	in	order	to	reduce	or	eliminate	double	 taxation,	but	also	 the	 intention	of	 the	contracting	 jurisdictions	that	the	CTA	not	create	opportunities	for	non-taxation	or	reduced	taxation	through	tax	 treaty	 shopping	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 tax	 avoidance.	 For	 this	 reason,	 when	interpreting	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 a	 CTA	 that	 is	 modified	 by	 this	 preamble	language,	 it	 is	no	 longer	possible	 to	conclude,	as	 the	Supreme	Court	of	 India	did	 in	the	 context	 of	 the	 India-Mauritius	 Tax	 Treaty,	 that	 treaty	 shopping	 is	 necessarily	consistent	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	tax	treaties	because	it	encourages	capital	and	technology	inflows.224	Finally,	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention	states	that	the	purpose	of	the	PPT	is:	…	 to	 ensure	 that	 tax	 conventions	 apply	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 purpose	 for	which	they	were	entered	into,	 i.e.	to	provide	benefits	 in	respect	of	bona	fide	exchanges	of	goods	 and	 services,	 and	 movements	 of	 capital	 and	 persons	 as	 opposed	 to	arrangements	 whose	 principal	 objective	 is	 to	 secure	 a	 more	 favourable	 tax	treatment.225	
																																																								224 	Union	 of	 India	 v.	Azadi	 Bachao	 Andolan,	 (2003),	 6	 ITLR	 233	 (S.C.),	 available	 at	https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1960330/.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	225	Paragraph	174	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.		
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Although	 this	 statement	 wrongly	 refers	 to	 the	 “principal	 objective”	 of	 an	arrangement	 (as	 opposed	 to	 “one	 of	 its	 principal	 purposes”)	 and	 appears	 to	erroneously	 conflate	 the	 PPT’s	 object	 and	 purpose	 test	 with	 its	 purpose	 test	 by	stating	 that	 it	would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 a	 treaty	 to	 provide	benefits	 for	 arrangements	 whose	 principal	 objective	 is	 to	 obtain	 these	 benefits,	 a	more	 plausible	 interpretation	 is	 that	 the	 primary	 purpose	 of	 a	 CTA	 with	 the	amended	 preamble	 language	 is	 not	 simply	 to	 allocate	 taxing	 rights	 in	 order	 to	encourage	 cross-border	 economic	 activity	 by	 reducing	 or	 eliminating	 double	taxation,	 but	 to	do	 so	 in	 a	way	 that	 encourages	bona	 fide	or	 genuine	 cross-border	economic	 activities	 rather	 than	 tax-motivated	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 with	little	or	no	economic	substance.	 Indeed,	examples	 in	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	 convention	 provide	 further	 confirmation	 that	 providing	 treaty	 benefits	 for	bona	fide	transactions	or	arrangements	with	real	economic	substance	is	generally	in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	tax	treaties,	even	if	one	of	the	purposes	or	even	a	principal	purpose	of	 these	 transactions	or	arrangements	 is	 to	obtain	 treaty	benefits.	
(ii)	 Assessing	the	Facts		 Having	 determined	 the	 objects	 and	 purposes	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions,	application	 of	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 depends	 on	 a	 factual	assessment	 of	 the	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 at	 issue	 in	 order	 to	 determine	whether	 granting	 a	 benefit	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 these	 objects	 and	 purposes.	 For	treaty-shopping	 transactions	 or	 arrangements,	 which	 could	 otherwise	 enable	 a	person	to	obtain	a	variety	of	treaty	benefits,	this	assessment	will	generally	relate	to	
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the	objects	and	purposes	of	the	treaty	as	a	whole	–	asking	whether	granting	a	treaty	benefit	is	in	accordance	with	the	primary	purpose	of	the	treaty	to	encourage	genuine	cross-border	 economic	 activity	 by	 allocating	 taxing	 rights	 and	 reducing	 or	eliminating	 double	 taxation,	 without	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 non-taxation	 or	reduced	 taxation	 through	 tax	 avoidance	 (including	 through	 treaty-shopping	arrangements	aimed	at	obtaining	reliefs	provided	in	this	agreement	for	the	indirect	benefit	 of	 residents	 of	 third	 jurisdictions).	 For	 rule-shopping	 transactions	 or	arrangements,	on	 the	other	hand,	 this	 factual	assessment	 is	more	 likely	 to	address	the	 objects	 and	 purposes	 of	 specific	 treaty	 provisions,	 the	 formal	 requirements	 of	which	 are	 either	 satisfied	 or	 circumvented	 by	 a	 particular	 transaction	 or	arrangement	–	asking	whether	granting	a	treaty	benefit	in	these	circumstances	is	in	accordance	 with	 the	 objects	 and	 purposes	 of	 these	 provisions.226	Although	 these	factual	 assessments	 necessarily	 depend	 on	 the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 the	transactions	 or	 arrangements	 at	 issue,	 at	 least	 some	 guidance	 on	 the	 possible	application	 of	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 test	 may	 be	 drawn	 from	 examples	 in	 the	commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	 convention	as	well	 as	 cases	discussed	 in	 the	 first	part	of	this	article.227		 	
																																																								226	In	this	circumstance,	 the	analysis	 is	similar	to	the	second-stage	of	 the	misuse	and	abuse	analysis	under	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 determining	 whether	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 (1)	 achieves	 an	outcome	 that	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 seek	 to	 prevent;	 (2)	 defeats	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 of	 the	relevant	provisions;	or	(3)	circumvents	the	relevant	provisions	in	a	manner	that	frustrates	or	defeats	their	 object	 or	 purpose.	 See	 Canada	 Trustco,	 supra	 note	 70	 at	 para.	 45;	 reaffirmed	 in	 Copthorne	
Holdings,	supra	note	107	at	para.	71.	227	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	examples	in	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention,	see	Chand,	supra	note	178	at	27-38.	
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(A)	 Tax	Treaty	Shopping	Beginning	 with	 tax	 treaty	 shopping,	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 examples	 in	 the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	consistently	suggest	that	the	PPT	would	not	 apply	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 involve	 genuine	 cross-border	economic	 activities.	 In	 the	 earlier	 example	 of	 a	 company	 resident	 in	 State	 R	 that	establishes	a	manufacturing	plant	in	the	only	one	of	three	developing	countries	with	which	State	R	has	a	tax	treaty,	the	commentary	concludes	that	this	investment	would	be	“in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	provisions	of	that	convention”	because	 “a	 general	 objective	 of	 tax	 conventions	 is	 to	 encourage	 cross-border	investment”.228	Likewise,	in	an	example	involving	an	institutional	investor	in	State	T,	which	 establishes	 a	wholly-owned	 subsidiary	 (RCO)	 in	 State	 R,	which	 invests	 in	 a	company	(SCO)	resident	in	State	S,	with	which	State	R	has	a	more	advantageous	tax	treaty	than	State	T,	 the	commentary	observes	that	“[t]he	 intent	of	 tax	treaties	 is	 to	provide	benefits	to	encourage	cross-border	investment”	and	concludes	that	the	PPT	would	not	apply,	even	though	the	decision	to	establish	RCO	in	State	R	is	driven	partly	by	 “the	 extensive	 tax	 convention	 network	 of	 State	 R,	 including	 its	 tax	 convention	with	State	S,	which	provides	for	low	withholding	tax	rates”	because	of	the	following	factors:	(1)	the	decision	to	establish	RCO	is	also	driven	by	“the	availability	of	directors	 with	 knowledge	 of	 regional	 business	 practices	 and	regulations,	the	existence	of	a	skilled	multilingual	workforce,	and	State	R’s	membership	in	a	regional	grouping”;		(2)	 “RCO	employs	 an	 experienced	 local	management	 team	 to	 review	investment	recommendations	from	Fund	and	performs	various	other	functions	which,	 depending	 on	 the	 case,	may	 include	 approving	 and																																																									228	Example	C	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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monitoring	investments,	carrying	out	treasury	functions,	maintaining	RCO’s	 book	 and	 records,	 and	 ensuring	 compliance	 with	 regulatory	requirements	in	States	where	it	invests”;		(3)	RCO’s	 board	of	 directors	 “is…	 composed	of	 a	majority	 of	 State	R	resident	directors	with	expertise	in	investment	management”;	and		(4)	 the	 investment	 in	 SCO	 “would	 constitute	 only	 a	 part	 of	 RCO’s	overall	investment	portfolio,	which	includes	investments	in	a	number	of	countries	in	addition	to	State	S	which	are	also	members	o	the	same	regional	grouping.”229		In	 another	 example,	 where	 a	 company	 resident	 in	 one	 state	 establishes	 a	regional	 company	 (RCO)	 in	 State	 R	 with	 a	 comprehensive	 tax	 treaty	 network	 in	order	to	provide	group	services	to	subsidiaries	that	are	resident	in	other	states,	the	commentary	concludes	that	the	PPT	should	not	apply	to	deny	the	benefits	of	the	tax	treaties	concluded	between	State	R	and	the	states	 in	which	the	subsidiaries	reside,	provided	that:	…	the	intra-group	services	to	be	provided	by	RCO,	including	the	making	of	decisions	necessary	 for	 the	conduct	of	 its	business,	 constitute	a	 real	business	 through	which	RCO	exercises	substantive	economic	 functions,	using	real	assets	and	assuming	real	risks,	and	that	business	is	carried	on	by	RCO	through	its	 	own	personnel	located	in	State	R,		unless	other	facts	“indicate	that	RCO	has	been	established	for	other	tax	purposes”	or	“RCO	enters	into	specific	transactions	to	which	[the	PPT]	would	otherwise	apply.”230	Similarly,	where	the	parent	company	of	a	worldwide	group	(TCO)	that	is	resident	in	State	T	 lends	 funds	 to	a	 finance	subsidiary	(RCO)	 in	State	R,	which	 lends	 the	same	amount	 on	 the	 same	 day	 at	 the	 same	 interest	 rate	 to	 a	 company	 (SCO)	 that	 is	 a	member	 of	 the	 worldwide	 group	 and	 resident	 in	 State	 S,	 with	 which	 R	 has	 a	 tax	treaty	but	T	does	not	have	a	tax	treaty,	the	commentary	concludes	that	the	back	to																																																									229	Example	K	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	230	Example	G	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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back	 loans	 “do	 not	 constitute	 a	 conduit	 arrangement”	 to	 which	 the	 PPT	 or	 anti-conduit	provisions	should	apply	because:	(1)	 RCO	 carries	 on	 a	 “normal	 treasury	 business”	 for	 TCO,	“coordinating	 the	 financing	 of	 all	 the	 subsidiaries	 of	 TCO”,	“maintain[ing]	a	centralized	cash	management	accounting	system	for	TCO	and	its	subsidiaries	…	disbursing	or	receiving	any	cash	payments	required	by	transactions	between	its	affiliates	and	unrelated	parties”	and	 “enter[ing]	 into	 interest	 rate	 and	 foreign	 exchange	 contracts	 as	necessary	 to	manage	 the	 risks	 arising	 from	mismatches	 in	 incoming	and	outgoing	cash	flows”;		(2)	RCO’s	activities	“are	intended	(and	reasonably	can	be	expected)	to	reduce	transaction	costs	and	overhead	and	other	fixed	costs)”;		(3)	 “RCO	 has	 50	 employees,	 including	 clerical	 and	 other	 back	 office	personnel,	 located	 in	 State	 R	 [reflecting]	 the	 size	 of	 the	 business	activities	of	RCO”;		(4)	 RCO	 therefore	 “appears	 to	 be	 carrying	 on	 a	 real	 business	performing	 substantive	 economic	 functions,	 using	 real	 assets	 and	assuming	real	risks”;		(5)	 RCO	 performs	 “significant	 activities	 with	 respect	 to	 the	transactions	with	TCO	and	 SCO,	which	 appear	 to	 be	 typical	 of	RCO’s	normal	treasury	business”;	and		(6)	“RCO	appears	to	be	bearing	the	interest	rate	and	currency	risk.”231		In	 yet	 another	 example,	where	 a	manufacturing	 company	 (RCO)	 resident	 in	State	R,	the	shares	of	which	are	wholly	owned	by	a	company	(TCO)	resident	in	State	T,	establishes	a	subsidiary	(SCO)	in	order	to	act	as	its	exclusive	distributor	in	State	S,	with	which	 T	 does	 not	 have	 a	 tax	 treaty,	 the	 commentary	 also	 concludes	 that	 the	arrangement	would	not	be	regarded	as	a	conduit	arrangement	because	the	example	involves	“a	normal	commercial	structure	where	RCO	and	SCO	carry	on	real	economic	
																																																								231	Example	F	in	paragraph	187	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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activities	in	States	R	and	S”	and	“[t]he	payment	of	dividends	by		subsidiaries	such	as	SCO	is	a	normal	business	transaction.”232		 In	 contrast,	 where	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 have	 little	 or	 no	 real	economic	substance,	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	Model	Convention	concludes	that	the	 PPT	 or	 anti-conduit	 provisions	 should	 apply	 to	 deny	 treaty	 benefits.	 In	 one	example,	based	on	the	Royal	Dutch	Oil	Company	case,233	a	company	(TCO)	resident	in	State	T	which	owns	shares	of	a	company	(SCO)	resident	in	State	S,	with	which	State	T	does	not	have	a	tax	treaty,	assigns	the	right	to	dividends	that	have	been	declared	but	not	yet	paid	by	SCO	to	RCO,	an	independent	financial	institution	resident	in	State	R,	which	has	a	tax	treaty	with	State	S	that	exempts	dividends	from	withholding	tax.234	In	this	circumstance,	the	commentary	concludes	that:	…	 it	 would	 be	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 for	 the	arrangement	 …	 was	 for	 RCO	 to	 obtain	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 exemption	 from	 source	taxation	 of	 dividends	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 State	 R	 –	 State	 S	 tax	 convention	 and	 it	
would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	tax	convention	to	grant	the	benefit	
of	that	exemption	under	this	treaty-shopping	arrangement.	235		 In	another	example,	based	on	the	Bank	of	Scotland	case,236	a	company	(TCO)	resident	 in	State	T	which	has	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary	(SCO)	resident	 in	State	S,	with	 which	 State	 T	 does	 not	 have	 a	 tax	 treaty,	 enters	 into	 an	 agreement	 with	 a	financial	institution	(RCO)	in	State	R,	with	which	State	S	has	a	tax	treaty	under	which	the	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends	is	reduced	to	5	percent	from	the	domestic	rate	of	 25	percent.237	Under	 this	 agreement,	RCO	acquires	 the	usufruct	 of	 newly-issued	
																																																								232	Example	B	in	paragraph	187	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	233	Supra	note	126.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	234	Example	A	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	235	Ibid.	[emphasis	added]	236	Supra	note	127.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	237	Example	B	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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preferred	shares	of	SCO	for	a	period	of	three	years	in	exchange	for	the	present	value	of	the	dividends	to	be	paid	on	the	preferred	shares	over	three	years,	discounted	at	the	 rate	 at	 which	 TCO	 could	 borrow	 from	 RCO.	 In	 this	 circumstance	 as	 well,	 the	commentary	concludes	that:	…	 it	 would	 be	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 purposes	 for	 the	arrangement	…	was	 to	obtain	 the	benefit	of	 the	5	per	 cent	 limitation	applicable	 to	the	source	taxation	of	dividends	provided	for	by	the	State	R	–	State	S	tax	convention	and	 it	would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	tax	convention	to	grant	the	
benefit	of	that	limitation	under	this	treaty-shopping	arrangement.238		 Yet	 another	 example,	 based	 on	 Aiken	 Industries	 Inc.	 v.	 Commissioner, 239	involves	a	company	(TCO)	resident	in	State	T	which	loans	funds	at	a	rate	of	7	percent	to	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary	(SCO)	in	State	S,	which	does	not	have	a	tax	treaty	with	State	T,	and	then	assigns	the	debt	to	another	wholly-owned	subsidiary	(RCO)	in	State	R,	with	which	State	S	has	a	tax	treaty,	in	exchange	for	a	note	paying	interest	at	a	rate	of	 6	 percent.240	Emphasizing	 that	 the	 assignment	 “was	 structured	 to	 eliminate	 the	withholding	 tax	 that	 TCO	would	 otherwise	 have	 paid	 to	 State	 S”,	 the	 commentary	concludes	that	the	transaction	“constitutes	a	conduit	arrangement”	to	which	the	PPT	or	anti-conduit	provisions	should	apply.241		 In	 addition	 to	 the	 specific	 cases	 on	 which	 they	 are	 based,	 these	 examples	suggest	that	the	PPT	could	also	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	like	those	in	
																																																								238	Ibid.	[emphasis	added]	239	56	T.C.	925	(1971)	[hereafter	Aiken	Industries].	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	240	Example	C	in	paragraph	187	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	This	example	 differs	 slightly	 from	 the	 facts	 in	 Aiken	 Industries,	 supra	 note	 239,	 where	 the	 debt	 was	assigned	for	a	note	paying	interest	at	the	same	rate	as	the	original	loan.	If	the	debt	were	assigned	for	a	note	 paying	 interest	 at	 the	 same	 rate	 as	 the	 original	 loan,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 original	 lender	 TCO,	rather	than	RCO,	would	be	regarded	as	the	beneficial	owner	of	the	interest.	241	Ibid.	
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Del	Commercial	Properties,	Inc.	v.	Commissioner	of	Internal	Revenue,242	X	Holdings	ApS	
v.	Federal	Tax	Administration,243	the	VSA	case,244	and	 the	HHU	 and	Cook	 cases,	245	in	which	companies	with	little	or	no	economic	substance	were	established	in	order	to	obtain	treaty	benefits	that	would	otherwise	have	been	unavailable.	They	also	suggest	that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 like	 those	 in	Northern	
Indiana	 Public	 Service	 Corp.	 v.	 Commissioner,246	Prévost	 Car,247	Velcro,248	and	 the	Spanish	 cases	 involving	 payments	 by	 the	 Real	Madrid	 football	 team	 to	 Hungarian	companies	for	the	image	rights	of	various	team	members,249	in	which	companies	to	which	interest,	dividends	or	royalties	were	paid	appear	to	have	earned	some	profits	on	 the	 spread	 between	 amounts	 received	 and	 amounts	 paid	 as	well	 as	 reinvested	profits,	but	otherwise	conducted	 little	or	no	business	activity.	 In	contrast,	 it	 seems	less	 likely	 that	 the	PPT	should	apply	 to	payments	such	as	 those	 in	 the	Swiss	Swap	case	 which	 are	 designed	 to	 hedge	 against	 swap	 payments	 –	 at	 least	 where	 these																																																									242	T.C.	Memo	1999-411,	aff’d	251	F.3d	210	(D.C.	Cir.	2001),	denying	treaty	benefits	on	the	basis	of	a	domestic	substance	over	form	doctrine.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	243	(2005)	8	 ITLR	536,	denying	 treaty	benefits	on	 the	basis	of	 an	 implicit	 anti-abuse	principle.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	244	Swiss	Commission	of	Appeals	in	Tax	Matters,	28	February	2001,	4	ILTS	2002,	191,	denying	treaty	benefits	on	 the	grounds	 that	 the	 recipient	of	dividends	was	not	 their	beneficial	owner.	This	 case	 is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	245	SKM	 2011.57	 LSR,	 and	 SKM	 2011.485	 LSR,	 denying	 treaty	 benefits	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	recipients	 of	 interest	 payments	were	 not	 their	 beneficial	 owners.	 These	 cases	 are	 discussed	 in	 the	first	part	of	this	article.	246		115	F.3d	506	 (7th	 Cir.	 1997),	 allowing	 treaty	 benefits	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 a	wholly-owned	 finance	subsidiary	incorporated	by	the	taxpayer	had	conducted	“recognizable”	though	“concededly	minimal”	business	activity,	earning	a	profit	 from	the	spread	between	 interest	paid	on	Euronotes	and	 interest	charged	 to	 the	 taxpayer	as	well	 as	 reinvested	profits.	This	 case	 is	discussed	 in	 the	 first	part	of	 this	article. 247	Supra	note	 124,	 allowing	 treaty	 benefits	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 recipient	 of	 dividends	 was	 their	beneficial	owner.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	248	Supra	note	125,	allowing	 treaty	benefits	on	 the	basis	 that	 the	 recipient	of	 royalty	payments	was	their	beneficial	owner.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	249	AN	 18	 July	 2006,	 JUR\2006\204307,	 JUR\2007\8915	 and	 JUR\2007\6549;	 AN	 10	 Nov.	 2006	JUR\2006\284679;	AN	20	 July	2006,	 JUR\2007\6526;	AN	13	Nov.	2006,	 JUR\200\284618;	and	AN	26	 Mar.	 2007,	 JUR\2007\101877,	 denying	 treaty	 benefits	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 recipients	 of	 the	royalty	 payments	 were	 not	 their	 beneficial	 owners.	 This	 case	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	article.	
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arrangements	 represent	 genuine	 business	 activities	 carried	 out	 by	 a	 financial	institution.250		 Less	clear	are	transactions	or	arrangements	involving	tax-motivated	changes	of	residence,	which	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	states	“may”	or	“could”	be	subject	to	the	PPT,251	without	explicitly	discussing	circumstances	in	which	these	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	might	 or	might	 not	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 the	object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 a	 tax	 treaty.252	If	 the	 primary	purpose	 of	 tax	 treaties	 is	 to	 encourage	 genuine	 cross-border	 economic	 activities,	however,	 it	 might	 be	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 a	 change	 of	 residence	 with	 real	economic	 substance	 should	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 PPT,	 even	 if	 one	 of	 the	 principal	purposes	of	 this	 change	was	 to	obtain	 a	 treaty	benefit.	 This	might	be	 the	 case,	 for	example,	with	 a	 change	of	 residence	by	 an	 individual,	 at	 least	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	requires	a	real	social	and	economic	presence.253	In	 contrast,	 where	 a	 corporation	 changes	 its	 residence	 by	 continuing	 from	one	jurisdiction	to	another	or	by	changing	its	place	of	effective	management,	it	is	less	certain	 that	 this	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 would	 have	 sufficient	 economic	substance	to	conclude	that	obtaining	treaty	benefits	would	be	in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	a	treaty	–	particularly	if	the	change																																																									250	CH:	Federal	Supreme	Court	(FSC),	5	May	2015,	BGE	141	II	447,	no.	2C_364/2012	[herein	referred	to	as	the	Swiss	Swap	case],	concluding	that	the	recipient	of	payments	from	investments	designed	to	hedge	against	swap	payments	was	not	the	beneficial	owner	of	the	payments.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	251	Paragraphs	177	and	180	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	252	Kok,	supra	note	93	at	411.	253	David	G.	Duff,	“Responses	to	Tax	Treaty	Shopping:	A	Comparative	Evaluation”	in	Michael	Lang,	et.	al.,	Tax	Treaties:	Building	Bridges	between	Law	and	Economics,	(Amsterdam:	IBFD,	2010)	75	at	77,	n.	11,	suggesting	that	tax-motivated	changes	of	residence	by	individuals	are	“rightly	regarded	as	a	form	of	 treaty	 shopping,	 but	 …	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 abusive	 [than	 tax-motivated	 changes	 of	 residence	 by	artificial	 entities]	 given	 the	 requirement	 of	 a	 real	 social	 and	 economic	 presence	 for	 individual	 tax	residence.”		
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of	 residence	 results	 in	 non-taxation	 or	 reduced	 taxation	 and	 treaty	 benefits	 are	indirectly	obtained	by	 shareholders	who	are	 residents	of	 third	 jurisdictions.254	For	this	reason,	the	PPT	could	be	expected	to	apply	to	transactions	such	as	those	in	MIL	
Investments	in	which	the	taxpayer	continued	from	the	Cayman	Island	to	Luxembourg	shortly	before	selling	shares	the	gain	from	which	would	otherwise	have	been	subject	to	tax	in	Canada,255	and	Yanko-Weiss	Holdings	in	which	the	taxpayer	moved	its	place	of	effective	management	from	Israel	to	Belgium	before	receiving	dividends	from	an	Israeli	subsidiary.256	(B)	 Other	Treaty	Abuses		 With	 respect	 to	 other	 treaty	 abuses,	 neither	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	model	convention	nor	the	Final	Report	on	BEPS	Action	6	are	as	clear	on	the	potential	role	of	 the	PPT	–	presumably	because	BEPS	Action	6,	 the	MLI	and	 the	2017	OECD	model	 convention	 all	 contain	 specific	 anti-abuse	 rules	 to	 address	 perceived	 treaty	abuses	 other	 than	 tax	 treaty	 shopping.257	Where	 a	 CTA	 does	 not	 include	 these	specific	 anti-abuse	 rules,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 tax-motivated	transactions	or	arrangements	that	either	satisfy	or	circumvent	the	formal	
																																																								254	For	 a	 contrary	 conclusion,	 see	 Kok,	 supra	 note	 93	 at	 411,	 arguing	 that	 a	 change	 of	 corporate	residence	should	not	be	subject	to	the	PPT	if	the	relevant	treaty	includes	a	tie-breaker	rule	based	on	place	 of	 effective	management.	 This	 argument	 depends	 on	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 PPT	 should	 not	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	that	could	be	subject	to	a	specific	anti-avoidance	rule	if	it	were	included	in	a	tax	treaty	–	in	this	case,	a	tie-breaker	rule	based	on	the	mutual	agreement	procedure	as	in	 article	 4(1)	 of	 the	 MLI.	 This	 conclusion	 was	 rejected	 earlier	 in	 this	 article	 at	 supra	 text	accompanying	 notes	 84-100	 under	 the	 heading	 “Relevance	 of	 Specific	 Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	 not	Included	in	a	CTA”.	255	Supra	note	 128,	 allowing	 treaty	 benefits	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 did	 not	 apply	because	 it	was	not	established	that	the	transactions	were	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	 the	Canada-Luxembourg	tax	treaty.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	256	Supra	note	129,	denying	treaty	benefits	on	the	basis	of	an	implicit	anti-abuse	principle.	This	case	is	discussed	in	the	first	part	of	this	article.	257	Supra,	text	accompanying	notes	35-51	under	the	heading	“Other	Treaty	Abuses”.	
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requirements	 of	 relevant	 treaty	 provisions	 in	 a	way	 that	 contradicts	 their	 objects	and	purposes.258		 As	 a	 result,	 even	 if	 a	 treaty	does	not	 include	a	 specific	 anti-abuse	provision	like	article	14(1)	of	the	MLI	to	address	the	tax-motivated	splitting-up	of	contracts	to	avoid	 permanent	 establishment	 status	 for	 a	 building	 site	 or	 construction	 or	installation	project	that	lasts	more	than	twelve	months,	the	PPT	could	apply	to	deny	treaty	benefits	 that	would	otherwise	be	denied	under	 this	 rule	where	granting	 the	benefits	would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 provision	 to	 exclude	short-term	building	or	construction	or	 installation	projects	 from	source	taxation	of	business	profits.259	Where	a	construction	project	that	is	expected	to	last	22	months	is	 divided	 into	 two	 different	 contracts,	 each	 lasting	 11	 months,	 for	 example,	 the	commentary	 concludes	 that	 granting	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 exclusion	 from	 permanent	establishment	 status	 under	 article	 5(3)	 of	 the	 OECD	model	 convention	 “would	 be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose”	of	this	provision	“as	the	time	limitation	…	would	otherwise	be	meaningless.”260	Since	 the	 time	 limitation	 in	 this	 provision	 would	 also	 be	 meaningless	 if	separate	contracts	 lasting	less	than	12	months	could	always	be	aggregated	to	deny	the	exemption	from	permanent	establishment	status,	 it	 is	clear	that	this	conclusion	depends	on	the	facts	and	circumstances	of	this	example,	according	to	which	the	bid	for	the	construction	project	is	originally	submitted	by	a	company	(RCO)	resident	in																																																									258	As	explained	earlier,	the	relationship	between	the	PPT	and	specific	anti-abuse	provisions	that	are	not	included	in	a	CTA	is	ultimately	a	matter	of	interpretation	having	regard	to	the	relevant	provisions	as	well	as	extrinsic	materials	such	as	explanatory	memoranda	and	commentaries	that	may	shed	light	on	 the	 intentions	of	 the	 contracting	 jurisdictions.	Supra	 text	accompanying	notes	84-100	under	 the	heading	“Relevance	of	Specific	Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	not	Included	in	a	CTA”.	259	Paragraph	52	of	the	commentary	on	article	5	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	260	Example	J	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	
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State	R	to	an	independent	company	(SCO)	resident	in	State,	the	contract	is	then	split	during	negotiations	and	separate	contracts	are	concluded	with	RCO	and	“a	recently-incorporated	 wholly	 owned	 subsidiary	 of	 RCO”	 (SUBCO),	 and	 “the	 contractual	arrangements	 are	 such	 that	 RCO	 is	 jointly	 and	 several	 liable	 with	 SUBCO	 for	 the	performance	of	SUBCO’s	contractual	obligations	under	the	SUBCO-SCO	contract.”261	Consequently,	 as	 with	 the	 treaty	 shopping	 examples	 in	 which	 the	 commentary	concludes	that	the	PPT	would	apply,	the	conclusion	that	the	PPT	should	apply	to	this	contract-splitting	 case	 ultimately	 depends	 on	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 real	 economic	substance	to	the	arrangement.		 Similarly,	although	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	does	not	explicitly	 state	 that	 the	 PPT	 can	 apply	 to	 deny	 benefits	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	denied	under	a	specific	anti-abuse	rule	for	dividend	transfer	transactions	like	article	8(1)	of	the	MLI,	this	conclusion	is	suggested	by	the	text	and	context	of	the	MLI	and	by	an	example	in	the	commentary	that	considers	the	possible	application	of	the	PPT	to	a	transaction	to	which	this	specific	anti-abuse	provision	could	also	apply.262	In	this	example,	a	company	(RCO)	resident	in	State	R	that	has	held	24	percent	of	the	shares	of	 another	 company	 (SCO)	 resident	 in	 State	 S,	 increases	 its	 shareholding	 to	 25	percent	following	the	entry-into-force	of	a	tax	treaty	between	States	R	and	S	in	order	to	obtain	the	reduced	rate	of	withholding	tax	on	dividends	under	article	10(2)(a)	of	the	 OECD	 model	 convention.263	Without	 discussing	 the	 time	 period	 between	 the	increase	 in	 RCO’s	 shareholding	 and	 the	 receipt	 of	 a	 dividend	 from	 SCO,	 or	
																																																								261	Ibid.	262	See	the	discussion	at	supra,	text	accompanying	notes	88-93.	263	Example	E	in	paragraph	182	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention	
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considering	 the	 possible	 existence	 of	 a	 minimum	 shareholding	 period	 for	 the	reduced	withholding	tax	rate	on	dividends,	the	commentary	concludes	that	the	PPT	“would	not	apply”	deny	the	benefit	of	article	10(2)(a)	because	 this	provision	“uses	an	 arbitrary	 threshold	 of	 25	 per	 cent	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 determining	 which	shareholders	are	entitled	to	the	benefit	of	the	lower	rate	of	tax	on	dividends.”264	While	 this	 statement	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 minimum	 shareholding	threshold	 in	article	10(2)(a)	operates	as	a	safe	harbor,	 the	commentary	also	states	that	“granting	that	benefit	 in	these	circumstances	would	be	 in	accordance	with	the	object	 and	 purpose”	 of	 the	 provision	 because	 RCO	 “genuinely	 increases	 its	participation”	 in	 SCO	 in	 order	 to	 satisfy	 this	 requirement.265	As	 with	 the	 treaty	shopping	 examples	 in	 which	 the	 commentary	 concludes	 that	 the	 PPT	 would	 not	apply,	 therefore,	 the	conclusion	 that	 the	PPT	would	not	apply	 in	 this	 circumstance	depends	 on	 an	 implicit	 economic	 substance	 criterion	 that	 distinguishes	 genuine	cross-border	economic	activities	for	which	treaty	benefits	are	properly	granted	from	tax-motivated	transactions	or	arrangements	with	little	or	no	economic	substance	for	which	treaty	benefits	may	be	denied.	Although	 the	commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	 convention	does	not	address	the	 possible	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 to	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 avoid	 a	substituted	 property	 rule	 by	 diluting	 the	 value	 of	 shares	 or	 comparable	 interests	attributable	to	immovable	property,	it	is	arguable	that	the	PPT	could	apply	in	these	circumstances	even	 if	 the	CTA	does	not	 include	a	specific	anti-abuse	provision	 like	article	 9(1)	 of	MLI	which	 applies	 the	 value	 threshold	 for	 the	 substituted	 property																																																									264	Ibid.	265	Ibid.	
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rule	 “at	 any	 time	 during	 the	 365	 days	 preceding	 the	 alienation”.266	As	 well,	 the	commentary	 explicitly	 states	 that	 the	 PPT	 could	 apply	 to	 hiring-out	 of	 labour	arrangements	even	if	a	treaty	does	not	include	a	specific	anti-abuse	rule	to	address	these	arrangements.267	In	each	of	these	cases,	application	of	the	PPT	would	depend	on	whether	 the	 transactions	or	arrangements	contradict	 the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions:	to	“prevent	non-taxation	by	the	source	state	of	capital	gains	derived	 principally	 from	 immovable	 property	 situated	 in	 the	 source	 state”	 in	 the	case	of	 the	substituted	property	rule,268	and	“to	avoid	 the	source	 taxation	of	short-term	 employments	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 employment	 income	 is	 not	 allowed	 as	 a	deductible	expense	 in	 the	State	of	 source”	 in	 the	 case	of	 article	15(2)	of	 the	OECD	model	 convention.269	As	 with	 the	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 to	 other	 transactions	 or	arrangements,	 the	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	 real	 economic	 substance	 may	 well	 be	relevant	to	this	inquiry.	
(c)	 Effect	of	Object	and	Purpose	Test	as	an	Exception	In	the	guiding	principle	and	the	Canadian	GAAR,	the	object	and	purpose	test	constitutes	 an	 additional	 requirement	 that	 must	 be	 satisfied	 in	 order	 to	 deny	benefits	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 available,	 imposing	 an	 onus	 on	 the	 revenue	department	 to	 establish	 that	 a	 benefit	 that	 a	 taxpayer	 would	 otherwise	 obtain	 is	contrary	 to	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions.	 In	 this	 context,	therefore,	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 test	 requires	 the	 revenue	 department	 to	 “go	behind”	 the	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate																																																									266	See	the	discussion	at	supra,	text	accompanying	notes	98-100.		267	Paragraph	8.8	of	the	commentary	on	article	15	of	the	OECD	model	Convention.	268	Alta	Energy,	supra	note	217	at	para	41.	269	Paragraph	6.2	of	the	commentary	on	article	15	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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why	 a	 benefit	 that	 would	 otherwise	 result	 from	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 these	provisions	 should	 be	 denied	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 granting	 the	 benefit	 would	contradict	 their	 objects	 and	 purposes.270	For	 this	 reason,	 Canadian	 courts	 have	generally	held	that	the	GAAR	should	apply	only	where	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	is	“clear	and	unambiguous”.271	In	the	PPT,	on	the	other	hand,	the	object	and	purpose	test	is	an	exception	that	allows	a	benefit	that	would	otherwise	be	denied	under	the	provision	on	the	grounds	that	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	the	benefit.	As	a	result,	the	PPT	shifts	the	onus	to	the	taxpayer	to	establish	that	a	benefit	that	would	otherwise	be	denied	should	be	allowed	because	it	is	in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	a	CTA.	For	this	reason,	the	PPT	has	been	sharply	criticized.272	Since	the	PPT	applies	only	to	benefits	that	would	otherwise	be	granted	under	the	ordinary	meaning	of	the	relevant	provisions,	however,	this	onus	should	be	easier	to	 establish	 than	 the	onus	on	 the	 revenue	department	under	 the	guiding	principle																																																									270	See,	 e.g.,	 Copthorne,	 supra	 note	 107	 at	 para.	 66,	 stating	 that	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 is	 “a	 legal	mechanism	whereby	 Parliament	 has	 conferred	 on	 the	 court	 the	 unusual	 duty	 of	 going	 behind	 the	words	of	the	legislation	to	determine	the	object,	spirit	or	purpose	of	the	provision	or	provisions	relied	upon	by	the	taxpayer”.	271	See,	 e.g.,	 OSFC,	 supra	 note	 189	 at	 para.	 69;	 Canada	 Trustco,	 supra	 note	 70	 at	 para.	 50;	 and	
Copthorne,	supra	note	107	at	para.	68.	This	conclusion	is	consistent	with	the	language	of	subsection	245(4)	as	it	read	at	the	time	of	the	decision	in	OSFC	which	provided	that	the	GAAR	would	not	apply	to	an	avoidance	transaction	where	it	was	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	transaction	did	not	result	in	a	misuse	or	abuse,	but	 is	not	consistent	with	 the	amended	 language	of	 this	provision	which	provides	that	 the	GAAR	applies	 to	an	avoidance	 transaction	 if	 it	may	reasonably	be	considered	 to	result	 in	a	misuse	or	abuse.	See	David	G.	Duff,	 “The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	and	 the	General	Anti-Avoidance	Rule”	 (2006),	 60	 Bulletin	 for	 International	 Taxation	 54	 at	 67.	 Without	 specifically	 addressing	 this	issue,	a	majority	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	stated	in	Lipson,	supra	note	75	at	para.	21,	that	the	Canadian	 GAAR	 imposes	 a	 burden	 on	 the	 revenue	 department	 “to	 prove,	 on	 the	 balance	 of	
probabilities,	 that	 the	 avoidance	 transaction	 results	 in	 abuse	 and	misuse	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 s.	245(4)”	[emphasis	added].	272	See,	 e.g.,	De	Broe	and	Luts,	 supra	note	65	at	145,	 arguing	 that	 the	burden	of	proof	 in	 the	PPT	 is	“manifestly	unbalanced.”	
	 80	
and	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 since	 it	 requires	 taxpayers	 only	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	objects	 and	purposes	of	 the	 relevant	provisions	 are	 consistent	with	 their	 ordinary	meaning,	not	incompatible	with	their	ordinary	meaning.	As	a	result,	even	though	the	PPT	 imposes	 a	 “reversed”	 onus	on	 the	 taxpayer	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 granting	of	 a	benefit	is	in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions,	the	ultimate	effect	may	not	be	very	different	from	the	guiding	principle	or	the	Canadian	GAAR,	 since	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 expect	 that	 the	 revenue	 department	 will	 still	 be	required	 to	 go	 behind	 the	 words	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 to	 demonstrate	 why	granting	the	benefit	under	a	CTA	would	be	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions.273		 At	the	same	time,	since	the	object	and	purpose	exception	in	the	PPT	applies	where	 “it	 is	 established”	 that	 granting	 a	 benefit	 would	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 the	object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions,	 not	 where	 it	 is	 “reasonable	 to	conclude”	 or	 “clearly	 established”	 that	 granting	 a	 benefit	 would	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions,	 the	 applicable	 standard	appears	 to	 be	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 probabilities	 so	 that	 neither	 the	 taxpayer	 nor	 the	revenue	 department	 must	 “clearly	 and	 unambiguously”	 establish	 that	 granting	 a	benefit	is	either	consistent	with	or	contrary	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions.274	In	 this	 respect,	 as	 with	 the	 purpose	 test,	 the	 PPT	 imposes	 a	 lower	burden	on	the	revenue	department	than	the	guiding	principle	or	the	Canadian	GAAR.	
																																																								273	For	a	similar	conclusion,	see	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	660,	arguing	that	“[t]he	fact	that	this	criterion	was	formulated	as	an	exception	is	irrelevant.”		274	Chand	takes	a	contrary	view,	relying	on	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	in	Canada	Trustco,	
supra	note	70	at	para	50,	for	the	proposition	that	“the	benefit	of	the	doubt	…	shall	go	to	the	taxpayer.”	Chand,	supra	note	178	at	21.	Notwithstanding	the	conclusion	 in	Canada	Trustco	 (which,	as	noted	at	
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(4)	 Consequences	of	Application	Where	a	transaction	or	arrangement	results	directly	or	indirectly	in	a	benefit	under	a	CTA,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	conclude	 that	one	of	 the	principal	purposes	of	 the	transaction	 or	 arrangement	 is	 to	 obtain	 the	 benefit,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 established	 that	granting	 the	 benefit	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	provisions	of	the	CTA,	the	PPT	provides	that	the	benefit	“shall	not	be	granted”.	In	this	respect,	the	consequences	of	the	PPT’s	application	are	similar	to	those	of	the	guiding	principle,	which	states	that	“the	benefits	of	a	double	taxation	convention	should	not	be	available”	where	the	principle	applies.	Where	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 applies,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 provision	 states	that	 “the	 tax	consequences	 to	a	person	shall	be	determined	as	 is	 reasonable	 in	 the	circumstances	 in	order	to	deny	a	tax	benefit”	that	would	otherwise	result	 from	the	transaction	or	 series	of	 transactions.275	As	a	 result,	unlike	 the	PPT	and	 the	guiding	principle,	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 establishes	 an	 objective	 “reasonable	 in	 the	circumstances”	standard	for	determining	the	tax	consequences	of	its	application,	and	limits	these	tax	consequences	to	those	that	are	reasonable	“in	order	to	deny	[the]	tax	benefit”.276	Since	 the	 characterization	 of	 a	 tax	 benefit	 under	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	generally	 depends	 on	 a	 comparison	 with	 the	 tax	 consequences	 resulting	 from	 an	alternative	transaction	or	arrangement	that	“might	reasonably	have	been	carried	out	but	for	the	existence	of	the	tax	benefit,”277	moreover,	the	tax	consequences	that	are																																																																																																																																																																							supra	 note	 271,	 is	 itself	 inconsistent	with	 the	 amended	 text	 of	 subsection	 245(4)	 of	 the	 ITA),	 this	approach	is	not	consistent	with	the	text	of	the	PPT.	275	ITA,	s.	245(2).	276	Arnold	and	Wilson,	supra	note	142	at	1171-1172.	277	Copthorne	Holdings,	supra	note	107	at	para.	35,	citing	Duff,	et.	al,	Canadian	Income	Tax	Law,	supra	note	107	at	187.	
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“reasonable	 in	 the	 circumstances	 in	 order	 to	 deny	 a	 tax	 benefit”	 generally	correspond	 to	 those	 that	would	have	 resulted	under	 the	alternative	 transaction	or	arrangement.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 contains	 an	 implicit	recharacterization	principle	governing	the	tax	consequences	of	its	application.	In	contrast,	because	the	PPT	states	only	that	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	“shall	not	be	granted”	when	the	provision	applies,	the	application	of	this	provision	could	make	taxpayers	worse	off	than	they	would	have	been	under	an	alternative	transaction	or	arrangement	 that	might	 reasonably	have	been	 carried	out	 but	 for	 the	 existence	 of	the	treaty	benefit	that	is	denied.	For	example,	where	an	individual	assigns	the	right	to	 receive	 dividends	 that	 have	 been	 declared	 but	 not	 paid	 to	 a	 company	 owning	more	 than	 the	 minimum	 shareholding	 that	 is	 required	 for	 the	 lower	 rate	 of	withholding	tax	on	dividends	payments	from	a	subsidiary	to	a	parent,	the	PPT	could	deny	 the	 benefit	 of	 any	 withholding	 tax	 reduction	 under	 the	 CTA	 rather	 than	 the	benefit	of	the	lower	withholding	tax	rate.	Likewise,	where	a	taxpayer	resident	in	one	state	 assigns	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 dividends,	 interest	 or	 royalties	 to	 a	 company	resident	in	a	state	that	has	a	more	advantageous	tax	treaty	with	the	source	state	than	the	state	of	which	 the	 taxpayer	 is	a	 resident,	 the	PPT	could	also	apply	 to	deny	 the	benefit	 of	 any	 withholding	 tax	 reduction,	 rather	 than	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 reduced	withholding	tax	under	the	more	advantageous	tax	treaty.	Although	 the	 PPT	 could	 recognize	 treaty	 benefits	 that	 would	 have	 been	obtained	 under	 an	 alternative	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 if	 the	 meaning	 of	 “a	benefit	 under	 a	Covered	Tax	Agreement”	were	understood	by	 reference	 to	 the	 tax	consequences	 that	 would	 have	 resulted	 from	 this	 alternative	 transaction	 or	
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arrangement,	 this	 interpretation	 is	 less	 persuasive	 than	 the	 more	 obvious	interpretation	of	this	term	which	compares	the	tax	consequences	of	the	transaction	or	 arrangement	 to	 the	 tax	 consequences	 that	 would	 have	 resulted	 under	 the	domestic	law	of	a	contracting	jurisdiction	absent	the	CTA.278	Nor	does	the	PPT	itself	authorize	 the	 recharacterization	 of	 a	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 in	 order	 to	recognize	 alternative	 treaty	 benefits,	 though	 more	 than	 one	 commentator	 have	correctly	 observed	 that	 the	 PPT	 would	 not	 apply	 to	 a	 suitably	 recharacterized	transaction	 or	 arrangement	 if	 such	 recharacterization	 were	 available	 under	domestic	law.279	Instead,	the	MLI	contains	a	remedial	benefits	rule	authorizing	the	competent	authority	of	the	contracting	jurisdiction	that	would	have	granted	a	treaty	benefit	but	for	the	PPT	to:	…	 nevertheless	 treat	 that	 person	 as	 being	 entitled	 to	 this	 benefit,	 or	 to	 different	benefits	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 specific	 item	 of	 income	 or	 capital,	 if	 such	 competent	authority,	upon	request	from	that	person	and	after	consideration	of	the	relevant	facts	and	 circumstances,	 determines	 that	 such	benefits	would	have	been	granted	 to	 that	person	in	the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement.280		Of	 eighty-four	 jurisdictions	 that	 had	 signed	 the	 MLI	 as	 of	 18	 September	 2018,	however,	only	twenty-eight	(not	including	Canada)	had	adopted	this	provision.281	
																																																								278	See	the	discussion	at	supra	text	accompanying	notes	106-110.	279	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	51,	arguing	the	PPT	would	not	apply	where	“treaty	benefits	are	granted	 on	 a	 recharacterized	 fact	 pattern”;	 and	 Chand,	 supra	 note	 178	 at	 40,	 concluding	 that	alternative	 treaty	 benefits	 may	 be	 granted	 “if	 such	 benefits	 are	 available	 under	 domestic	 law	mechanisms.”	280	Article	7(4)	of	the	MLI.	In	this	circumstance,	the	provision	continues:	“The	competent	authority	of	the	Contracting	Jurisdiction	to	which	a	request	has	been	made	under	this	paragraph	by	a	resident	of	the	other	Contracting	Jurisdiction	shall	consult	with	the	competent	authority	of	that	other	Contracting	Jurisdiction	before	rejecting	the	request.”	281	Figures	compiled	by	the	author	 from	positions	of	signatories	available	at	OECD,	“Signatories	and	Parties	 to	 the	Multilateral	Convention	To	 Implement	Tax	Treaty	Measures	 to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting:	Status	as	of	18	September	2018”	supra	note	33.	
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As	the	commentary	on	the	OECD	model	convention	explains,	this	provision	is	intended	 to	 allow	 the	 competent	 authority	 of	 a	 Contracting	 State	 to	 “have	 the	possibility”	 of	 treating	 a	 person	who	 is	 denied	 a	 benefit	 under	 the	 PPT	 “as	 being	entitled	 to	 this	benefit,	or	 to	different	benefits	with	respect	 to	 the	relevant	 item	of	income	 or	 capital,	 if	 such	 benefits	would	 have	 been	 granted	 to	 that	 person	 in	 the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement”	that	triggered	application	of	the	PPT.282	For	example,	the	commentary		explains,	where	an		individual	who	is	resident	in	State	R	and	owns	shares	of	SCo,	which	 is	resident	 in	State	S,	assigns	 the	right	 to	receive	dividends	declared	by	SCo	to	another	company	resident	in	State	R	which	owns	more	than	10	percent	 of	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 paying	 company	 for	 the	 principal	 purpose	 of	obtaining	a	reduced	rate	of	withholding	tax	under	article	10(2)(a)	of	the	treaty,	and	the	PPT	applies,	this	provision	would:	 	…	allow	the	competent	authority	of	State	S	to	grant	the	benefit	of	 the	reduced	rate	provided	 for	 in	 subparagraph	 b)	 of	 paragraph	 2	 of	 Article	 10	 if	 that	 competent	authority	determined	that	such	benefit	would	have	been	granted	 in	 the	absence	of	the	assignment	to	another	company	of	the	right	to	receive	dividends.283			 Although	 this	 provision	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 remedial	 benefits,	 it	 is	poorly	drafted	since	it	limits	these	benefits	to	those	that	would	have	been	granted	to	the	same	person	(“that	person”)	in	the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement.	As	the	 above	 example	 indicates,	 however,	 the	 alternative	 treaty	 benefits	 might	 have	been	granted	to	a	different	person	than	the	person	whose	treaty	benefits	are	denied																																																									282	Paragraph	184	of	 the	 commentary	on	article	29	of	 the	OECD	model	 convention.	 See	also	 ibid.	 at	paragraph	185,	emphasizing	that	the	provision	grants	broad	discretion	to	the	competent	authority	to	which	the	request	is	made	to	determine	whether	a	benefit	would	have	been	granted	in	the	absence	of	an	 arrangement	 or	 transaction	 subject	 to	 the	 PPT,	 but	 also	 noting	 that	 the	 provision	 requires	 the	competent	authority	 to	consider	all	 the	relevant	 facts	and	circumstances	before	reaching	a	decision	and	 requires	 the	 competent	 authority	 to	 consult	 with	 the	 competent	 authority	 of	 the	 other	Contracting	State	before	rejecting	a	request	brought	by	a	resident	of	the	other	Contracting	State.	283	Paragraph	186	of	the	commentary	on	article	29	of	the	OECD	model	convention.	
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under	 the	 PPT.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 preferable	 to	 provide	 for	alternative	benefits	 to	be	 granted	 if	 the	 competent	 authority	determines	 that	 such	benefits	“would	have	been	granted	in	the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement”	regardless	of	the	person	to	whom	they	would	have	been	granted.284		 More	generally,	this	provision	is	also	deficient	because	it	leaves	the	decision	to	 grant	 alternative	 benefits	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 competent	 authority	 of	 the	contracting	 jurisdiction	 that	would	 have	 granted	 a	 treaty	 benefit	 but	 for	 the	 PPT,	subject	only	to	the	requirement	that	it	consult	the	competent	authority	of	the	other	contracting	 jurisdiction	 before	 rejecting	 a	 request	 for	 such	 benefits.	 Instead,	 as	 at	least	 one	 commentator	 has	 suggested,	 the	 right	 to	 alternative	 benefits	 should	 be	automatic,285	and	 any	 penalty	 associated	 with	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 should	 be	levied	explicitly	rather	than	implicitly	through	the	denial	of	other	treaty	benefits	that	would	otherwise	have	been	available.		 Finally,	it	is	unfortunate	that	neither	the	MLI	nor	the	OECD	model	convention	nor	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	OECD	model	 convention	 address	 the	 consequences	 in	the	other	contracting	jurisdiction	where	one	contracting	jurisdiction	applies	the	PPT	to	deny	benefits	 that	would	otherwise	have	been	available	under	 the	CTA.286	Since	the	elimination	of	double	 taxation	article	 in	a	CTA	obliges	 the	state	of	residence	to	allow	a	credit	for	income	tax	paid	in	the	source	state	where	this	income	is	taxed	“in	accordance	 with	 the	 provisions”	 of	 the	 CTA,	 the	 denial	 of	 treaty	 benefits	 by	 the	source	 state	 should	 create	 a	 corresponding	 obligation	 on	 the	 residence	 state	 to	
																																																								284	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	52.	285	Ibid.	286	For	a	useful	discussion	of	possible	challenges,	see	Lang,	supra	note	82	at	662-663.	
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credit	 the	 increased	 tax	 that	 must	 be	 paid	 in	 the	 source	 state.	 The	 extent	 of	 this	obligation,	 however,	 will	 presumably	 depend	 on	whether	 the	 source	 state	 applies	the	PPT	 to	deny	 all	 treaty	benefits	 or	 grants	 treaty	benefits	 that	would	have	been	granted	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement.	Where	 the	 contracting	jurisdictions	disagree	about	application	of	the	PPT	or	the	appropriate	consequences,	double	taxation	is	 likely	and	resort	to	the	mutual	agreement	procedure	may	be	the	only	alternative.287	
Conclusion		 Although	based	 on	 the	OECD’s	 guiding	 principle	 and	 similar	 in	 structure	 to	many	 domestic	 GAARs	 including	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR,	 the	 PPT	 represents	 a	significant	 development	 in	 international	 tax	 law,	 adding	 a	 general	 anti-abuse	provision	to	all	CTAs	as	well	as	other	tax	treaties	that	follow	the	2017	OECD	model	convention.	 As	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	 domestic	 GAARs,	 the	 PPT	 will	 pose	 new	challenges	 for	 tax	 practitioners,	 revenue	 authorities	 and	 adjudicators,	 since	 treaty	benefits	 that	 would	 previously	 have	 resulted	 from	 tax-motivated	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 may	 now	 be	 denied	 under	 the	 PPT.	 These	 challenges	 may	 be	compounded	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 PPT	will	 apply	 to	multiple	 tax	 treaties	 among	many	 jurisdictions,	 which	 may	 not	 adopt	 similar	 approaches	 to	 tax	 treaty	interpretation	generally	or	the	PPT	in	particular.288	As	a	result,	over	the	short	run	at	
																																																								287	Taboada,	supra	note	142	at	606.	288	For	 a	 pessimistic	 assessment,	 see	 Philip	 Baker,	 “The	Multilateral	 Convention	 to	 Implement	 Tax	Treaty	Related	Measures	to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting”	[2017]	Brit.	Tax	Rev.	281	at	283,	concluding	 that:	 “There	 is	every	reason	 to	 fear	 that,	once	 the	MLI	 is	 in	 force	and	a	 large	number	of	countries	 (including	 ones	 with	 tax	 authorities	 that	 do	 not	 have	 a	 reputation	 for	 predictable	interpretation	 of	 tax	 treaties)	 begin	 to	 apply	 the	 PPT,	 this	will	 undermine	 the	whole	 system	of	 tax	treaty	benefits.”	
	 87	
least,	the	PPT	can	be	expected	to	increase	uncertainty	in	international	tax	planning	and	 lead	 to	an	 increased	number	of	 tax	 treaty	disputes289	–	a	 result	 that	 the	OECD	itself	 anticipates	 in	 also	 seeking	 to	 make	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanisms	 more	effective	through	BEPS	Action	14.290	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	pre-BEPS	responses	to	tax	treaty	shopping	and	other	perceived	tax	treaty	abuses	have	themselves	been	varied	and	inconsistently	applied,	and	that	the	PPT	is	intended	not	only	to	intended	to	both	strengthen	 treaty-based	 responses	 to	 perceived	 tax	 treaty	 abuses	 but	 also	 to	promote	 greater	 consistency	 in	 these	 responses	 through	 a	 single	 anti-abuse	provision	which	all	 signatories	 to	 the	MLI	have	chosen	 to	adopt	 in	order	 to	satisfy	the	 OECD’s	 minimum	 standards	 on	 tax	 treaty	 abuse	 under	 BEPS	 Action	 6.	 If	 this	objective	of	increased	consistency	is	to	be	realized,	however,	it	is	important	that	tax	practitioners,	 revenue	 authorities	 and	 adjudicators	 understand	 why	 the	 PPT	 was	adopted,	how	 it	 relates	 to	other	anti-avoidance	doctrines,	principles	and	 rules,	 the	requirements	for	and	consequences	of	its	application,	and	the	kinds	of	transactions	or	arrangements	 to	which	 it	may	reasonably	be	expected	 to	apply.	 It	 is	 to	 this	end	that	this	article	is	directed.	Briefly	recapping,	the	first	part	of	this	article	surveyed	pre-BEPS	responses	to	tax	 treaty	 shopping	 and	 other	 perceived	 tax	 treaty	 abuses,	 providing	 necessary	background	and	context	for	understanding	BEPS	Action	4,	the	MLI,	the	PPT,	and	the	kinds	of	 transactions	or	arrangements	 to	which	 the	PPT	can	be	expected	 to	apply.	
																																																								289	See,	e.g.,	Danon,	supra	note	69	at	32;	and	Kużniacki,	supra	note	120	at	32.	290	OECD,	Making	Dispute	Resolution	Mechanisms	More	Effective,	BEPS	Action	14:	2015	Final	Report,	(Paris:	OECD,	2015).	
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Building	on	this	analysis,	the	second	part	of	the	article	has	examined	the	PPT	in	the	context	 of	 BEPS	 Action	 4	 and	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	 MLI,	 considering	 the	relationship	 between	 this	 general	 anti-abuse	 provision	 and	 other	 anti-avoidance	doctrines,	 principles	 and	 rules,	 and	 the	 various	 elements	 that	 comprise	 its	 basic	structure	including	the	various	tests	that	must	be	satisfied	for	the	provision	to	apply	as	well	as	the	consequences	of	its	application.	With	respect	to	other	anti-avoidance	doctrines,	principles	and	rules,	it	seems	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 PPT	 will,	 where	 applicable,	 displace	 the	 “guiding	principle”	 in	 the	 commentary	 on	 the	OECD	model	 convention,291	but	 not	 domestic	anti-avoidance	 doctrines	 and	 statutory	 anti-avoidance	 rules,	 which	 should	 be	considered	prior	to	the	PPT	since	these	doctrines	and	rules	generally	determine	the	characterization	of	transactions	or	arrangements	to	which	tax	treaty	apply.292	In	this	respect,	as	with	treaty-based	SAARs,	the	PPT	is	properly	regarded	as	a	provision	of	“last	resort”	that	should	not	be	used	to	augment	the	tax	consequences	resulting	from	the	 application	of	 other	 anti-avoidance	doctrines	 or	 rules.293	Where	 a	 treaty-based	SAAR	does	not	 apply	 to	 a	 transaction	or	 arrangement,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 the	PPT	may	apply	if	the	transaction	or	arrangement	circumvents	the	SAAR	in	a	manner	that	contradicts	its	underlying	object	and	purpose.294	Likewise,	 it	appears	as	though	the	PPT	may	also	apply	to	transactions	or	arrangements	that	would	otherwise	be	subject	
																																																								291	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 66-69	 under	 the	 heading	 “Relationship	 to	 Implicit	 Anti-Abuse	Principle”.	292 	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 57-65	 under	 the	 heading	 “Relationship	 to	 Domestic	 Anti-Avoidance	Doctrines	and	Statutory	Anti-Avoidance	Rules”.	293	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 70-75	 under	 the	 heading	 “Relationship	 to	 Specific	 Treaty	 Anti-Abuse	Rules	in	a	CTA”.	294	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 76-83	 under	 the	 heading	 “Relationship	 to	 Specific	 Treaty	 Anti-Abuse	Rules	in	a	CTA”.	
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to	 treaty-based	 SAARs	 that	 do	 not	 modify	 a	 particular	 CTA	 or	 are	 not	 otherwise	included	in	the	CTA.295	Regarding	 the	structure	of	 the	PPT	 itself,	 application	of	 this	provision	 turns	on	the	satisfaction	of	three	tests:	(1)	a	result	test,	which	requires	that	a	transaction	or	 arrangement	 has	 resulted	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 in	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA;	 (2)	 a	purpose	test	that	applies	where	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude,	having	regard	to	all	the	relevant	facts	and	circumstances,	that	obtaining	the	benefit	was	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement;	and	(3)	an	object	and	purpose	test	that	excludes	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 from	 application	 of	 the	 PPT	 where	 it	 is	established	 that	 granting	 the	 benefit	 would	 be	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 object	 and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	CTA.	Where	the	first	two	tests	are	satisfied	and	 the	 third	 is	 not,	 the	 PPT	 denies	 the	 benefit	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 granted	under	the	CTA.	The	 result	 test	 requires	 a	 connection	 or	 nexus	 between	 the	 transaction	 or	arrangement	 and	 the	 benefit,	 which	 may	 be	 easily	 established	 where	 a	 single	transaction	results	in	a	benefit,	but	could	be	more	difficult	to	identify	where	a	benefit	results	 indirectly	 from	 another	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 or	 from	 several	transactions	that	may	or	may	not	comprise	an	arrangement	for	the	purposes	of	the	PPT.	However,	since	the	concept	of	an	arrangement	may	be	broadly	understood	to	include	 an	 extended	 series	 of	 transactions,	 and	 the	 PPT	 clearly	 applies	 where	benefits	 are	 obtained	 indirectly	 as	 well	 as	 directly,	 this	 test	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 easily	
																																																								295	Supra	 text	 accompanying	notes	 84-100	under	 the	 heading	 “Relationship	 to	 Specific	 Treaty	Anti-Abuse	Rules	not	Included	in	a	CTA”.	
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satisfied.296	Unlike	the	Canadian	GAAR,	for	which	the	concept	of	a	tax	benefit	may	be	interpreted	 by	 reference	 to	 a	 benchmark	 transaction	 that	 might	 reasonably	 have	been	 carried	 out	 but	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 tax	 benefit,	 the	 most	 reasonable	interpretation	of	a	benefit	under	a	CTA	relates	 to	 the	tax	consequences	that	would	have	resulted	under	the	domestic	law	of	the	relevant	contracting	jurisdiction	absent	the	CTA.297	The	purpose	test	requires	an	objective	assessment	of	the	principal	purposes	of	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 one	 of	 these	purposes	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.298	Interpreting	similar	language	in	the	context	of	domestic	tax	provisions,	U.K.	decisions	have	held	that	a	principal	purpose	“has	 a	 connotation	 of	 importance”299	and	 that	 a	 principal	 purpose	 of	 a	 transaction	may	be	to	obtain	a	tax	advantage	even	if	the	transaction	had	a	commercial	objective	at	 least	 as	 important	 as	 the	 tax	 advantage.300	As	 a	 result,	 the	 threshold	 for	 this	purpose	 test	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 threshold	 in	most	domestic	GAARs	which	generally	apply	only	where	the	sole	or	dominant	purpose	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	to	obtain	 a	 tax	 benefit,	 and	 lower	 than	 the	 threshold	 in	 the	 Canadian	 GAAR	 which	applies	where	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	undertaken	primarily	to	obtain	a	tax	benefit.301	Since	the	purposes	test	applies	where	 it	 is	 “reasonable	to	conclude”	 that	one	of	the	principal	purposes	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	is	to	obtain	a	benefit,	it																																																									296	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 117-134	 under	 the	 headings	 “Transaction	 or	 Arrangement”	 and	“Benefit	Results	Directly	or	Indirectly	from	the	Transaction	or	Arrangement”.	297	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	101-116	under	the	heading	“Benefit	under	a	CTA”.	298 	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 139-152	 under	 the	 heading	 “Purpose	 of	 a	 Transaction	 or	Arrangement”	and	notes	187-193	under	the	heading	“Reasonableness	of	Conclusion”.	299	Travel	Document	Service,	supra	note	167	at	para.	48.	300	Lloyds	TSB	Equipment	Leasing	(TCC),	supra	note	168	at	para.	82.	301	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 153-181	 under	 the	 heading	 “One	 of	 the	 Principal	 Purposes	 of	 a	Transaction	or	Arrangement”.	
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also	imposes	a	relatively	low	burden	on	the	revenue	authority,	effectively	requiring	taxpayers	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 would	 be	 unreasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 a	 principal	purpose	of	a	transaction	or	arrangement	was	to	obtain	a	benefit	under	a	CTA.302	As	a	result,	 the	purpose	test	 in	the	PPT	may	also	be	easy	to	satisfy,	as	a	result	of	which	application	 of	 the	 provision	 will	 turn	 primarily	 on	 whether	 granting	 the	 benefit	would	be	in	accordance	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	CTA.303	The	 object	 and	 purpose	 test	 requires	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 “relevant	provisions”	of	the	CTA	as	well	as	their	underlying	objects	and	purposes,	in	order	to	determine	 whether	 granting	 a	 treaty	 benefit	 in	 the	 circumstances	 would	 be	 in	accordance	 with	 these	 objects	 and	 purposes.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 specific	 provision	that	is	relied	upon	to	obtain	the	benefit,	relevant	provisions	include	other	provisions	that	are	circumvented	by	the	transaction	or	arrangement,	as	well	as	provisions	of	the	CTA	 (including	 the	 preamble)	 read	 as	 a	 whole	 –	 which	 reflect	 the	 objects	 and	purposes	of	the	CTA	more	generally.304	Since	contracting	jurisdictions	to	the	MLI	are	required	 to	 adopt	 the	 amended	 preamble	 language	 in	 article	 6(1)	 in	 order	 to	implement	 the	 minimum	 standard	 on	 BEPS	 Action	 6,	 this	 amended	 preamble	language	 will	 be	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 cases	 of	 tax	 treaty	 shopping.305	Other	relevant	provisions	may	include	provisions	of	the	MLI	of	model	treaties	that	are	not	included	 in	 the	 particular	 CTA	 –	 though	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 provisions	 will	presumably	depend	on	extrinsic	evidence	of	whether	the	parties	intended	to	permit																																																									302	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	194-195	under	the	heading	“Reasonableness	of	Conclusion”.	303	Supra	text	accompanying	note	196	under	the	heading	“Reasonableness	of	Conclusion”.	304	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	201-208	under	the	heading		“Relevant	Provisions”.	305	Supra	text	accompanying	note	205	under	the	heading	“Relevant	Provisions”.	
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transactions	 or	 arrangements	 that	 might	 otherwise	 be	 prohibited	 by	 these	provisions	or	intended	to	rely	on	the	more	general	language	of	the	PPT	to	challenge	these	transactions	or	arrangements	without	adopting	the	detailed	limitation	of	these	SAARs.306		Unlike	 ordinary	 interpretation,	 in	 which	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 a	provision	 is	 relied	upon	 in	order	 to	 interpret	 its	 ordinary	meaning,	 the	object	 and	purpose	 test	 in	 the	 PPT	 looks	 to	 the	 rationale	 that	 underlies	 the	 words	 of	 the	provision	or	the	treaty	as	a	whole,	which	may	not	be	 fully	expressed	by	the	words	themselves.307	Although	these	objects	and	purposes	may	be	inferred	from	the	text	of	the	 relevant	 provision,	 they	 may	 also	 be	 explained	 in	 extrinsic	 materials	 like	 the	commentary	 on	 the	 OECD	 model	 convention,	 or	 construed	 in	 light	 of	 the	 more	general	 objects	 and	 purposes	 of	 the	 CTA	 as	 a	 whole.308 	Once	 the	 objects	 and	purposes	of	the	relevant	provisions	are	determined,	a	second	stage	of	the	object	and	purpose	analysis	involves	a	factual	assessment	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	at	issue	 to	 determine	whether	 granting	 a	 benefit	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 these	 objects	and	purposes.309	Statements	 and	examples	 in	 the	 commentary	on	 the	OECD	model	convention	 suggest	 that	 this	 will	 generally	 be	 the	 case	 for	 transactions	 or	arrangements	 involving	 genuine	 cross-border	 economic	 activities,	 but	 not	 for	transactions	or	arrangements	with	little	or	no	real	economic	substance.310	
																																																								306	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	209-211	under	the	heading	“Relevant	Provisions”.	307	Supra	 text	accompanying	note	213	under	 the	heading	“Treaty	Benefit	 in	Accordance	with	Object	and	Purpose	of	Relevant	Provisions”.	308	Supra	 text	accompanying	notes	215-225	under	the	heading	“Interpreting	the	Object	and	Purpose	of	a	Treaty	Provision”.	309	Supra	note	212	and	accompanying	text.	310	Supra	 text	accompanying	notes	182-1867	under	 the	heading	“One	of	 the	Principal	Purposes	of	a	Transaction	or	Arrangement”	and	notes	226-268	under	the	heading	“Assessing	the	Facts”.	
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In	 contrast	 to	 the	object	 and	purpose	 tests	 in	 the	 guiding	principle	 and	 the	Canadian	GAAR,	which	operate	as	additional	requirements	that	must	be	satisfied	in	order	 to	 deny	 benefits	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 available	 under	 an	 ordinary	interpretation	of	the	relevant	provisions,	the	object	and	purpose	test	in	the	PPT	is	an	exception	 to	 the	 general	 anti-abuse	 provision	 that	 allows	 benefits	 that	 would	otherwise	 be	 denied	where	 it	 is	 established	 that	 granting	 the	 benefit	would	 be	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions.	 Although	 this	shifts	the	onus	from	the	revenue	authorities	to	the	taxpayer,	the	ultimate	effect	may	be	negligible	since	the	guiding	principle	and	the	Canadian	GAAR	require	the	revenue	authorities	 to	 go	 behind	 the	words	 of	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 to	 demonstrate	 that	granting	a	benefit	would	be	contrary	to	the	objects	and	purposes	of	these	provisions,	while	 the	PPT	 requires	 taxpayers	 to	 argue	only	 that	 granting	 a	 benefit	 that	would	otherwise	be	available	under	the	ordinary	interpretation	of	the	relevant	provisions	is	also	consistent	with	their	underlying	objects	and	purposes	–	which	shifts	the	onus	back	 to	 the	 revenue	 authorities	 to	 establish	 that	 granting	 the	 benefit	 would	 be	contrary	to	the	objects	and	purposes	of	these	provisions.311	Finally,	 since	 the	 PPT	 states	 only	 that	 a	 benefit	 under	 a	 CTA	 “shall	 not	 be	granted”	 if	 the	 provision	 applies,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	 provision	 could	 have	punitive	consequences	–	denying	not	only	a	treaty	benefit	that	would	have	resulted	from	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 at	 issue	 but	 also	 other	 treaty	 benefits	 that	would	 have	 resulted	 under	 an	 alternative	 transaction	 or	 arrangement	 that	 might	
																																																								311	Supra	 text	 accompanying	 note	 272	 under	 the	 heading	 “Effect	 of	 Object	 and	 Purpose	 Test	 as	 an	Exception”.	
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otherwise	 have	 been	 carried	 out. 312 	Although	 the	 MLI	 includes	 a	 provision	authorizing	the	competent	authority	of	the	contracting	jurisdiction	that	would	have	granted	 treaty	benefits	but	 for	 the	PPT	 to	grant	 remedial	benefits	 to	 a	person	 if	 it	determines	 that	 these	 benefits	 would	 have	 been	 granted	 to	 that	 person	 in	 the	absence	of	the	transaction	or	arrangement	at	issue,	this	provision	is	deficient	since	it	limits	these	benefits	to	those	that	would	have	been	granted	to	the	same	person	in	the	absence	 of	 the	 transaction	 or	 arrangement,	 depends	 discretion	 of	 the	 competent	authority	 of	 the	 contracting	 jurisdiction	 that	 would	 otherwise	 have	 granted	 the	benefit,	 and	 does	 not	 address	 the	 obligations	 of	 a	 residence	 states	 to	 make	adjustments	consequential	on	application	of	the	PPT	by	a	source	state.313	Aside	from	these	deficiencies,	it	is	unfortunate	that	of	eight-four	signatories	to	the	MLI	as	of	18	September	2018	only	twenty-eight	(not	including	Canada)	indicated	that	they	would	adopt	this	remedial	benefits	provision.314	Although	this	may	suggest	that	contracting	jurisdictions	intend	that	the	PPT	should	have	punitive	consequences,	it	may	also	be	the	 case	 that	 contracting	 jurisdictions	 have	 not	 fully	 considered	 the	 potential	consequences	of	the	PPT’s	application.	Indeed,	if	these	punitive	consequences	make	revenue	 authorities	 and	 adjudicators	 reluctant	 to	 apply	 the	 PPT	 in	 the	 first	 place,	failure	to	adopt	the	remedial	benefits	provision	may	undermine	the	potential	role	of	the	PPT.	
																																																								312	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	273-277	under	the	heading	“Consequences	of	Application”.	313	Supra	text	accompanying	notes	278-285	under	the	heading	“Consequences	of	Application”	314	Figures	compiled	by	the	author	 from	positions	of	signatories	available	at	OECD,	“Signatories	and	Parties	 to	 the	Multilateral	Convention	To	 Implement	Tax	Treaty	Measures	 to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting:	Status	as	of	18	September	2018”	supra	note	33.	
